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Foreword
Sustainability standards are an important element of any strategy that aims at
accelerating action towards implementing the Sustainable Development Goals and
the Paris Climate Agreement. These agendas were both adopted in 2015, the year in
which the collaborative work on this book commenced. Spirits were high then, and
confidence in the ability of multilateralism to tackle global challenges grew again.
In the end of 2019, it is a source of deep joy to see the final product and to know
that it will soon be shared across the network of authors, their institutions and the
communities of research and practice that they belong to.
The intellectual adventure that lured the editors and authors into writing was
based on the hypothesis underlying any international cooperation initiative: putting
resources together beyond national borders increases our understanding of global
problems and our possibilities of implementing solutions to them. In fact, the
interest in learning from others across the world in order to increase the shared body
of knowledge has always been an important motive of scientific activity. And a
success factor, too, as intellectual curiosity and cooperation helped to push the
geographical and epistemological boundaries of the known world ever further.
Five years after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Climate
Agreement, we know that “we are not on track” as the UN Secretary General,
António Guterres, put it in September 2019 when speaking at the SDG and climate
action summits. More ambition and more action are needed, domestically and
globally, as well as renewed investment in international cooperation. Global
greenhouse gas emissions are growing instead of falling, and global trade is stalled
by tensions between what used to be strong trading partners. At the same time,
companies and investors are increasingly realising that the sustainable development
goals and the climate agreement actually speak the language of reason in a world
threatened by unmitigated climate change, social polarization and unrest. In this
situation, it is most useful to be presented an analysis of what sustainability stan-
dards are, their strengths and weaknesses, and under which conditions their
potential can best be realised, particularly in emerging economies.
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The questions agreed by editors and authors in 2015 which this book seeks to
answer remain most pertinent: How can public mandatory regulation for sustain-
ability and voluntary standards for the same purpose be designed to promote
complementarity between public and private collective action and thus accelerate
change? What is the role of global norm-setting institutions, such as the WTO, to
ensure that the growing number of voluntary private standards that in fact regulate
access to global trade and value chains does not create new barriers? How to ensure
that sustainability standards and regulations of dominating markets support inno-
vation in exporting firms in the South and at the same time do not hinder the
creation of locally adapted rules and standards for sustainability? How to better
understand the needs of smallholders in agriculture and SMEs and enable them to
participate in growing sustainability markets? Do corporate social responsibility
commitments and sustainability reporting help to align companies’ core objectives
and performance indicators with the SDGs?
The book provides some answers to these questions, which hopefully will be
picked up by its readers, in academia, in public policy and companies’ strategies,
and in everyone’s practice, to achieve the accelerated action we need. The book’s
insights also inevitably lead to new research questions that can contribute to new
and enhanced learning processes.
I thank the editors of this book, Archna Negi, Jorge Antonio Pérez-Pineda and
Johannes Blankenbach, for their dedication and perseverance, as well as all con-
tributors, for their interest in understanding the potential and the problems of
sustainability standards in making global trade more compatible with social
inclusion, the reduction of inequalities, sharing benefits and significantly reducing
the environmental burden of production, consumption and trade of goods and
services. May this book find avid readers and practitioners ready to invest in
change!








Complex interfaces and dynamics of a global nature mark not only the subject
matter of this book but also the process through which it was produced. The unique
nature of this book necessitates a brief introduction to the project from which it
resulted. We believe that it represents an innovative experiment in ‘knowledge
cooperation’ that involved a coming together of scholars and practitioners from the
global South and North to jointly ponder upon the conceptual aspects of a chosen
theme, enriched by empirical insights from the ‘emerging economies’.
This project has taken shape under the knowledge cooperation component of the
Managing Global Governance (MGG) programme run by the Bonn-based German
Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) with the
financial support of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ). The MGG programme, initiated in 2007, is a training and
dialogue programme designed for young professionals from the ‘emerging powers’
and Germany to converge under the broad theme of ‘global governance’ (See
https://www.die-gdi.de/en/managing-global-governance/). The ‘MGG Academy’
has run for about 13 years now (until 2020), having completed 17 MGG courses so
far—located mainly in Bonn. The MGG programme has created a rich alumni and
partner network amongst a group of countries—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, South Africa and Germany/Europe—which are a part of the programme
(as were Egypt and Pakistan for some years). MGG works with young professionals
as well as senior experts located in government bodies, research institutions, aca-
demia, think tanks, civil society organizations, private sector organizations, etc. to
jointly discuss and contribute to knowledge cooperation on issues of global gov-
ernance. This book project was one such activity that emerged from ‘knowledge
cooperation’ within the MGG alumni network, led and supported by the DIE.
The project was initiated in January 2015, when the theme for the project was
finalized and a Call for Papers was conceptualized under the guidance of the three
co-directors, located across three continents—in India, Mexico and Germany. The
first project workshop, which took place in Bonn in May 2015, brought together all
the alumni from previous MGG programmes who had sent in paper proposals. The
research proposals were thoroughly assessed and the possible shape that could be
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given to the project discussed in detail. This initial meeting was followed by several
others, such as an authors’ workshop in New Delhi in April 2016, where paper
contributors were invited for further discussion.
The co-directors also met on the sidelines of several other international events to
which the project got closely linked as it took shape. For instance, the thematic
content of the project was found to be relevant to the THINK 20 (T20) process
—‘the research and policy advice network for the G20’—and thus fed into the T20
Conference in Berlin in May 2016, followed by the T20 Germany Kick-Off
Conference in December 2016 in Berlin.
The MGG Knowledge Cooperation project also linked up with the activities
of the United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS), a UN hub for
informed policy dialogue and independent research on the potential as well as
challenges of sustainability standards, and co-hosted the high-level launch event
of the 2nd Flagship UNFSS Report in Berlin in October 2016. At this event, much
discussion was held on the then recently launched (on 18 March 2016) and
UNFSS-supported Indian Platform on Private Sustainability Standards.
Subsequently, the Brazilian Voluntary Standards Platform was launched in
May/June 2017 in Brasilia and Sao Paulo and the Chinese National Platform on
VSS was launched soon thereafter in Qingdao, in June 2017. The MGG programme
was represented and participated actively in both events. In September 2017, the
UNFSS held various conferences on sustainability standards in collaboration with
the International Trade Centre (ITC), the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and MGG. A subsequent MGG workshop on sustain-
ability standards took place in Mexico City in December 2017, hosted by the
Mexican Ministry of the Economy, and in April 2018, the Mexican Platform for
Voluntary Sustainability Standards was launched. Another MGG Conference on
sustainability standards was organized in Jakarta, Indonesia, in November 2018 to
explore the possibility of setting up a National Platform on VSS in Indonesia.
Earlier the same year, in September 2018, the 3rd Flagship Report of the UNFSS—
titled Voluntary Sustainability Standards, Trade and Development—was launched
at the first International Convention on Sustainable Trade and Standards (ICSTS)
held in New Delhi, India and contained a chapter contributed by the DIE MGG
network. MGG participation in several international conferences on sustainability
standards continued through 2019, including the second ICSTS that was held in Rio
de Janeiro in September 2019, and an international conference on stakeholders’
perspectives on sustainability standards, organized by DIE, UNFSS and the South
African Bureau of Standards (SABS) in Pretoria, South Africa in November 2019.
It has indeed been timely and fortuitous that significant developments have taken
place at the international as well as domestic levels—in the emerging economies—
in the context of sustainability standards, including a focus on the challenges and
pitfalls pertaining to them. The project has been able to create direct links with
many of these new processes, thereby gaining from—and, it is hoped, also con-
tributing to and enriching—this dialogue amongst researchers and practitioners
from across the world.
viii Preface
Sadly, future planned activities were interrupted (temporarily, it is hoped) in
2020 by the unanticipated outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It should be
pointed out here that developments relating to the COVID-19 situation are not
reflected in the content of this book as the project predated the outbreak and the
manuscript was finalized in 2019. However, the global nature of the threat to public
health, and the consequent economic and social disruptions across the world, will
undoubtedly reinforce the debates relating to sustainability concerns and the role of
global governance in addressing them. More specifically, incidences of workers at
the bottom of global supply chains being abandoned by big brands or having to
work without proper health and safety measures during the current crisis are likely
to refocus the debates around sustainability standards and underscore the urgency to
resolve many of the questions raised in this book—so that the world can “build
back better” after this crisis.
New Delhi, India Archna Negi




Managing Global Governance (MGG) is implemented by the German Development
Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) with financial support




This publication is a product of cooperation amongst project partners, participants
and peers located across several continents and time zones, and traversing varied
national, disciplinary and professional locations. It has taken large doses of patience
and perseverance to reach its present form. We would like to thank everyone who
participated in this endeavour of ‘knowledge cooperation’ on the seminal and
topical theme of sustainability standards. In this ‘wheel’ (of knowledge coopera-
tion), the Managing Global Governance (MGG) programme has constituted the
‘hub’ that connected the ‘spokes’ (the project participants). The German
Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), which
implements the MGG programme, was the connector that brought together MGG
alumni as well as researchers located at DIE to write on an identified theme of
common interest.
Our foremost and sincere thanks go out to all MGG alumni and DIE researchers
who have contributed as authors to this publication. Discussions that took place in
Berlin, Bonn, Brasilia, New Delhi, Qingdao, São Paulo, Geneva, Mexico City,
Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro and Pretoria have contributed immensely to the richness of
this publication. We also acknowledge the additional lustre this project acquired
from its intersection with researchers and personnel of several institutions working
on the theme of sustainability standards such as the United Nations Forum on
Sustainability Standards (UNFSS), the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Environment (UNE), the
International Trade Centre (ITC), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
THINK 20 (T20) process, the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling
Alliance (ISEAL Alliance) and the National Platforms on Sustainability/Private
Standards located in India, Brazil, China and Mexico.
We acknowledge with gratitude the financial support provided to the MGG
programme by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ), which made the project possible. At DIE, we thank Prof. Dr.
Imme Scholz (Deputy Director), Dr. Sven Grimm (Head of Programme, Inter- and
xi
Transnational Cooperation), Dr. Wulf Reiners (Head of Managing Global
Governance), Dr. Tatjana Reiber (Head of the MGG Academy) and Dr. Ariel
Hernandez (Researcher), for providing unwavering support to this project. Prof. Dr.
Dirk Messner (former Director, DIE), who oversaw the initiation of this project is
also gratefully acknowledged. We further thank Cornelia Hornschild, Bettina Beer,
Rita Klüwer and Sabine Middecke at DIE for so efficiently handling and coordi-
nating the publication, technical, and logistics-related aspects of the project, and the
entire MGG team at DIE for providing contant motivation. Thanks to Sayan
Samanta for providing helpful conceptual inputs. Finally, but most importantly, we
would like to express our sincere gratitude to Dr. Thomas Fues (former Head of the
Training Department at DIE) not only for his vision, patience, contribution and care
towards nurturing this publication but also for having played a seminal role in
holding the vast MGG alumni network worldwide together.
June 2020 Dr. Archna Negi
archnanegisingh@gmail.com
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Johannes Blankenbach, Archna Negi, and Jorge Antonio Pérez-Pineda
1 Thematic Context
While accelerated economic globalization may have generated additional employ-
ment and income worldwide, it has also been one of the drivers of unsustainable
production and consumption patterns across the globe. Every day, conditions of
production somewhere in the world infringe on human health and wellbeing, often
far away from the place where the goods and services are eventually purchased by
the end consumer. Likewise, current production and consumption models exceed
planetary limitations to human activity in many ways, causing irreversible damage
to the environment and earth system. These impacts of economic activity are, in
principle, recognized today and manifest as key sustainability concerns.
The objective of sustainability is being pursued through multiple routes at many
different levels by a variety of actors. The focus of this edited volume is on sustain-
ability standards (and sustainability regulations) as an important vehicle to make
global consumption and production more sustainable. The different contributions
also shed light on the link between sustainability standards and global governance.
The scope of global governance has been thus described by the Commission on
Global Governance:
Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private,
manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal
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institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, aswell as informal arrangements
that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. […] At
the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships,
but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
citizens’movements,multinational corporations, and the global capitalmarket. (Commission
on Global Governance, 1995, p. 2)
Sustainability standards and regulations, in general, are meant to achieve a spec-
trum of societal objectives by attaching certain criteria to commodities and their
production. In theory, they aspire to achieve the social, cultural and environmental
values that consumers wish to see promoted in society. Given the growing quantum
of commodities crossing international borders, standards, when attached to interna-
tional trade, can be an extremely effective means of promoting a certain set of values.
Estimates from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) show
that standards and regulations have an impact on approximately 80 percent of the
world’s trade in commodities.
The increasing use of sustainability standards in production and trade, and across
global value chains, has opened up several lines of questioning and contesta-
tion—How are standards to be defined? Who defines standards (or whose inter-
ests are reflected in standards)? How are standards to be differentiated from regula-
tions?What could be the advantages and limitations of purely voluntary approaches?
How do standards deal with the problem of competition, given the multiplicity of
standards that apply simultaneously to products? How do private and public stan-
dards co-exist (collaboration or competition?) with each other in the same space?
What are the differential implications of standards—(1) for the developing countries
with less wherewithal to meet the financial implications flowing from the use of
standards vis-a-vis the industrialized countries, who are often the sources of these
standards; and (2) for big firms with absorptive capacity for additional costs and
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially in developing countries and
emerging economies, who suffer from both capacity and information asymmetries?
Thus, both the setting and the implementation of standards are fraught with inherent
complexities.
Standards are met with a level of acceptability when they are set and imple-
mented in a domestic setting but tend to become problematic when they operate in
a cross-border context. Further, standards may be intentionally designed for protec-
tionist purposes—in order to provide domestic producers with an advantage vis-a-vis
foreign ones—thereby impeding international trade. Alternatively, they may act as
de facto barriers to trade, even if they are not designed with that intention, when
producers are differentially equipped tomeet standards. The challenge, then, in using
standards in international trade lies in achieving a balance that allows for their use for
genuine sustainability reasons—environmental protection or prevention of unethical
business practices across global value chains—while not allowing them to turn into
instruments of protectionism.
The starting point of any enquiry is definitional; it is therefore pertinent to
ask: what are “sustainability standards” and “sustainability regulations”? Given the
plethora of sometimes contradicting definitions and categorisations of standards, it
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is not an easy task to harmonize them to a common understanding but an interlinking
is possible in order to provide a common reference point. At a general level, sustain-
ability standards have been defined as “set[s] of criteria defining good social and
environmental practices in an industry of product” (ISEAL, 2015). By extension,
this definition can also be applied to sustainability regulations, as the legal nature of
the criteria is not specified. While it is narrow enough to distinguish sustainability
standards and regulations from other types of standards and regulation, it is broad
enough to cover different categories within the field of sustainability standards and
regulations.1
The term “international standard” is also commonly referred to in research and
policy. Swann makes a distinction between the “purist” understanding of the word
“international” and its more limited application. In the former, a standard is consid-
ered “international” only if it conforms to a standard published by an international
organization such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), whereas in the more limited under-
standing, a standard will qualify as being “international” if it is commonly used
by a group of countries or within a region (Swann, 2010, p. 6). As far as defining
“standards” is concerned, the main distinction that is usually stressed upon is that
“standards” entail voluntary compliance, whereas “regulations” impose mandatory
compliance. However, it is an established fact that it is not always easy to distinguish
between the actual economic effects of both (Swann, 2010, p. 6).
Sustainability standards and regulations can be distinguished from other standards
and regulations on the basis of their content, i.e. their focus on social, environmental
and other sustainability challenges emanating from business activity. The 17 Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) make clear that “sustainability” or “sustainable
development” is an extremely broad concept interactingwith almost all aspects of life
in all countries in theworld. This does notmean, however, that every example of regu-
lation or standard setting in the world economy qualifies as sustainability related. A
performance standard, for instance, may only qualify as a sustainability standard if it
aims at reducing environmentally and socially harmful impacts of technical products
once they are in use, e.g. energy consumption of cars and electric devices. A quality
standard simply defining the size of a screw is clearly not a sustainability standard.
However, other quality (and as a sub-category: safety) standards considerably overlap
with sustainability standards if, for instance, they set limits to pesticide and other
chemical residues in (food) products, thereby protecting human and environmental
health both at the consumption and at the production stage. In fact, sustainability
standards and regulations typically address wider environmental, social and other
sustainability issues at the production stage that may or may not affect the nature of
a final product: local pollution, CO2 emissions in production, harvesting practices,
social rights of workers, wages, community rights, and even financial transparency
and good corporate governance.
1Some of the conceptual parts of this chapter are taken from an earlier, internal concept note for
the project.
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In trying to identify different categories within the field of sustainability standards
and regulations, four generic forms of sustainability standards are recognizable on the
basis of their institutional origin and legal nature, following Henson and Humphrey
(2009, p. 5). They differentiate between (1) public, mandatory sustainability stan-
dards (= regulations) set by national governments or government agencies that
impose legally binding requirements for generalmarket access and (2) private, volun-
tary sustainability standards (VSS) set up byprivatemulti-stakeholder initiativeswith
often global memberships to open up high-value market segments and respond to
sustainability concerns. Some private voluntary sustainability standards are also set
up by large individual companies, e.g. TESCONurture (Henson &Humphrey, 2009,
p. 6). These standards may be treated as a distinct sub-category, termed company-
specific voluntary sustainability standards. About two-thirds of private standards use
a logo, whereas one-third rely on business-to-business implementation without a
consumer-facing label (Potts et al., 2014, p. 37).
Two more categories need to be added: governments may also promulgate public
voluntary sustainability standards, and private voluntary standards can become
legally mandated if referred to in binding regulations (Henson & Humphrey, 2009,
p. 5). This blurs the line between public and private; all the more so as some public
sustainability regulations have their origins in private standards (Smith, 2009, p. 13).
For instance, the Forest Stewardship Council’s (FSC) instruments for zoning high
conservation values areas have been fully incorporated into public regulation by
China, Bolivia and others (Djama, 2011, p. 4). Similarly, the distinction between
voluntary and mandatory is not always as clear as it seems, considering that volun-
tary sustainability standards can become “de factomandatory in a commercial sense”
if dominant companies require their suppliers to comply with them (Henson &
Humphrey, 2009, p. 5; Smith, 2009, p. 17) and/or because of consumers’ prefer-
ences. The effectiveness of a standard that is not legally mandatory, but de facto
mandatory due to market dynamics, is certainly limited in a number of ways, for
instance when it comes to legal enforceability, remediation and compensation for
harm caused by non-compliance. The toughest sanction that voluntary schemes can
take against an individual member is usually just exclusion from the scheme, which
does not entail any immediate remediation for victims of a company’s non-compliant
behaviour, nor is there a possibility without appropriate legislation to hold lead firms
or the scheme itself accountable for a lack of due diligence or audit failure.
The examples of the EU Timber Regulation and EU Organic Farming in Table 1
illustrate the conceptual difference between mandatory public/governmental regula-
tions (EU in this case may be considered a supranational government) and voluntary
sustainability standards, be they private or public. The Timber Regulation prescribes
that all timber entering the EU market must comply with certain criteria, e.g. it must
not have been illegally logged. Non-compliance may be sanctioned by EU crim-
inal or administrative courts. EU Organic Farming, in contrast, is a public voluntary
sustainability standard; any domestic or imported product that carries the description
“organic” and/or the official EU organic logo is required to comply with it. However,
compliance is not mandatory for all products on the market as products below this
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Table 1 Different forms of sustainability standards and regulations
Public Private
Mandatory Sustainability regulations
Example: EU Timber Regulation (EU
995/2010)
Legally mandated private sustainability
standards
Example: Reference to ISO 9000 in EU
Directives on CE marking
Voluntary Public voluntary sustainability standards




Examples: Fairtrade, FSC, UTZ,
GlobalGAP
Source Henson and Humphrey (2009, p. 5), complemented by Blankenbach
standard may still be sold as regular non-organic products as long as they comply
with basic EU food quality and safety regulations.
Apart from variations in their institutional origin and legal nature, standards and
regulations as presented in Table 1 may also differ in terms of their geographic reach
as well as in the ambition of their formal criteria. Thus, the distinctions to be noted
are apparently not limited to those between the different categories of standards and
regulations, but also occur within these categories.
From the perspective of geographic reach, some advanced sustainability regula-
tions (e.g. by the EU on timber or biofuels, 2009/28/EC) take into account production
and harvesting practices abroad, while others tend to focus on domestic protections.
For instance, many richer industrialized and emerging economies may have adopted
strict environmental and labour regulations for domestic production. These provi-
sions, however, do not directly apply to production abroad, e.g. in poor countries
where weaker sustainability regulations might be in place. Similarly, some public
regulations may focus on protecting the “domestic environment and public health
in the importing country against the harmful effects of consumption or disposal of
[…] imported products” (Khatun, 2009, p. 8). A growing number of regulatory inno-
vations extend this scope; for instance those striving to legally mandate corporate
human rights due diligence across global value chains, which is the key operational
principle of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (OHCHR,
2011).2 The French Duty of Vigilance Law is a pioneering example where respect for
human rights and the environment is legally mandated into transnational corporate
activities (ECCJ, 2017, p. 1), in this case those of large French companies. Debates
and initiatives on mandatory due diligence are currently underway in several other
countries, mostly European, as well as at the regional (EU) and global (UN) levels.
Voluntary sustainability standards schemes, in theory, also strive to generate sustain-
ability benefits transnationally, especially in the global south, but their voluntary
nature means that none of this is legally enforceable.
Apart from geographic reach, standards and regulations vary on the basis of ambi-
tion. First of all, it is notable that from a governance perspective, it is per se much
2See the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre’s web portal and blog series on “Mandatory
Due Diligence” at https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/mandatory-due-diligence.
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more ambitious to introduce binding public regulation than to rely on corporate self-
regulation through voluntary standards. In terms of the formal content of standards
and regulations, the criteria that voluntary standards set may in some contexts be
stricter than those of local regulations. In this volume, for instance, Brandi contends
that the requirements of the Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) regulation (a
public mandatory certification scheme) are less demanding and comprehensive than
those of the voluntary Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) standard, espe-
cially when it comes to environmental criteria. There are other contexts and sustain-
ability dimensions, however, where “broad [voluntary] standards […] rarely go
further than local labour law” (Åhlberg, 2019), e.g. when they refer to (often very
low) local minimum wages rather than requiring living wages. The question then is
whether such voluntary initiatives at least provide for stronger internal assurance and
implementation mechanisms, especially when compared to poorly enforced public
regulations in countries with weak governance.
Having discussed definitions and classifications of standards and regulations, a
preliminary look at institutional and normative frameworks for sustainability stan-
dards and regulations is in order for identifying their global governance linkages.
Sustainability standards, even if many of them are private, do not emerge and operate
in isolation from broader institutional and normative frameworks of global gover-
nance. In fact, there is ample evidence of interactions and overlaps. International
treaties such as International Labour Organization (ILO) labour conventions and
technical codes developed by international organizations such as the World Health
Organization (WHO)CodexAlimentarius for food safety provide an important refer-
ence frame for sustainability standards and regulations. Sustainability regulations in
general implement national sustainability laws, which may in turn result from the
ratification of an international treaty (Altmann, 1994, p. 176). Similarly, private
sustainability standards often refer to international norms. The formal standards of
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), for instance, mainly build on those of the
Food andAgricultureOrganization (FAO)CodeofConduct forResponsible Fisheries
(Santacoloma, 2014, p. 20).
The World Trade Organization (WTO) provides an additional institutional and
legal framework to regulate the use and content of sustainability standards. Under
WTO rules, member states “can adopt trade-related measures aimed at protecting the
environment” (WTO, 2015) if these laws and regulations are “not applied arbitrarily
and are not used as disguised protectionism” (ibid.). The WTO sets out a number of
legitimate reasons for the use of sustainability-related trade barriers. It recommends
that member states adopt internationally agreed sustainability standards—such as
those originating from the Codex Alimentarius, the World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). If standards
more stringent than the internationally laid-down ones are to be adopted, those are
permitted as well, provided a scientific justification can be established for their use.
These provisions, however, only apply to standards established or endorsed by public
institutions, i.e. to public regulations and private standards legallymandated bypublic
regulation. Purely private sustainability standards, in contrast, may “fall outside of
this regime” (Henson 2008, p.76) as only states are subject to the WTO regime.
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Therefore, the problem of the additional burden that private sustainability standards
that are passed down supply chains “impose on small and medium producers and
exporters in developing countries […] have not yet been satisfactorily solved” (Santa-
coloma, 2014, p. 19). While the need for the WTO to address private standards has
been highlighted, both inside and outside the WTO, they currently remain excluded
from the regime.
It is important to note that general public and corporate policies do not fall into the
definition of sustainability standards and regulations as established at the beginning
but still interact with this field. For instance, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
strategies and reports of private companieswill inmost cases include a commitment to
obey mandatory laws and regulations and refer to the type of voluntary sustainability
standards the company uses.
Any study of sustainability standards therefore entails an engagement with the
complex interface between the voluntary and the mandatory, the local and the
global levels, the private and the public domains, the industrialized and the devel-
oping countries, states, intergovernmental and non-governmental processes, large
and small enterprises, and producers and consumers—and the dynamic processes
createdby their interaction andoverlap.Recent studies point to “…apolicy ecosystem
dominated by a proliferation of standards that complement, substitute, or compete
against each other, with coordination mechanisms beginning to arise” (Lambin &
Thorlakson, 2018, p. 369). The complex nature of the interactions between the
multiple and varied actors need not always be antagonistic and can sometimes be
complementary.
2 About the Book
The discussion above has made clear the significance of identifying “sustainability
standards” as a theme of research. Further, “emerging economies” were chosen as
the focus of the study as they represent countries that are increasingly engaged
in international trade, yet continue to face challenges in implementing standards.
This becomes a hindrance in their efforts to compete internationally at the level of
industrialized countries as also in the attempt to provide effective protection to people
and the environment through the use of standards. It was expected, therefore, that
empirical inputs from this set of countries would yield rich learnings. The book is
simply structured, with discussion divided into two main parts. It starts by broadly
looking at global governance frameworks for sustainability standards and thenmoves
to empirical studies of sustainability standards atwork in specific sectoral and country
contexts.
Part I, which focuses on global governance frameworks, begins with a discussion
of sustainability standards in the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were adopted by the
United Nations (UN) at the summit meeting of 2015. Blankenbach examines the
supposed interlinkages and interfaces between voluntary sustainability standards
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(VSS) and the SDGs. He points out that while it is not for the first time that VSS
have been a part of sustainable development agendas, it is the SDG framework that,
in the most prominent way, helps shine a light on the said instrumental value of
VSS in meeting sustainability objectives. This chapter explores to what extent VSS
can or cannot play a role in taking forward the agenda of the SDGs. Using the Inter-
national Trade Centre’s (ITC) Standards Map, the chapter assesses whether specific
formal VSS requirements align with one or more SDGs. Blankenbach finds that,
in theory, a considerable number of VSS criteria correspond with the 17 SDGs but
he also cautions that most assessments of the on-the-ground sustainable develop-
ment impacts of such schemes have so far come to tentative or inconclusive results.
He notes with concern the growing evidence of the failure of social auditing—a
procedure also used to certify and verify standards compliance—in uncovering or
mitigating human and labour rights abuses in companies’ global value chains. Given
themutually reinforcing relationship between the SDGs and human rights, the pitfalls
of certification and verification audits and lack of accountability may compromise
any transformative potential of VSS, the author contends. This paper is thus a call
for fundamental reform of VSS schemes, especially of their assurance and worker
engagement arrangements and culture, aswell as formore sustainability regulation—
including mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence—for companies
across their operations and global value chains.
Another significant locus of global governance where sustainability standards
play out is the World Trade Organization (WTO).Negi provides an overview assess-
ment of sustainability standards within the framework of the WTO. Her paper is
methodologically a legal study that focuses on the rules and judicial interpreta-
tions that have emanated from the WTO in relation to standards and regulations.
WTO rules have long recognized the conditional need for the use of standards and
regulations by member states. Two WTO agreements—the Agreement on Technical
Barriers toTrade and theAgreement on theApplicationof Sanitary andPhytosanitary
Measures—recognize the right of member states to use standards and regulations to
meet their legitimate objectives, provided trade is not restricted in a disguised fashion.
The interpretations that have emerged in relation to standards and regulations from
theWTOdispute settlement system have sometimes helped clarify the legal positions
while at other times, have led to further confusion. Some select disputes relating to
the use of standards are discussed in this chapter. Private sustainability standards are
not currently dealt with at the WTO, and despite the argument having been made in
favour of the WTO taking up private standards within its purview, the organization
is reluctant to do so in the face of divergences between its industrialized and devel-
oping member states on this issue. The chapter also discusses the special concerns
of the developing countries in relation to standards. Negi points to the fact that the
WTO has grown organically since its inception to include newer issue areas; given
the proliferation of private standards (many of which actually play out as manda-
tory requirements in a commercial sense), it remains to be seen whether the WTO
will take on the additional responsibility of regulating private standards as well.
In the context of trade, given the sclerosis of theWTO’s Doha Round and the trou-
bles of the organization itself, there has been an increasing resort to preferential trade
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agreements (PTAs) to negotiate trade rules. Taking forward the trade-related focus
initiated in the previous chapter, the chapter by Berger, Blümer, Brandi and Chi
provides a detailed survey of environmental provisions in preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs) in emerging markets. In pursuing the SDGs, the authors point out,
economic activity needs to be transformed to make it “consistent with environmental
sustainability” and for this, an appropriate regulatory framework is required for the
global economy. Because of the “proliferation” and “deepening” of PTAs, they are
identified as potential loci for promoting sustainability goals through the global
economy by integrating the use of both regulations and voluntary standards through
PTAs. The authors point out that “…strong environmental provisions in PTAs may
provide a context that is conducive to the effective implementation and use of stan-
dards and regulation that seek to address sustainability challenges” (p. 61). In this
chapter, the authors assess environmental provisions in emergingmarket PTAs to test
the assumption that emerging markets (as compared to the industrialized world) are
less interested in linking environmental and labour standards to trade policies. The
analysis conducted in this chapter is based on an original dataset that maps envi-
ronmental provisions in emerging market PTAs. The authors focus attention on five
specific case studies—China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico—and develop a
dataset mapping environmental provisions in PTAs, comprising nine dimensions.
All full free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions established by emerging
markets are discussed. The central finding of this chapter is that “…the PTAs of
emerging markets incorporate more and more environmental provisions over time
and that they tend to include more environmental content when they have negotiated
and signed with OECD countries, which in turn suggests that OECD countries can
still be considered as rule-makers and emerging markets still largely as rule-takers in
the context under consideration” (p. 62). This chapter, by focusing on PTAs, show-
cases the interesting regional variations that exist in the context of their sustainability
ambitions.
Moving from the intergovernmental spaces, the chapter by Pérez-Pineda focuses
on the private sector and its engagementwith sustainability standards and regulations,
using Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) a link. Pérez-Pineda begins by revis-
iting the historical context of the 1980s and 1990s, capturing the changing landscape
of globalization, liberalization, free trade, etc., leading eventually to the launch of
the “Global Compact” by the United Nations (UN) in 2000. The chapter reviews the
role of the private sector in the realm of sustainability standards, looking at context,
conceptual approaches and implications. Private firms and transnational corporations
(TNCs) are understood as potentially having a positive as well as negative impact
on society and there has consistently been an effort—“through guides, codes of
conduct and multilateral agreements” (p. 85)—to try and regulate their activities in
order to minimize adverse impact. The UN’s Global Compact represents one of the
most relevant initiatives in aligning the activities of the private sector with sustain-
ability objectives. With the growing power and reach of the private sector (which
is demonstrated by the author), the demand for accountability of their activities has
also grown. CSR has developed as a concept bridging this growing power with the
increasing awareness of the effects of the private sector. Pérez-Pineda looks at a
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range of different forms in which standards—public and private, global and local,
market-based and non-market-based—canmanifest. He uses the example ofMexico,
identifying three key institutions that are relevant to standards, to show how a conver-
gence can be brought about to contribute to the 2030 goals. He concludes that given
the significance of the private sector in the current times, there is a need to ensure
that its activities are aligned with sustainability goals, and he argues that CSR could
provide the framework for such an alignment.
A related theme is taken up bySantos, Sena andFreitas in their paper on “sustain-
ability reporting” (SR), which argues that companies are increasingly under pressure
to be more socially and environmentally responsible. CSR has emerged as a new
business paradigm and “sustainability reporting” has become an important instru-
ment of transparency and accountability. The question being asked in this chapter is
whether the tool is being used to full potential? SR is a voluntary process but there is a
growing tendency to make it mandatory. The authors focus on the Group of Friends
of Paragraph 47 (GoF47)—a voluntary group of national governments supported
by the United Nations Environment Programme/UN Environment (UNEP) and the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that subscribe to the idea of SR. The chapter points
to the link of GoF47 with Goal 12.6 of the SDGs (“Encourage companies, especially
large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate
sustainability information into their reporting cycle”). The authors argue that SR
“…has a high potential to promote good governance schemes as well as social and
environmental standards…” (p. 104) and make suggestions on how to improve it. A
major shortcoming identified in the SR process is that there is little evidence of stake-
holders—governments and civil society—using SR to its full potential. Weak stake-
holder participation is thus identified as the missing link between SR practices and
social and environmental improvements and the chapter recommends “stakeholder
involvement” in order to make SR a strong instrument of good governance.
In the last chapter of this section, Bandyopadhyay discusses the impact of global
labour standards on export performance. Contextualizing her study in the debates
around “comparative advantage”, “race to the bottom” and “disguised protection-
ism”, the author empirically investigates the effects of labour standards on the export
performance of a country. The chapter tests the popular view that low-standards coun-
tries enjoy a better export performance, using a robust empirical analysis of World
Bank datasets. For labour standards, the author looks at whether countries have rati-
fied the core ILO conventions, collecting data from the ILOLEX dataset. The chapter
finds, contrary to traditional wisdom, that no definite relationship can be discerned
between labour rights and export performance. However, “if a richer country ratifies
more labour conventions its effects on exports will be less positive than what will
occur if a comparatively poorer country ratifies the conventions” (p. 124). Further,
the author argues that in some cases, some proxies of labour standards have a posi-
tive impact on export performance, signifying that “…countries do have an incentive
to strengthen their labour conditions to improve export performance, especially if
it is a poorer country” (p. 127). Undoubtedly, the presence of emerging economies
in the global value chains is rising, both via the supply side and the demand side
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participation as well as via the participation of civil society; thus their participation
in global standard setting needs to be studied carefully.
A wide canvas is thus covered in the first section relating to governance frame-
works, touching upon important players such as the UN, the WTO, regional trade
frameworks, the private sector,GoF47and the ILO.These studies collectively provide
the backdrop for the case study based research focusing on “emerging economies”
that is contained in the subsequent section. The country context includes experi-
ences ranging from Indonesia, Thailand, India, China, Mexico and Brazil while the
sectoral context spans the palm oil sector, forestry, farming, vehicular emissions,
tourism, and fruit and vegetables.
Part II openswith two chapters focused on Indonesia. Interestingly, both chapters
delve into the theme of the interactive dynamics between private and public stan-
dards. The first chapter, by Brandi, describes the “…changing landscape of volun-
tary sustainability standards in Indonesia…” (p. 133) and discusses the challenges of
making global value chainsmore sustainable. The chapter focuses on standards in the
palm oil sector, including theRoundtable on Sustainable PalmOil (RSPO), which is a
private standards scheme, and the recently introduced Indonesian Sustainable Palm
Oil (ISPO) initiative, which is a mandatory government-led certification scheme.
The author points out that “[t]he interaction between private and public authorities in
the governance of environmental and social challenges is still an understudied field
of global governance” (p. 134). The chapter highlights the importance of including
smallholders into certification schemes, while recognizing that this is challenging.
Field research for this chapter included interviews with smallholder certification
projects in Indonesia. An interesting point that this chapter raises is the potential
trade-offs between the environmental and social dimensions of sustainable (inclu-
sive) development. The chapter also suggests someways inwhich such trade-offs can
be managed. The findings of this study can easily relate to other sectoral examples
as well.
The second case study from Indonesia is byKartika,Hariyadi and Cerdikwan.
This chapter focuses on the forestry sector and the practice of sustainable forest
management (SFM) in the country. Two internationally recognized certifications
that are available to a forest concession holder in Indonesia—the Forest Steward-
ship Council (FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification
(PEFC)—are studied. The chapter points out that generally, these VSS comple-
ment public standards and regulation, but it also notes that multiple standards
are challenging for producers due to increased compliance costs. The research is
based on interviews conducted with forestry research and certification institutions in
Indonesia. A variety of government regulations are assessed in order to determine
whether PEFC fills the gap in what was lacking. The findings of the chapter are that
PEFC seems to substitute and is preferred to FSC; they both complement government
regulations, while requiring higher standards. The PEFC standard will potentially
enjoy higher acceptability because its requirements are not as stringent as the FSC.
The twin challenges faced by PEFC, however, are that it does not enjoy high domestic
stakeholder support and it has low legitimacy as a non-state scheme.
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The chapter byHolzapfel andHampel-Milagrosa traces a “transformation of the
agricultural sector in the developing countries” (p. 163) and points out how meeting
the market requirements in high-value supply chains, has become more challenging
for the developing countries. They pick as a case study a well-known private standard
for good agricultural practices—GlobalGAP—that focuses on food safety but also
covers aspects of environmental protection. The authors make a point similar to the
one made by Brandi—that smallholders are particularly disadvantaged in meeting
the requirements of standards. The chapter takes the example of smallholders in
the fruit and vegetable value chain in Thailand and India and bases its findings on
both secondary data and field work. The authors conclude from their study that
mostly smallholders do not have to face GlobalGAP requirements as they serve
domestic or lower value export markets and even when they do, “…it is the wealthier
and more educated small-scale farmers who adopt and benefit from the GlobalGAP
standard…” (p. 180). During the course of their research, the authors found co-
existing public and private GAP standards in both countries (APEDA’s IndiaGAP
and QCI’s IndGAP in case of India); since the governments enjoy low credibility as
a monitor of compliance, the private entities tend to introduce their own standards.
The chapter points out that “[p]arallel standards, as found both in Thailand and
India, lead to high transaction costs and confusion among producers, exporters and
consumers” (p. 181) and underscores the need for harmonization. The authors also
suggest institutional arrangements allowing for more smallholders to adopt local
GAP standards.
Another comparative study that is carried out byMendoza and Jiahan is between
China andMexico in the context of vehicular emissions. The comparison flows from
three justifications. The transport sectors of both countries are significant contribu-
tors to overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in their respective countries. Both
countries rank among the ten largest automobile producers and are thus leading auto-
mobile exporters. They have to fulfil their individual commitments in combating
climate change as they have committed to climate mitigation and adaptation targets
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
mandate. Aside from these similarities, the standard setting and implementation
process in China and Mexico has been quite different. The main dissimilarity is
the adoption of different reference standards: while China has been working under
the EU’s regulatory framework, Mexico has set a partial homologation with the
US EPA regulation. Vehicular emissions efficiency standards, the authors claim, are
targeted at reaping not merely local advantages but also global advantages in the
form of GHG emissions reduction. The authors show—through their case studies
of China and Mexico—that “global” (EURO VI/US EPA 2010) standards cannot
automatically be transposed to the emerging economies as they do not always fit the
national contexts and the sectoral specificities. Rather than being treated as “one-
size-fits-all” solutions, the “global” standards should serve as a reference point on
which national agendas can be superimposed.Mendoza and Jiahan make the argu-
ment that vehicle efficiency standards in emerging economies should be aligned with
national sustainability goals.
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Moving to Brazil, the focus of study shifts to the tourism sector, in particular the
use of “greywater” in this sector. The chapter byCoelho,Domingues,Mousinho and
Saretta highlights the special role that tourism plays in impacting natural resource
use, “responsible for a great amount of aggressive use of resources such as water…”
(p. 201). This chapter seeks to assess towhat extent standards and regulations apply to
the use ofwater in the hotel industry, comparing the tourist areas in twomajor cities—
Rio de Janeiro and Berlin. The study reveals that the actions undertaken by the hotels
analyzed were more to do with self-compliance rather than external pressure. Also,
in most cases, they were not based on the demands of particular standards but related
to the image-building of the hotel vis-à-vis its clients. The quantitative results from
the study show that recycling systems are relevant for volume savings; however, most
of the analyzed standards are not oriented properly to sustainability. This is a gap that
could be turned into an opportunity by the different stakeholders involved (public
and private). The authors propose the creation of a common regulatory framework
with public and private intervention that can create benefits for both. The chapter
makes a case for a strong focus on the impact of tourism on the use of water and
possible standards to be developed in this area. The UNWorld TourismOrganization
(UNWTO), it is suggested, could play a more proactive role in this. Linking with the
SDGs could have a positive benefit in addressing specific issues areas like the one
focused upon in this chapter.
As the summaries of the chapters above reveal, the issue of “sustainability stan-
dards” has been accorded a wide interpretation. Taking advantage of the confusion
in discourse over the definitional limits, no strict definitional scope was retained
for the contributions in this book. Depending on a more intuitive understanding of
“sustainability standards” was a deliberate decision taken in order to gain from an
expanded canvas of discussion. Thus, many of the chapters included move freely
between “standards” and “regulations” and typologies of “sustainability standards”
are not strictly uniform.
What is noteworthy is how studies located in different parts of the world have
come up with common concerns and questions in relation to sustainability stan-
dards. A key finding that repeatedly finds mention, for instance, is that voluntary
standards are clearly not sufficient to meet sustainability concerns and need to be
complemented with enforceable, mandatory regulations. The fact that the dynamic
interface between public and private standards, and the role of lead firms, need to
be better understood in order to minimize the burden on less powerful producers
emerges more than once. The special focus on smallholders is of utmost importance
as there are differential impacts of standards implementation on different sizes of
enterprise. Capacity limitations—in setting as well as meeting international stan-
dards—in emerging economies (let alone in other developing countries), emerges as
a central theme in most chapters. Thus, many common findings have emerged during
thewriting and collation of this book, written from a cross-country, trans-disciplinary
perspective. Multiple pathways of enquiry remain that need to be pursued in order
to achieve the twin goals of attaining the sustainability objectives embodied in the
SDGs through the optimal use of sustainability standards while, at the same time,
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watching out for the pitfalls and taking cognizance of the particular concerns of the
“emerging economies”.
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and the Sustainable Development Goals
Johannes Blankenbach
1 Introduction
Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS) have since long been used and referred
to in the context of the evolving global sustainability and development agenda(s),
such as the 1992 Rio Earth Summit’s Agenda 21 or the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) introduced in 2000. Discussions on the instrumental
value of VSS in contributing to global development, however, have gained new
ground since the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015 (UN GA, 2015). More and more VSS
schemes and organisations refer to the SDGs in their official communications,1 UN
reports point to potential linkages,2 andwhile VSS are not explicitlymentioned in the
17 SDGs, 169 targets and 244 indicators, they havemade their way into (sub)national
SDG implementation strategies. The 2016 Sustainability Strategy of the German
State ofNorthRhine-Westphalia, for instance, includes a target to increase themarket
share of products labelled as organic (MKULNV, 2016, p. 37).3
Can VSS, or in other words, voluntary sets of “criteria defining good social and
environmental practices in an industry or product” (ISEAL, 2015), contribute to the
implementation of a framework as universal and ambitious as the SDGs? The 2030
1See, for example, ISEAL and WWF (2017), “How Credible Standards Can Help Companies
Deliver the 2030 Agenda”; ISEAL is a VSS umbrella organisation. One of the earliest of such publi-
cations came from Fairtrade International (2015)—“Sustainable Development Goals and Fairtrade:
The Case for Partnership”.
2See, for instance, UNFSS (2016), “Meeting Sustainability Goals: Voluntary Sustainability
Standards and the Role of the Government”.
3In an earlier draft of the strategy, the target was to increase the market share of Fairtrade and
similarly labelled products; the final version only refers to EUOrganic Certification (a public VSS).
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Agenda for Sustainable Development is nothing less than an action plan for profound
transformation across the globe to improve the lives of all people while keeping the
planet healthy (Scholz, 2015, p. 1).
This chapter starts off with a content analysis of VSS, based on data from the
International Trade Centre’s (ITC) Standards Map, to assess to what extent formal
VSS requirements and processes alignwith the SDGs. Considering that this approach
mainly captures what VSS-SDG linkages exist on paper, a subsequent section looks
at what kind of real-life contributions VSS may—or may not—make to SDG imple-
mentation. This later section also links to the discussion on business and human
rights, considering its intersections with the SDGs and VSS debates, respectively.
The chapter ends with conclusions from the two substantive sections, including
recommendations on the way forward.
2 Alignment of VSS with the SDGs: Content Analysis
It is fairly obvious why there has been increasing reference to the link between
VSS and SDGs: The conditions that VSS initiatives claim to improve, sometimes
even by their very name, all broadly relate to the different dimensions of sustain-
ability. Tying them more systematically to the SDGs, which have gained traction in
politics, business, civil society and the broader public in recent years, provides for
a compelling narrative and, ideally, greater synergies. The 2030 Agenda also puts
much emphasis on the crucial role of business and civil society in promoting sustain-
able development—two groups of actors that are at least formally represented in
many multi-stakeholder VSS initiatives, sometimes along with local producers and
public sector actors. The real influence of these different groups within a scheme, of
course, varies, depending on how serious it is about multi-stakeholder—and ideally
worker-driven—standards design and implementation.VSS also claim to empower
consumers to take responsible buying decisions; indeed, two-thirds of VSS use a
consumer-facing label, whereas one-third rely on business-to-business implementa-
tion (Potts et al., 2014, p. 37). The SDGs are very much in line with a mechanism
where, in theory, consumers and end-user companies opt for sustainably produced
goods to contribute towards sustainable development in their own countries as well
as in other countries along global value chains. This may reflect the paradigm shift
from an “aid”-centred development model for the global south (as epitomised by
the previous MDGs) towards a more holistic, SDG-based approach, acknowledging
global interdependencies and a need for change, especially in richer economies and
societies. Whether sustainability in consumption and production as such should just
be a voluntary option is of course questionable, all the more so if this option is partly
based on a “jungle of certification schemes” (Verzijden, 2017) that, with their multi-
tude, overlaps and gaps, confuse both consumers and companies. In turn, assessments
of on-the-ground impacts have, to some extent, remained inconclusive, and certifi-
cation and verification audits have reportedly failed human and workers’ rights (see
Sect. 3).
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In a narrow sense, a VSS is a document that lists detailed requirements for good
social and environmental practice in business operations. Producers, manufacturers
or—depending on the scope of the standard—traders and retailers who wish to
become (and stay) certified under a given VSS need to prove that they fulfil these
requirements in (usually third-party) certification/verification audits, which in itself
is a highly problematic practice (see Sect. 3). However, the assumption is that if
VSS are to contribute to SDG implementation, their formal requirements need to
correspond to at least some of the SDGs and related targets by addressing similar
issues. The ITC Standards Map at www.standardsmap.org (ITC, 2017) provides a
viable source for testing this as it details the requirements pertaining to over 210VSS.
From all of these VSS, 16were included in the formal content analysis in this section,
representing the “most important standards initiatives currently active in agriculture,
forestry and biofuels sectors with a global reach” according to a landmark review by
Potts et al. (2014, p. 3):4
• 4C/Global Coffee Platform
• Better Cotton Initiative (BCI)
• Bonsucro
• Cotton made in Africa (CmiA)
• Ethical Tea Partnership (ETP)
• Fairtrade5
• Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)6
• International Foundation for Organic Agriculture (IFOAM)
• Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes (PEFC)
• Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)7
• Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN)/Rainforest Alliance
• UTZ Certified
• Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP)8
• ProTerra Foundation
• Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS)
• Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB)
VSS are not just defined by their requirements but also by corresponding and
very distinct formal process criteria for verification, marketing, support, revision
and governance. ITC Standards Map features details on some (although not all) of
these standards system elements in a separate “processes” section for eachVSS in the
database. It was therefore possible to complement the analysis of VSS requirements
with some information on formal VSS processes. The goal was, as a first step, to
4Lernoud et al. (2018) also use this sample (apart from ETP and RSB) in an ITC-commissioned
assessment of “The State of Sustainable Markets 2018”.
5Sometimes there are several standards operated by one initiative; this analysis focused on the
Fairtrade standard for “small producer organizations”.
6The formal analysis focused on the FSC standard for “forest management”.
7The formal analysis focused on RSPO “Principles and Criteria”.
8The formal analysis focused on the GlobalGAP standard for “crops”.
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assess whether a specific VSS requirement (e.g. “practices promoting healthy/high
nutritional value foods”, ITC, 2017) or process criterion fits under one, several or
none of the SDGs.9
The SDGs, by their very nature, are much broader in scope and wording than
the detailed requirements and processes formally established by VSS. In order to
proceed without too much of causal interpretation, the 169 SDG targets and 244
SDG indicators (IAEG-SDGs, 2017)10 were used to translate the 2030 Agenda’s
vision into more technical and narrow terms for the purpose of this chapter (with
the disadvantage of some aspects of the original SDGs getting lost). It should still
be mentioned that matching VSS requirements and processes with corresponding
SDGs remains a subjective exercise. Table 1 demonstrates this for a selected goal
(SDG 7—Affordable and Clean Energy), listing all categories of VSS requirements
and process criteria from the Standards Map that seem to plausibly match it. The
on-paper performance of two selected VSS initiatives (ETP and RSPO) in those
categories is presented at the right-hand side of the table, as per the 2017 Standards
Map data.11
Table 1 illustrates the span of causal interpretation that was considered acceptable
for establishing plausible formal VSS-SDG correspondences, with the second to last
criterion (“responsible entity for implementation cost”) probably being the most
debatable. The table also shows that one specific requirement or process criterion
could be listed only once per SDG at the maximum (but several times across all
17 SDGs, reflecting their interconnectedness). The total results for each SDG were
weighted in order to compensate for the different length and complexity of goals.12
Turning to the second step of the analysis, i.e. a weighted average of SDG-related
VSS requirements and process criteria across all 16 VSS initiatives for each SDG, it
is striking to see that VSS, at least on paper, in some or the other way link to all 17
9The data used for the latest version of this chapter was retrieved from the Standards Map in
July/August 2017. There may thus have been updates to formal standards contents in the meantime
that were not considered for this analysis.
10It is obvious that SDG indicators are not meant to further specify targets in the sense of a guide-
line for implementation—the purpose of indicators is to measure progress. In fact, however, an
indicator integrates key aspects of a target in one very specific, (comparatively) easy-to-measure
parameter. The indicator framework therefore provided additional orientation for matching VSS
requirements/process criteria with different SDGs (guiding question: “Would implementation of
VSS requirement/process criterion X improve the result of indicator Y?”). In several rounds of
testing, targets on their own appeared to be too broad, leaving considerable room for interpretation.
11The spreadsheet for all 16 VSS across all 17 SDGs comprises more than 1000 rows.
12Some SDGs have very few targets and indicators, whereas others have many. In the latter case,
it is easier to find corresponding VSS requirements and process criteria on the Standards Map
according to the methodology explained above. This could increase statistical bias (i.e. the more
targets/indicators one particular SDG has, the more VSS requirements/process criteria correspond
to it). Weighting was applied to reduce such bias, with SDG 7 providing the most extreme example
of weighting (coefficient 2.392) as it is the shortest goal in terms of the number of its targets and
indicators. Coefficients were determined by dividing the total number of indicators (244) by the
number of goals (17); this average was then divided by the number of indicators per SDG to define
a weighting coefficient for each SDG, ranging from 0.532 (SDG 3, which has the most indicators)
to 2.392 (SDG 7, as explained).
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Table 1 Matching of relevantVSS requirements/process criteria from the StandardsMapwith SDG
7;Checkingwhether or not (✓/✗) the ETP andRSPO standards include such requirements according














SDG 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable,






















7.2. By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix
7.2.1. Renewable























Use of biofuels ✓ ✓
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7.3. By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency
7.3.1. Energy intensity
measured in terms of
primary energy and
GDP
Reduce use of energy
resources
✓ ✗
7.a. By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and
technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel
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7.b. By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and
sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed
countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance
with their respective programmes of support
7.b.1. Investments in
energy efficiency as a
proportion of GDP and








Source Author’s compilation based on UN GA (2015), IAEG-SDGs (2017) and ITC (2017)
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Fig. 1 Average number of standards requirements/process criteria per VSS scheme corresponding
to each SDG. Source Author
SDGs (Fig. 1), based on an interpretation of 2017 Standards Map data. On average,
the 16 schemes comprehend a significant number of requirements and processes
corresponding to each of the SDGs, albeit to varying degrees. For instance, on
average, 68.38 formal requirements and process criteria per individual VSS are in
line with SDG 2 (Zero Hunger; Food Security & Sustainable Agriculture), whereas,
on average, only 7.62 requirements/process criteria per VSS correspond to SDG 5
(Gender Equality) according to this formal analysis and as shown in the ranking chart
in Fig. 1.
SDG2 (ZeroHunger; FoodSecurity&SustainableAgriculture),13 SDG8 (Decent
Work & Economic Growth) and SDG 12 (Sustainable Consumption & Production)
top the ranking, i.e. VSS, on average, list many formal criteria plausibly corre-
sponding to these SDGs (and targets/indicators). This may not come as a surprise as
such topics and areas are commonly associated with VSS. SDG 2 comprises rela-
tively broad provisions on productive and sustainable agriculture (targets 2.3, 2.4 and
corresponding indicators), whichmeans thatmany environment-relatedVSS require-
ments, e.g. for soil, water and biodiversity conservation as well as for chemicals and
waste treatment, plausibly fit under this SDG, along with basic social and economic
VSS criteria. However, almost no VSS criteria according to 2017 Standards Map
data seem to correspond to the first part of SDG 2, focusing on ending hunger and
malnutrition (targets 2.1, 2.2 and corresponding indicators). There are a few VSS
out of the sample of 16 that list requirements on “practices promoting healthy/high
nutritional value foods” and “avoiding practices endangering food security” (ITC,
2017), but there is nothing beyond this.
13The full titles of all 17 SDGs can be found in the annex to this chapter.
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Regarding SDG 8 (Decent Work & Economic Growth), many VSS on paper
require the abolition of forced and child labour and refer to a wide range of labour
rights. These were considered as linked to SDG targets 8.7, 8.8 and their respective
indicators. A range of formal VSS criteria on resource efficiency were grouped under
target 8.4 and its indicator on material footprints (8.4.1), whereas requirements on
wages (e.g. “minimum wage”; ITC, 2017) and gender aspects (e.g. “family-friendly
policies to increase the labour force participation of women”, ibid.) may formally
match target 8.5 and related indicators on full/productive employment.
Regarding SDG 12 (Sustainable Consumption& Production), number three in the
ranking, several formal VSS process criteria on transparent certification/verification
practices and annual reporting were considered to match target 12.7 on sustainable
public procurement, as such information may support public procurement decisions,
provided that VSS are to play a role in this. Most VSS requirements that seem to
correspond well to SDG 12 across the 16 reviewed initiatives, however, focus on
resource efficiency as well as on chemicals and waste treatment, matching targets
12.2, 12.4 and related indicators. Several gaps remain, even on paper; there are, for
instance, no VSS requirements that can be plausibly linked to target 12.3/indicator
12.3.1 on reducing food loss, according to this formal interpretation of Standards
Map data from 2017.
While it may not be surprising to find SDG 14 (Life below Water) and SDG 15
(Life on Land) in the medium to upper range of this ranking based on formal VSS
content, one may not have expected rank four for SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities),
given its macro-level scope. SDG 10, however, includes some hints as to how micro-
level steps may contribute towards transformative change at a larger scale, if truly
implemented. For instance, target 10.3 focuses on “eliminating discriminatory laws,
policies and practices” (UN GA, 2015). At the level of VSS, requirements relating
to “no discrimination at work (ILO, 111)”, “minority rights”, “involuntary resettle-
ment, physical displacement and/or economic displacement” (ITC, 2017) and other
issues may link to this target and indicator. Requirements regarding the “use of price
premium” and formal process criteria on sharing certification and implementation
costs as well as on access to finance (free of charge) were grouped under target
10.b/indicator 10.b.1 (development assistance and other financial flows). However,
only a few of the 16 VSS initiatives under review include such requirements as per
2017 Standards Map data.
There is a clear decline of potential formal VSS-SDG correspondences in the
medium to lower range of the chart. SDG 1 (No Poverty), ranked tenth in this theo-
retical assessment, covers some of the particularly structural and far-reaching issues
on the 2030 Agenda. Target 1.2 as well as the corresponding indicators on multidi-
mensional poverty provides some indication of the kind of VSS contents that may
be relevant here, ranging from process criteria specifically targeting vulnerable and
minority groups to requirements regarding wages, the “hiring [of] workers from
local communities” (ITC, 2017) and the promotion of education as well as medical
care services. Many VSS initiatives formally list such requirements according to the
data on the Standards Map, but as per 2017 data, there are fewer criteria on average
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relating to other dimensions of SDG 1, such as disaster risk reduction and resilience
of the poor (target 1.5).
Even this formalistic review of VSS, purely based on content analysis, suggests
thatVSS in their current shape are poorly suited to contribute towards SDG4 (Quality
Education), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 7 (Affordable & Clean Energy), SDG
11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), SDG 13 (Climate Action) and SDG 17
(Partnerships for the Goals). Very few formal VSS requirements and processes plau-
sibly link to these fields, according to the assessment of 2017 data from the Standards
Map.
Last but not the least, relative standard deviations of 44–58% for SDG 5, SDG
7 and SDG 11 in this formal interpretation of 2017 Standards Map data suggest
that some VSS include a larger number of criteria matching these SDGs, whereas
other VSS include only a few. Whether or not a VSS initiative has a specific sectoral
focus seems to be of low significance in this regard. A comparison between the two
forestryVSSunder formal review in this section (FSCandPEFC), the two cottonVSS
(BCI andCmiA) and the sixVSS coveringmultiple commodities (Fairtrade, IFOAM,
SAN/RainforestAlliance,UTZCertified,GlobalGAP andProTerra) produced incon-
clusive results. Calculations based on this (very small) sample and 2017 Standards
Map data suggest that forestry VSS, on average, have the highest number of require-
ments and process criteria formally corresponding to each of the SDGs, whereas
cotton VSS have the lowest. The average numbers for multiple commodity VSS are
somewhere in the middle.14 The chart below (Fig. 2) illustrates this, using the data
for multiple commodity VSS as an orientation value (i.e. the ranking follows the
descending order of SDG correspondences per multiple commodity VSS).
3 From Paper to Practice: Examining VSS Impacts
on the Ground
Even if standards requirements and processes are perfectly in line with the SDGs—
which is not always the case, as the previous content analysis has shown—VSS will
have anecdotal rather than transformative, and in the worst case, harmful impacts
if formal criteria are not properly implemented by producers, processors, manufac-
turers, traders and/or retailers. All VSS forming part of the formal content analysis
in the previous section cover at least the (farm/plantation) level of extraction and
production, whereas the processing/manufacturing as well as the trading/retailing
levels is covered less frequently, according to Standards Map data from 2017. This
in itself might weaken the impact of some initiatives.
Moving beyond the StandardsMap sample and turning to VSS impacts in general,
it is encouraging to see that, in recent years, VSS impact studies have become more
numerous and moved beyond basic facts such as the number of certified producers
and the market share of certified products (UNFSS, 2016, p. 2). The socioeconomic
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Fig. 2 Comparison of VSS for cotton, forestry products and multiple commodities regarding their
average number of requirements/process criteria corresponding to each SDG (for better readability,
numbers are only indicated for multiple commodity VSS (upper bar)). Source Author
situation of producers and their communities as well as environmental conditions in
the production area are increasingly being covered. This is dearly needed for clarity
on whether formal VSS requirements and processes are properly and continuously
implemented by producers and other entities covered by a scheme so that it has real-
life impacts, asmentioned above. A related question is whether VSS adoption as such
really leads to higher sales prices and better market access for those who get certified,
and whether poorer, vulnerable producers and their workers and communities can
benefit from this as well.
An early broad-based impact assessment conducted by the Committee on Sustain-
ability Assessment (COSA) found moderately positive, though sometimes inconclu-
sive, economic, social and environmental impacts of coffee and cocoa certification
in 12 countries at the producer and farm level (COSA, 2013, p. 3). The authors note
that in most cases the cost of entry and training for VSS were (partly) covered by
external partners such as development agencies, NGOs, buyers and traders, which
may no longer be the case once larger numbers of producers aspire certification.
COSA is a consortium built on partnerships with numerous organisations, ranging
from national and international research institutions to VSS initiatives.
A more recent independent literature review on certification in agriculture finds
positive effects of VSS adoption for certified producers and their households with
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regard to prices (plus 14%), sales income (plus 11%) and children’s schooling (plus
6%), but negative effects on workers’ wages (minus 13%), as well as unclear effects
regarding yields, household income,wealth and illness, again at the level of producers
and their respective households (Oya, Schaefer, Skalidou,McCosker,&Langer 2017,
p. vi). Positive contributions of certification towards “Increased dignity, confidence,
control and choice” were found by a Centre for Evaluation/Centrum für Evaluation
(CEval) study commissioned byFairtrade on the scheme’s poverty reduction impacts,
based on six country and sector case studies with comparative data from 2011/12 and
2017/18. There were also moderate contributions to “improved household income,
assets and standards of living”, “increased environmental sustainability and resilience
to climate change”, and “enhanced influence and status of small producers” according
to this study, but even less significant effects in four other areas such as “improved
access to basic services” (Mauthofer, Schneider, Väth, & von Cölln, 2018, p. 124).
A synthesis report on agriculturalVSSput together by ISEAL,RainforestAlliance
and WWF for their new Evidensia online platform looks at economic criteria in
particular (yield, price, costs and income). Only 13 out of 51 studies in this review
focus on net household incomes for certified farms. In 31% of cases, these were
higher or significantly higher than for non-certified farms, while in 69% of cases
(nine in absolute numbers), there was no significant difference (Evidensia, 2019,
p. 18).
Several VSS assessments have focused on potential environmental contributions,
such as a recent synthesis report on conservation outcomes, compiled by theMeridian
Institute. A section based on seven different studies states that the adoption of
certification reduced deforestation rates in some settings, specifically Ethiopia and
Colombia as well as primary forests in Indonesia (Komives et al., 2018, p. 4).There
was no reported difference between certified and non-certified areas in other settings,
however. Impacts on plant diversity were generally found to be positive and impacts
on fauna diversity mixed, again based on a very small sample of five studies covering
plant and three covering fauna biodiversity (ibid., p. 18).
The clearest positive income and, based on fewer examples, environmental effects
seem to relate to the adoption of “organic” standards in farming, as production costs
and yields tend to be similar to conventional production (or even more favourable)
while sales prices are higher, according to a number of recent impact studies. This
leads to higher profits and/or household income for farmers (but not necessarily for
their workers, who are not specifically looked at) across different commodity and
country samples such as rice from northern India (Eyhorn, van den Berg, Dedock,
Maat, & Srivastava, 2018), strawberries from central Brazil (Resende Filho et al.,
2017) and tea from northern Vietnam (Doanh, Thuong, & Heo, 2018). As for these
three reports, two of them do not specify under what type of scheme organic farms
were certified. The India case study of smallholder farmers in hilly Uttarakhand
mentions Indian and Swiss standards as well as EU Council Regulation (EC) No.
834/2007, which is about the EU’s public organic VSS scheme and has a predomi-
nantly agricultural and technical focus. Apart from higher profits for local producers
due to less inputs and higher yields and sales prices, this study found that organic
30 J. Blankenbach
management improved soil quality and helped save irrigation water. What is inter-
esting about the Uttarakhand case is the role of one Indian processing company,
Nature Bio-Foods Ltd., business partner of Swiss retailer Coop, in providing farmers
with organic seeds and biofertiliser at cost prices. The company also paid for partic-
ipating farmers’ third-party certification against the aforementioned organic stan-
dards, as well as for additional Fairtrade certification, and purchased the certified
paddy for an agreed (Fairtrade) price plus an organic premium of 10–15%.
Without such company engagement, potential transformative impacts of VSS
schemes may be hampered by their lack of accessibility for poorer producers, espe-
cially smallholders, who are in the most urgent need of livelihood gains but struggle
with high certification and implementation costs, among other challenges. In many
cases, the bulk of the certification benefits may thus have gone to larger, better-
organised producers in regionswith higher production capacities, aswell as to traders,
brands and retailers (UNFSS, 2016, p. 4).What possibly reinforces this pattern is that
real price premiums for producers of certified goods still largely depend on external
(market) factors, i.e. whether buyers are willing to pay a higher price. What seems
to work well for organic farming may work less well for other forms of certification.
Only three out of 16 VSS in the sample used in the previous section include a formal
internal requirement of price premiums, according to the Standards Map as per 2017
data. Carlson and Palmer (2016, pp. 130–132), focusing on the “less tangible bene-
fits of certification”, point to the general unwillingness of powerful retailers to pay a
premium to suppliers.
Other work more specifically addresses the social impacts of VSS adoption, such
as an independent study by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),
University of London, from 2014 on VSS implementation in Uganda and Ethiopia.
It contends that research on Fairtrade standards has so far overly focused on the small
farm household using family labour, rather than looking at the plight of seasonal and
casual agricultural wage workers (Cramer, Johnston, Oya, & Sender, 2014, pp. 20–
22). Considering the scope of other studies, there seems to be a general need to
look beyond the level of producers and smallholders to uncover the situation of
their workers and/or domestic servants, who may be much worse off. Indeed, the
poor wages and labour conditions of workers covered by the SOAS sample did not
improve under certification, according to the study (ibid., p. 15).
A growing body of evidence-based academic and NGO research has also pointed
to the failures of social auditing, a practice that is part of virtually every VSS
scheme, in capturing abuses of the human rights of workers and communities in
global value chains.15 The European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights
(ECCHR, 2018), for instance, comments on the Ali Enterprises fire in a supplier
factory in Karachi, Pakistan: “Th[e…] audit failed to notice a range of infractions
on the international standards it was upholding (SA 8000) and Pakistani safety stan-
dards regulations that would prove fatal, including an illegally constructed floor,
15See the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s web portal and blog series on “Beyond
Social Auditing” at https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/beyond-social-auditing.
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and defunct fire alarm system, as well as the presence of child labour and struc-
tural excessive overtime”.16 A research report on forced labour risks in cocoa supply
chains in Ghana and tea supply chains in India, based on, inter alia, in-depth inter-
views with more than 120 tea and cocoa workers and a survey of over 1000 tea and
cocoa workers, states: “Some of the worst cases of exploitation documented within
our research occurred on ethically certified [tea] plantations” (LeBaron, 2018, p. 3).
Auditors, in many cases from a formally independent third-party, certify and
verify standards compliance at the supplier level, which is then cited by end-user
companies and big brands, but the system is unreliable for a number of reasons.
Audit firms may be subject to market pressures and compete for clients, for instance;
there is a clear conflict of interest if the cost of certification is met by the entity that is
audited, e.g. a supplier farm or factory. A recent Guardian report on migrant worker
exploitation at tomato farms in southern Italy quotes an NGO worker arguing that
“[w]hen the person being inspected is the same person paying the inspector’s fee,
99.9% of the time the inspector will say: ‘No, you’re not exploiting anyone’” (Jones
& Awokoya, 2019). Also, audits may just require “checklist compliance” (Terwindt
& Burckhardt, 2018), miss out on contextual factors ranging from building safety
to religious discrimination, or proceed without an on-site visit, as alleged in the
Ali Enterprises case (ECCHR, 2018). The Guardian report on tomato farming in
the Italian south found certification bodies to “perform an arm’s-length box-ticking
exercise, and [to] rarely visit the farms” (Jones & Awokoya, 2019). There are also
accounts of business owners literally cheating on auditors and telling their workers
to change working practices while the audit is ongoing (LeBaron, 2018, p. 41).
Engagement with workers, who could point to shortcomings if there were appro-
priate and safe arrangements for them to speak out, remains low or superficial. For
instance, the tea and cocoa research mentioned above found that 95% of surveyed
workers on Ghanaian cocoa plantations were unaware whether they were working
on a certified site (LeBaron, 2018, p. 42). All this has led critics to argue that “these
programs mask significant risks for workers at the bottom and brands atop global
supply chains”, and that voluntary certification is “part of the problem, not the solu-
tion” (WSRNetwork, 2018, p. 3). The trend of VSS achievingmore andmore signifi-
cantmarket shares in individual commodities such as coffee, cocoa and tea17(Lernoud
et al., 2018, p. 4) is thus not as good news as it potentially could be.
The growing evidence of human rights risks and abuses going unnoticed by social
audits, including VSS certification and verification audits, should also inform the
debate on SDG implementation, as SDGs “seek to realise the human rights of all”
according to the 2030 Agenda (UN GA 2015, p. 1). A study by the Danish Institute
for Human Rights (DIHR) claims that more than 90% of the SDG targets are linked
16See the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s coverage of an OECD complaint filed by
NGOs against auditing firm RINA, including RINA’s response, at https://www.business-humanr
ights.org/en/ngo-coalition-files-oecd-complaint-with-italian-ncp-against-auditor-rina-for-allege
dly-failing-to-detect-safety-labour-abuses-at-ali-enterprises-factory-in-pakistan-incl-co.
17According to the 2018 “State of Sustainability Markets” report (Lernoud et al., 2018, p. 4), at
least 25.8% of global coffee area, 22.8% of global cocoa area and 13.2% of global tea area are
certified.
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to core international human rights and labour standards (Filskov & Feiring, 2018,
p. 1). VSS content analysis in the previous section has shown that many human and
labour rights are explicitly listed as formalVSS requirements. As long as certification
and verification audits, however, miss out on rights abuses, the practical value of such
requirements remains limited.
Human rights due diligence, as established by the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs; OHCHR, 2011), has emerged as a central
and practicable concept specifying companies’ responsibilities in respecting human
rights across all their operations and global value chains. Due diligence is about them
“assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon
the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed”
(ibid., p. 17), all in close collaboration with those potentially or actually affected
by negative human rights impacts. Another recent discussion paper put forward
by the DIHR argues “that the implementation of the UNGPs can be the single-most
important contribution bybusiness to the realisation of theSDGs” (Morris,Wrzoncki,
& Lysgaard, 2019, p. 9), and thus to real transformations of the status quo.
In order for human rights due diligence to be effective, companies need to inter-
nalise due diligence steps rather than outsourcing them to an external scheme. This
makes all the more sense as the kind of price and time pressure exerted by many big
brands is said to have been drivingworker exploitation at the supplier level, e.g. in the
garment (HRW, 2019) and food (Jones &Awokoya, 2019) sectors. The Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance
for Responsible Business Conduct, providing practical orientation for companies
on how human rights due diligence can be implemented, states that “[p]articipation
in an initiative does not shift responsibility from the enterprise to the initiative for
adverse impacts that it causes, contributes to or to which it is directly linked” (OECD,
2018, p. 53). Questions of responsibility can become questions of legal liability once
human rights due diligence becomes part of binding regulation.18 Pioneering legisla-
tive examples such as the French Duty of Vigilance Law are not limited to human
rights as they legallymandate respect for human rights and the environment into busi-
ness activities (ECCJ, 2017, p. 1), thus having considerable transformative power
in line with the SDGs. What role VSS initiatives in their current shape can play in
this context is questionable, given their shortcomings in uncovering and mitigating
abuse. If they are to play a role in supporting—not replacing—companies’ human
rights and environmental due diligence, they will, among other steps, have to further
align VSS requirements with human rights (and thus with the SDGs, as the two
areas are so closely linked), i.e. at least with those expressed in the International
Bill of Human Rights and the ILO’s core/fundamental Conventions. Most impor-
tantly, however, the role of workers and other rights-holders in standards design,
governance, implementation and assurance needs to be strengthened.
18See the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s web portal and blog series on “Mandatory
Due Diligence” at https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/mandatory-due-diligence.
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4 Conclusions and Recommendations
To conclude, VSS, in theory, link to the SDGs in many ways, but there are practical
constraints regarding their transformative impacts and on-the-ground contributions
towards SDG implementation. As long as voluntary certification provides a fig leaf
for perpetuated human rights abuse in global value chains that goes unnoticed due
to unreliable audits, it is at least in some contexts part of the problem rather than the
solution.
At a formal level, a semi-statistical analysis of Standards Map data from 2017
in this chapter pointed to various correspondences between VSS criteria and the 17
SDGs (Fig. 1), suggesting that the detailed requirements ofmanyVSS cover different
aspects of the 2030 Agenda. There are areas with less alignment, however, such as
poverty reduction, climate change, health as well as gender, where VSS are thin on
concrete requirements even on paper. Most of these issues, like many others covered
by the SDGs, directly relate to human rights.
Regarding on-the-ground impacts, the increasing number and quality of impact
studies is good news. Some of them have been commissioned or co-authored by indi-
vidual schemes or related organisations, which could pose a credibility problem, but
this was not further explored here. Most studies so far have found modest or incon-
clusive sustainable development impacts in the context of VSS adoption. Improve-
ments of social, environmental and economic indicators may be relatively difficult
to measure in some contexts, but there also seems to be an indication that formal
requirements are often inadequately implemented by those getting certified, and/or
that there is a lack of tangible certification benefits, such as higher sales prices and
better market access. What is even more disturbing is the number of documented
cases of social audit failure, including in the context of certification. Conditions
such as those reported for some cocoa and tea plantations by LeBaron (2018), or in
Jones’ and Awokoya’s (2019) Guardian feature on Italian tomato farms, as well as in
many other reports, raise serious doubts as to whether VSS schemes and the audits
they require can reliably uncover and mitigate human and labour rights abuses. If
these shortcomings cannot be resolved, this will severely hamper the transformative
potential and impacts of VSS initiatives, given the mutually reinforcing relationship
between human rights and the SDGs.
As VSS seem to be there to stay, however, governments, businesses and civil
society should engage with each other, and with standards organisations, to explore
andmaximise any potential “common good” benefits of certificationwhilemitigating
deficiencies and pitfalls and promoting alternatives, including regulation.
• With corporate due diligence on human rights and the environment emerging
as the global standard of practice for responsible business conduct in line with
human rights obligations and the SDGs, there should be an open an honest debate
on what role VSS schemes can—or cannot—play in this context, and whether
and how they can be adapted. It is crucial to recognise that prime responsibility
for human rights and environmental due diligence across a company’s global
value chains is with the company, to avoid situations where no one feels—and
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can be held—accountable. Arguably, many businesses willing to improve respect
for human rights and the environment have relied too heavily on external initia-
tives, including VSS, which then have not always delivered what they (seemed to)
promise, especially when it comes to failures in uncovering human rights abuse
through certification and verification audits. VSS schemes should state clearly
what their limitations are, and companies should be clear about this and internalise
human rights and environmental due diligence, effectively integrating it into all
their operations rather than outsourcing it. There may be ways in which funda-
mentally reformed VSS schemes can support—not replace—this, e.g. by helping
companies engage with local players and rights-holders, provided that the initia-
tive itself manages to step up its worker engagement and establishes trustful NGO
relations on the ground. This includes accessible complaints and grievance mech-
anisms where whistle-blowers and victims of abuse can speak out without fear of
reprisals, including sub-contracted or casual workers and surrounding communi-
ties. At a formal level, VSS schemes should further align their requirements with
all human rights, which will also strengthen their alignment with the SDGs as
there are strong interconnections. At a practical level, they should substantially
improve the reliability and independence of certification and verification audits,
introduce additional checks, and publish audit results, including negative results.
Most importantly, the influence of workers and other local rights-holders in stan-
dards design, governance, implementation and assurance needs to be credibly
strengthened.
• VSS organisations, academia, civil society and governments could explore oppor-
tunities for integrated sustainable development impact monitoring of VSS and
SDG implementation attempts, making use of and strengthening current global
efforts on statistical capacity and better availability of sustainable development
data. The Cape Town Global Action Plan for Sustainable Development Data
acknowledges that “[e]ffective planning, follow-up and review of the implemen-
tation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development requires the collection,
processing, analysis and dissemination of an unprecedented amount of data and
statistics at local, national, regional and global levels and by multiple stakehold-
ers” (HLG-PCCB, 2017, p. 1). Matching SDG monitoring results with data on
VSS adoption in a specific region or district may provide cost-efficient opportu-
nities for continuous impact monitoring at an unprecedented scale. For improved
development impacts and human rights compliance, the issue of price premiums
securedby the standards system (e.g. through a fund supported by end-user compa-
nies) is of utmost importance as well as requirements on fair purchasing practices
by lead firms and living wages along their value chains that are actually monitored
and implemented, including for wage and casual workers in smallholder produc-
tion. Progress on these and any other human rights- and environment-related
matters cannot be left to voluntary initiatives alone, however, but requires effective
mandatory due diligence regulation for companies, among other measures.
• Governments should support independent VSS impact assessments and surveys
that also look at auditing practices, conducted by leading academics in collabo-
ration with workers and other rights-holders. Governments should also promote
2 Voluntary Sustainability Standards and the Sustainable Development … 35
“standards for standards” at national and international levels, including manda-
tory legal requirements, e.g. on audit transparency and auditor liability, to guide
and harmonise fundamental reforms of VSS requirements, processes, and most
importantly, implementation and assurance. National platforms on sustainability
standards, connected to one another through a global “platform of platforms” such
as the UN Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS), represent one low-barrier
option to bridge coordination gaps, to harmonise the plethora of standards, and
to increase local ownership. The Indian government launched such a platform
supported by the UNFSS in 2016 already, mandating the autonomous Quality
Council of India (QCI) to host its secretariat. Similarly, the Brazilian, Chinese and
Mexican governments co-founded sustainbility standards platforms with support
from the UNFSS. Platforms should now ensure proper worker and rights-holder
engagement and also explore legislative options.
• Considering that the SDGs build on human rights, and that corporate human rights
and environmental due diligence potentially represents the single-most important
business contribution to sustainable development, governments should promote
mandatory due diligence regulation at the national, regional and global (UN) level.
Such regulation needs to make clear that prime responsibility for due diligence
lies with the company, and that therefore, external initiatives cannot replace but
at best support it, if fundamentally reformed.
Annex
Sustainable Development Goals
Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote
sustainable agriculture
Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong
learning opportunities for all
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation
for all
Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for
all
Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and
productive employment and decent work for all
Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industri-
alisation and foster innovation
Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries
Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustain-
able
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Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts*
Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for
sustainable development
Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems,
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse
land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and
inclusive institutions at all levels
Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partner-
ship for sustainable development
*Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the
global response to climate change.
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With the increase in spending power and public awareness about health and envi-
ronmental concerns on the one hand, and the progressive elimination of quotas and
reduction of tariff barriers on the other, the use of standards and technical regulations
in international trade has increased exponentially.1 Goods and services traded across
borders need to meet multiple requirements—mandatory or voluntary, international
or domestic, public or private, sustainability-targeted or otherwise—before being
able to access international markets.
Not all standards are designedwith the objective of sustainability inmind; sustain-
ability standards are a type of standards that are increasingly used and accepted,
based on the recognition that they serve important social objectives (eg. protection
of health and environment) that are otherwise ignored by the private market. Product
standards for weights, measures, voltage, quality, etc., have a history dating back to
the Industrial Revolution, with initial concerns focused on the objectives of safety
and interoperability. Sykes points at the irony of the fact that product standards
and regulations, originally created for promoting trade, should be viewed as trade
barriers (Sykes, 1995, p. 1). In the 1970s, as social and environmental causes gained
in strength, standards were appropriated as instruments to promote sustainability by
qualifying the impact of market forces (Sykes, 1995, p. 1; Gale, Ascui, & Lovell,
2017, p. 70). At the same time, scepticism over the role of sustainability standards
as protectionist measures led to their being described as “wolves (of protectionism)
1Robert Baldwin’s description of non-tariff barriers has been quoted often, “[t]he lowering of tariffs
has, in effect, been like draining a swamp. The lower water level has revealed all the snags and
stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared away.” (cited in Baldwin, 2000, p. 237).
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disguised under sheepskin” (Thorstensen & Vieira, 2016, p. 9). Potential benefits
and risks thus accompany the use of sustainability standards in equal measure.
The use of sustainability standards is further complicated by the proliferation of
“private standards”, i.e. standards initiated and driven by private and non-state actors.
Marx, Maertens, Swinnen and Wouters (2012, p. 16) point out that “…while earlier
stages in history saw a move from private to public regulation …what we now see
is an opposite movement, back again from public to private”. Principal reasons for
the turn to private standards include (i) the fact that private standards are an effective
means of managing global supply chains, (ii) the fact that standards are viewed by
consumers as effectivemeans to attain sustainability objectives (Mavroidis&Robert,
2016, p. 4) and (iii) the fact that private standards can stay safe of legal controls that
exist for public standards.
The general legal disciplines that apply to standards apply to sustainability stan-
dards aswell. Because standards havemarket access implications, a role for theWorld
Trade Organization (WTO) in regulating and managing their proliferation and appli-
cation is indisputable. The WTO rules include specific provisions and dedicated
legal instruments that address standards. Additionally, the scope and application of
these legal provisions have been interpreted by its dispute settlement system (DSS),
ordinarily clarifying the rules through judicial elaboration but sometimes resulting in
further obfuscation of the existing provisions. The context of voluntary sustainability
standards (VSS)—and private standards in particular—is new to theWTO; currently
the organization, based on its purist understanding of itself as an inter-governmental
entity, does not formally regulate private standards. However, the question ofwhether
it should do so has been under discussion for some years, even though no consensus
exists around this issue yet. Ambiguity remains over theWTO’s role in the context of
“private standards”, even as they increasingly occupy larger swathes of the landscape
of sustainability standards.
The use of sustainability standards has worrisome implications for the “devel-
oping countries” in particular, which have, in general, remained wary of the idea of
using trade as an instrument to achieve sustainability goals. The developing countries
expect theWTOrules to facilitatemarket access for themand the use of standards—in
the setting of which they have very little participation—is perceived as an obstruc-
tion to the achievement of this objective. For the “emerging economies”, however,
there is pressure to undertake measures to ensure that their exports are environment-
friendly. The development-related concerns over the use of sustainability and private
standards have thus been a core area of debate.
Even while the potentially trade-restrictive impact of standards and technical
regulations has been a cause of concern, the WTO has displayed a willingness to
recognize that the use of sustainability standards can be complementary to the cause
of international trade. The 2005 World Trade Report of the WTO, titled Exploring
the Links Between Trade, Standards and the WTO, recognized that standard regimes
and international trade rules needed to bemutually supportive for an effective trading
system (WTO, 2005). A 2017 joint publication of the UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and the WTO, titled Trade and Food Standards, argued that
countries—and developing countries in particular—need to proactively participate
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in the development of food standards if theywish to be gainers from the benefits of the
burgeoning global trade. Roberto Azevedo, the current WTO Director-General, has
argued that the alignment of food standards and international trade will not only help
ensure food safety but also deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
(FAO & WTO, 2017).2 In April 2019, the WTO—along with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)—organized
the International Forum on Food Safety and Trade at the WTO Headquarters in
Geneva, where the role of food standards in ensuring food safety was discussed.3
This focus on issues of safety and sustainability seems indicative of the in-principle
acceptance by the WTO of the fact that international trade is to be conducted within
the SDG framework.
This chapter is an overview of the WTO’s interface with sustainability standards
and is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses the rules of the WTO that relate to
standards in general, points at select judicial interpretations relating to the use of
standards and highlights the relevant committees in which discussions on standards
take place. Section 3 discusses private standards in particular and analyses the argu-
ments in relation to the nature of the possible engagement of the WTO with them.
Section 4 describes the special status of the developing countries in the context of
sustainability standards and discusses where the “emerging economies” stand in this
regard. Section 5 attempts tentative conclusions.
2 WTO Disciplines on Sustainability Standards
The interface of the WTO with the issue of sustainability standards is viewed below
in three contexts: (1) legal provisions; (2) judicial interpretations; and (3) committee
structures.
1. Legal Provisions and Sustainability Standards
Regulation of standards arose as a concern for the multilateral trading system (MTS)
at the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which
ran through 1973–1979. The Tokyo Round Standards Code4 recognized the posi-
tive contribution that standards could make to international trade and provided for
sustainability standards by “recognizing that no country should be prevented from
taking measures necessary … for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, of the environment …” (GATT, 1979, Preamble). Since it was the sole legal
document at the time, its coverage was broad and included both regulations and
2Food safety is closely linked with sustainability as its impacts both the social as well as
environmental realms.
3The Future of Food Safety—Transforming Knowledge into Action for People, Economies and the
Environment, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/faowhowtoapril19_e.htm.
4For a history of the development of the StandardsCode, see (Thorstensen&Vieira, 2016, pp. 12–13.
For a detailed, article-by-article commentary on the Standards Code, see (Middleton, 1980).
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standards (mandatory and voluntary specifications) applicable to industrial and agri-
cultural goods. The Standards Code was hailed as an “innovative document” as it
brought within the normative purview of the MTS an area that till then had not been
subjected to multilateral supervision (Middleton, 1980, p. 201).
The Standards Code, however, failed to prevent trade disruptions caused by tech-
nical regulations and standards (Marceau & Trachtman, 2002, p. 814). Sykes, in his
more cautious assessment of the Code, argues that the Code was effective only in
instances where member states were “…determined to pursue formal dispute resolu-
tion…the day-to-day process of adopting new standards and regulations…may not
have been affected much” (Sykes, 1995. p. 77). There was a felt need to replace
the plurilateral Standards Code with a multilateral agreement binding on all parties.
Also, with agricultural liberalization brought under theGATT in theUruguay Round,
a need was felt to separately address sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPMs)
relating to agricultural goods (Debroy, 2005, p. 3).
In the 1990s, the use of TBT and SPS measures grew sharply as tariff barriers
declined (Thorstensen & Vieira, 2016, p. 13, Figs. 1 and 2). The 1990s also saw
the active engagement of civil society organizations in partnering with businesses
to “green” global supply chains through sustainability standard-setting in sectors
such as organic food and sustainable forestry and fisheries (Gale et al., 2017, p. 65).
Two separate agreements were negotiated during theUruguayRound (1986–1994) to
replace the Tokyo Round Standards Code, which formed the basis for the negotiation
and adoption of these agreements (WTO & OECD, 2019, p. 20). In distinguishing
between the scope of the two WTO agreements, the “type of measure” (all technical
regulations, except when they are SPMs) acts as a determinant for the TBT Agree-
ment whereas the “purpose of measure” (any measure—not necessary technical—to
protect human, animal or plant life or health) determines the application of the SPS
Agreement.5
The two agreements of theWTO that deal with the use of environmental and social
standards are the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement). Both
agreements regulate the use of certain types of restrictive measures in international
trade, allowing their use under permitted circumstances, yet qualifying their use so
that international trade is not (or only minimally) adversely impacted. As has been
pointed out (Marceau&Trachtman, 2002, p. 815; Thorstensen&Vieira, 2016, p. 15),
these agreements represent “… ‘interpretation notes’ of the rules enshrined in the
exceptions of Article XX of GATT”.6
5SeeWTO website, Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm.
6Article XX of the GATT, which sets out the “General Exceptions” to core WTO obligations reads:
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: … (b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health; … (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible
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The preamble to the TBT Agreement recognizes that international standards
contribute to improved efficiency in international trade and talks of the positive need
to encourage the development of international standards. What must be ensured,
however, is that technical regulations and standards do not create unnecessary obsta-
cles to international trade (WTO, 1994a, Preamble, emphasis added). These agree-
ments thus constitute a “balancing act”—on the one hand, allowing their use for
legitimate policy needs ofmember states, while on the other hand, requiring that their
use does not unnecessarily restrict trade (Sampson, 2005, p. 115; Wolfrum, Stoll,
& Anja, 2007). The TBT Agreement recognizes and defines three forms of regula-
tory barriers to trade—technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment
procedures.7 A core provision of the TBT Agreement mandates member states to
ensure that technical regulations do not constitute “unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade”, i.e. are not “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective….” (WTO, 1994a, Article 2.2). The TBT Agreement also has annexed to
it a “Code of Good Practice”, which lays out the disciplines for the “preparation,
adoption and application of standards” by all standardizing bodies—governmental
or non-governmental (WTO, 1994a, Annex 3).
The SPS Agreement, similarly, recognizes the right of members to take sanitary
and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant
life or health (WTO, 1994b, Article 2.1) provided they ensure that “…any sanitary
or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health … and is not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence…” (WTO, 1994b, Article 2.2). Members are to ensure that their SPMs
do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between members and SPMs are not
applied so as to constitute a disguised restriction on international trade (WTO, 1994b,
Article 2.3, emphasis added).
The SPS Agreement promotes the use of international standards developed by
international standard-setting bodies and recognizes some—the Codex Alimentarius
(for food safety), theWorldOrganisation for AnimalHealth (OIE) (for animal health)
and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) (for plant safety)—whose
standards are deemed to be consistent with the requirements of the WTO disciplines
[WTO, 1994b: Preamble, Article 3(4)]. “The international standards produced by
the “three sisters”, while voluntary, provide the basis for harmonization of the SPS
measures adopted by WTO members, unless … there is a scientific justification
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption…” (GATT, 1947: Article XX).
7As defined in the TBT Agreement, a technical regulation is “a document which lays down product
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable admin-
istrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory” (WTO, 1994a, Annex 1:1, emphasis
added). A standard is “a document approved by a recognized body that provides, for common and
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production
methods, with which compliance is not mandatory” (WTO, 1994a, Annex 1:2, emphasis added). A
conformity assessment procedure is “any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that
relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled” (WTO, 1994a, Annex 1:3,
emphasis added).
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and based on a risk assessment, a member decides to introduce a measure that would
result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection” (WTO&OECD, 2019,
p. 40). Thus, although member states are free to choose higher levels of protection
than international standards, such measures have to be based on a risk assessment
carried out by the member state that establishes “sufficient scientific evidence” for
the existence of the risk (Sampson, 2005, p. 117). The TBT Agreement similarly
requires member states to use “relevant international standards” as a basis for their
national regulations and standards but it neither defines “international standards”,
nor does it list out recognized international standardizing bodies.8
Marceau and Trachtman (2002, p. 816), in an exhaustive article comparing the
GATT, the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement,9 identify the following disci-
plines that the TBT and SPS Agreements together encompass: non-discrimination
(most favoured nation and national treatment); necessity and proportionality; scien-
tific basis; harmonization (conformity with international standards); mutual recog-
nition and equivalence; internal consistency; permission for precautionary action;
and balancing and product/process issues. Besides the TBT and SPS disciplines,
some provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) also apply,
in particular, Articles I, III, XI and XX of GATT. In principle, then, the use of
standards—for legitimate purposes—is not a problem in the WTO. Problems arise,
however, with variant interpretations of what is “legitimate”. It is often difficult to
distinguish between an intentionally protectionist measure and a non-protectionist
measure, with a genuine objective, that incidentally restricts trade (Marceau &
Trachtman, 2002, p. 811) and this becomes thekey reason for disputes amongmember
states.
2. Judicial Interpretation and Sustainability Standards
Judicial interpretations by theWTOpanels andAppellate Body (AB) have elaborated
upon the content of the legal provisions relating to standards. The WTO website
lists 49 disputes that have cited (uptil September 2019) the provisions of the SPS
Agreement (spanning measures relating to agricultural products; beef, meat, seafood
and poultry products; fruits and vegetables; seeds and oil; bottled water, wood and
textiles, biotech products and cigarettes, etc.) and 54 disputes that have cited the
provisions of the TBTAgreement in the request for consultations (coveringmeasures
relating to gasoline and biodiesel; meat, fisheries and dairy, pharmaceuticals, textiles,
tobacco and cigarettes, etc.).10 Given the close relationship and overlap between the
8In 2000, in order to elucidate what “relevant international standards” could mean, the TBT
Committee adopted a decision laying down the principles based on which international standards
should be developed by international standard-setting bodies so as to be considered as “relevant
international standards”: (i) transparency; (ii) openness (iii) impartiality and consensus; (iv) effec-
tiveness and relevance; (v) coherence; and (vi) the development dimension (WTO & OECD, 2019,
pp. 41–42).
9For a tabulated comparison of the TBT and SPS Agreements, see (Thorstensen & Vieria, 2016,
pp. 57–62).
10For a complete listing of SPS-related and TBT-related disputes at theWTO, see https://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm.
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two agreements, very often, a dispute invokes measures of both the TBT and SPS
Agreements. However, the panels and Appellate Body dealt substantively with these
two agreements in only a few cases as most of the disputes were presumably resolved
during the mandatory consultation phase (WTO & OECD, 2019, p. 26).
Emerging interpretations on issues relating to standards can be viewed through
the work of the WTO Panels and AB. Several complex TBT- and SPS-related ques-
tions that have come up for consideration by the DSS deal with interpretations on
“technical regulation”, “like product” analysis, objectives fulfilled by a domestic
regulation, “least-trade-restrictive” regulations, “process and production methods”
(PPMs) “relevant international standard”, “precautionary principle”, “risk assess-
ment”, etc. More specifically, the WTO DSS increasingly engaged with aspects
relating to standards that are sought to be implemented through labels. Whether a
label is “mandatory” or “voluntary” in effect; what constitutes an “international stan-
dard”; whether labels are being used for genuine reasons with the interests of the
consumer in mind; what kind of information labels should be expected to carry are
all questions that have been addressed.While an exhaustive review of dispute-related
interpretations is not possible within the scope of this chapter, some interesting and
controversial interpretations are discussed below.
In the 2002 EC Sardines case, the importance of Codex Alimentarius harmonized
standards was demonstrated. In this case, Peru successfully challenged an EC regu-
lation under which only a species caught in European waters could be marketed as
“sardines”. As per an international standard set by the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion, however, a sardine species of the Pacific Ocean could be sold worldwide as
“sardines” along with a qualifying phrase such as “Pacific sardines” or “Peruvian
sardines”. The WTO panel and AB struck down the EC regulation as it was neither
based on the Codex standard nor did it demonstrate that the Codex standard was
inadequate to fulfil the EC’s legitimate objectives relating to “market transparency,
consumer protection, and fair competition” (Shaffer & Victor, 2002). The EC had
contended in this case that only standards that had been adopted by consensus by
international bodies could be considered to qualify as “relevant international stan-
dards”. The AB upheld the panel’s finding, stating, “…the definition of a “standard”
in … the TBT Agreement … does not require approval by consensus for standards
adopted by a “recognized body” of the international standardization community
(WTO, 2002, p. 63).
Two interesting interpretations came out of the 2012US-Tuna II dispute. The first
related to the characteristic of a measure that helps classify it either as a “standard” or
a “regulation”. A key characteristic that theWTOhas traditionally used to distinguish
standards from regulations is the voluntary or mandatory nature of the obligations
they entail, respectively. However, this distinctionwas rendered fuzzy in theUS-Tuna
II case. In this case, Mexico challenged a US measure regarding a “dolphin-safe”
label as violating the TBTAgreement and claimed that the USA had failed to comply
with applicable international standards.11 Interesting contestations of the voluntary
11The international standard at issue was the 1998 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conser-
vation Program (AIDCP), negotiated among fourteen Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) countries, US
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versus mandatory nature of technical regulations emerged in this dispute. Mexico
argued that the US requirements were mandatory because the label could be used
only when the requirements were met. USA contended that the labelling measure
was voluntary as it did not require all products to use the label. The panel ruled
in favour of Mexico on this point and found that the requirements to grant the label
weremandatory (WTO, 2011).12 TheAB upheld this view that the USmeasure was a
mandatory technical regulation and not a voluntary standard, since it imposed legally
enforceable conditions that must be met in order to have access to the “dolphin-safe”
label;13 “…the U.S. law effectively prohibits any mention of dolphin safety on cans
of tuna that do not meet U.S. regulatory requirements” (Shaffer, 2013, p. 195; WTO,
2012a). This interpretation throws a new light on the traditional distinction that the
TBT Agreement has maintained between a voluntary “standard” and a mandatory
“technical regulation” (Trujillo, 2012) and the AB ruling has opened a debate over
this distinction.
A second interpretation related to the question of what constitutes an “interna-
tional standard”. Article 2.4 of the TBTAgreement requires that, where international
standards exist, WTO member states are to use them as a basis for their regulations.
Mexico argued that the USA had failed to comply with international standards, in
this case, the 1998 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program
(AIDCP). While the panel agreed with Mexico’s contention that the AIDCP stan-
dard was an international standard and that the USA had failed to base its labelling
provisions on it, the AB disagreed with the panel and noted instead that “…under …
the TBT Agreement, an international standard must be adopted by “an international
andMexico, whichmandated the use of certain equipment and practices to prevent dolphinmortality
and injury. The US labelling regime under the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
(DPCIA), prohibited the use of labels that tuna products are “dolphin-safe” if tuna are caught by
“setting on dolphins” (chasing and encircling dolphins with a net in order to catch tuna) in the
ETP. For tuna caught in the ETP, access to the label requires an additional certification that “no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured” in the process. The labelling of tuna as “dolphin-safe”
was not a legal requirement. But Mexican tuna would lose US markets because only tuna that can
be labelled as dolphin-safe is preferred (Shaffer, 2013, p. 195). The Mexican tuna fleet was using
fishing practices that did not meet the criteria specified in the US law although they complied with
the “dolphin-safe” standards agreed upon in the less-stringent AIDCP.
12“…to the extent that they prescribe, in a binding and legally enforceable instrument, the manner
in which a dolphin-safe label can be obtained in the United States, and disallow any other use
of a dolphin-safe designation, the US tuna labelling measures “regulate” dolphin-safe labelling
requirements “in a binding or compulsory fashion”. It is not compulsory to meet these requirements
and to bear the label, in order to sell tuna on the US market… However, … no tuna product may be
labelled dolphin-safe … if it does not meet the conditions set out in the measures, and thus impose
a prohibition on the offering for sale in the United States of tuna products bearing a label referring
to dolphins and not meeting the requirements that they set out. (WTO, 2011, p.150, para 7.131).
13“In this case, … the measure at issue sets out a single and legally mandated definition of a
“dolphin-safe” tuna product and disallows the use of other labels on tuna products that do not
satisfy this definition. In doing so, … the US measure covers the entire field of what “dolphin-
safe” means in relation to tuna products. For these reasons, we find that the Panel did not err in
characterizing the measure at issue as a “technical regulation” within the meaning of … the TBT
Agreement”. (WTO, 2012, p. 80, para 199).
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standardizing body” and that the AIDCP did not qualify, since not all WTOmembers
could join it.” (Shaffer, 2013, p. 197). In other words, the AB averred that if a state
relies on a standard, then the characteristics of the body are salient to an assessment
of whether it is a “recognized international standard” (Wijkström & Devin, 2013,
p. 1028). The interpretations forwarded in this dispute are especially seen as being
problematic as they are likely to endanger market access for developing countries
(Trujillo, 2012).
Other than these illustrative cases, there are several others that address various
aspects relating to the issue of standards in general and sustainability standards
in particular. The application of sustainability standards will remain subject to the
interpretations of the WTO DSS, which constitutes a key component of the global
governance landscape applicable to sustainability standards (provided, of course,
that the WTO DSS itself survives the current crisis it finds itself in).
3. Committees and Sustainability Standards
Discussions relating to sustainability standards are also carried out within the rele-
vant committee structures of the WTO. The WTO Committee on Trade and Envi-
ronment (CTE) has been discussing voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) since
many years. In 2001, the CTE received a formal mandate to address “labelling for
environmental purposes” under the 2001 Doha Development Agenda (WTO, 2001:
Paragraph 32(iii)). TheCTEheld discussions on the sustainability of palmoil produc-
tion and trade (including the issue of standards) in May 2019, highlighting the need
to ensure that the growth opportunities in this sector are pursued in a way that the
environment is safeguarded (WTO, 2019). At the CTE, the developing countries
have consistently emphasized their concerns over the rapid proliferation of private
standards and the consequent market access difficulties but industrialized member
states have maintained that discussion should be limited to public measures.
TheTBTandSPSAgreements are supported by their two respective committees—
the Technical Barriers to Trade Committee and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Stan-
dards Committee. Additional to allowing for information exchange and discussion,
the committees provide a forum for raising “specific trade concerns” (STCs) relating
to draft measures of other members that may obstruct trade. When differences arise
between member states over the conformity of national measures relating to SPS
and TBT, STCs can be raised and addressed in the committees, preventing differ-
ences and frictions from blowing up into full-fledged disputes. It has been pointed
out that the conflict resolution contribution of the WTO is grossly undervalued if
only the settlement of formal disputes is considered (Horn, Mavroidis, &Wijkström,
2013); the STC mechanism can constitute a viable and effective alternative to the
formal DSS (Holzer, 2018). Discussions within the committee structures, however,
are outside of the formal negotiation track, even while the outcome of the discussions
may feed into the negotiations.
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3 WTO and Private Standards
No internationally recognized definition of “private standards” exists as of yet. In
order to distinguish between public and private standards, earlier literature asked
the question as to whose interests are taken into account in setting a standard, the
assumption being that while the former consolidate the interests of all stakeholders
(including externalities) in the economy, the latter narrowly pursue profits of private
companies (WTO, 2005, pp. 32–33). Such a distinction is based on anarrowdefinition
of “private standards” as it does not take into account the role of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in setting and implementing standards, expectedly not with a
“profit motive”. More expansive definitions of “private standards” refer to “…any
requirements that are established by non-governmental entities, including wholesale
or retail stores, national producer associations, civil society groups, or combinations
of them” (Thorstensen, Weissinger, & Sun, 2015, p. 1; Meliado, 2017, p. viii).
In the realm of VSS, in particular, private actors not only act alone to set standards
but also interact closely with governments and civil society actors [what Abbot and
Snidal (2009) refer to as the “governance triangle”] to form partnerships in order
to address sustainability impacts of global value chains (GVCs) (Lambin & Thor-
lakson, 2018). In fact, the harmonization of public and private standards is advocated
as constituting an important strategy for achieving positive welfare gains such as
sustainability. The nature of the interaction between public and private standards, it
is asserted, will be determined by the legitimacy of the standard (ITC, 2011, p. 10).
The subject matter of private standards, which most often relates to food safety, envi-
ronmental protection, animal welfare, fair trade, labour, human rights, etc.,14 points
to a large overlap between sustainability standards and private standards.
Private standards are a concern because of several reasons. First, private standards
add to the already massive proliferation of existing standards that complicate inter-
national trade. Starting with sectors such as agriculture, forestry, aquaculture and
apparel, private standards are now found in almost all sectors. For suppliers, espe-
cially the smaller ones, the “proliferation and increased influence” of private stan-
dards is cumbersome (Thorestensen et al., 2015, p. 1). Private standards contribute
to further fragmentation in the field of standardization, leading to the possible risk
of “standards shopping”. Second, the content of private standards is perceived as
being much more rigid than public-sector standards and without scientifically estab-
lished justification. The process of their adoption is seen as lacking in democracy
and transparency (Mbengue, 2011).
Third, as per common understanding, private standards are viewed as, by defini-
tion, voluntary while public standards can be either mandatory or voluntary (WTO,
14See examples of private standards listed in Table 1 (Thorstensen & Vieira, 2016, p. 71). Exam-
ples of private voluntary standards schemes listed by Mbengue (2011) include “the ‘Carrefour
Filière Qualité ’ standard, the ‘British Retail Consortium Global Standard—Food’, the ‘QS Qual-
itat Sicherheit’, the ‘Label Rouge’, the ‘Global Food Safety Initiative’, as well as the International
Standards Organization (ISO) standards: ‘ISO 22000: Food safety management systems’ and ‘ISO
22005: Traceability in the feed and food chain’” (Mbengue, 2011).
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2005, p. 33). But private standards may not be as “voluntary” as they are projected
to be as they often act as necessary conditions for market access. This is especially
the case when they are implicitly endorsed by governments, thereby transforming
their voluntary nature to a de facto mandatory one. Marx (2017, pp. 3, 12) ques-
tions the relevance of the distinction between public and private standards based on
two arguments—(i) private standards are often based on public norms and (ii) when
governments back private standards, they become a part of “public” governance. Such
“incorporation by reference” is problematic because when a private standard finds
government backing, “…the rule becomes mandatory but the process of developing
the standard remains private” (Mavroidis & Robert, 2016, p. 14).
Fourth, the legal implications of the use of private standards need to be recognized;
since these standards do not fall within the normative purview of the WTO regime, a
government could choose to support a private standard to avoid its WTO obligations
instead of setting its own public standard which would need to be WTO compliant.
This would undermine the structure of theWTOAgreements, which do not recognize
private standards unless they are “backed by governments” (Thorstensen and Vieira,
2016, p. 49). Fifth, the developing countries face greater difficulties in dealing with
such standards as small-scale producers will bear a greater risk of exclusion from the
market if they do not comply with them (Thorestensen et al. 2015, p. 50; Mbengue,
2011).
While the WTO has long discussed the issue of private standards, it has stopped
short of bringing private standards within its normative purview. Discussions on
private standards have taken place in the committee structures of the WTO, with the
SPS Committee discussing the issue since 2005–2006. The issue of private standards
caught the limelight when in 2007, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines complained to
theWTO about how the proliferation of private standards was posing a challenge for
small vulnerable economies, particularly small farmers within them, and argued for
application of WTO rules to private standards in order to address the “…confusion,
inequity and lack of transparency” that often accompanies them (WTO, 2007a).
This complaint led to the debate gaining strength in the SPS Committee, with
member states trying to define “private standard”. In 2008, an ad hocWorking Group
on private standards was established under the SPS Committee, which came out with
a report in 2010 on “Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-related
Private Standards”, highlighting the need to define “private standards”. In the face
of an inability to produce an acceptable definition, an “electronic working group”
(E-WG) was set up to continue attempts at definition.15 The developed countries are
against the inclusion of private standards into the purview of the SPS Agreement.
Outside of the committees too, the WTO has discussed the issue of private stan-
dards. A joint UNCTAD/WTO informal information session on private standards
15The E-WG proposal for consideration by the Committee of an SPS-related private standard is:
“A written requirement or condition, or a set of written requirements or conditions, related to food
safety, or animal or plant life or health that may be used in commercial transactions and that is
applied by a non-governmental entity that is not exercising governmental authority” (Mavroidis &
Wolfe, 2016, p. 9).
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was organized way back in 2007 and in 2008, the Standards and Trade Develop-
ment Facility (STDF) also held an information session on private standards (WTO,
2007b). The WTO’s Public Forum too has, in recent years, discussed private stan-
dards multiple times. In September 2016, for instance, a WTO Public Forum session
was held under the theme: Should the Development of Private Standards Be More
Transparent? (WTO, 2016).
Based on their review of the TBT and SPS Committee discussions, Mavroidis
and Robert (2016, p. 11) succinctly sum up the current state of play thus: “… both
committees perceive the issue, and neither can get past the “public-private” divide,
which is partly a north-south debate and partly a transatlantic chasm. … negotia-
tion on the modalities of WTO action is stymied by the absence of agreement on
the quintessential element … definition of the term ‘private standard’”. Clearly, a
dominant sense of the inter-governmental nature of the WTO stands in the way of
the WTO foraying into the field of private standards. However, analyses suggest that
it may be a costly decision to leave out private standards from the purview of the
WTO’s work. Thorstensen and Vieira (2016, p. 21) suggest that when private stan-
dards are backed by governments, they should fall within the scrutiny of the TBT
and SPS Agreements. Meliado identifies three reasons for the lack of movement in
theWTO over private standards: “(i) lack of clarity as to…the nature of the problem,
(ii) fear of agreeing on language that might later be used in WTO disputes and (iii)
excessive emphasis placed on the downside of private standards” and offers a “menu
of policy options” (Meliado, 2017, p. ix, 32)16
Several writings look into the need or otherwise of bringing private standards
within the normative purview of the WTO regime (Mavroidis & Robert, 2016;
Meliado, 2017; Du, 2018). Mavroidis &Wolfe explicate “…the… line of distinction
between what is public, hence subject to WTO rules, and what is private, thus none
of its business, still preoccupies the imagination of delegates in Geneva … How
reclusive should the WTO allow product standards to be? … even a recluse must
abide by certain social norms” (Mavroidis & Robert, 2016, pp. 1, 2–3). Du shares
the apprehension that the growth in private standards can have adverse impacts and
explores a possible justification for an intergovernmental organization such as the
WTO to regulate transnational private standards (Du, 2018, p. 1). Thorstensen and
Viera argue in favour of the negotiation of a “meta-regulation” and suggest that the
United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS) could be a good candi-
date to play the role. For the interim, they suggest that private standards be jointly
scrutinized by the TBT and SPS Committees as they fall in the interface of the work
areas of the two committees (Thorstensen and Vieira, 2016, p. 65, 102).
16Meliado’s options followed by aSWOTanalysis of each (p. 38) are: “(1)Creating a joint SPS–TBT
transparency mechanism for private standards; (2) Establishing a public–private crosspollination
mechanism under the Agreement on Government Procurement; (3) Launching a work programme
on sustainability-related PPPs within the framework of the Trade Facilitation Agreement; and (4)
Expanding the work programme of the UNFSS so as to officially include international, regional,
and national standards bodies; (5) Using the UN Global Compact to promote transparency and
accountability principles” (Meliado, 2017, p. 32).
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Mavroidis and Robert (2016, p. 1) do not argue for formally binding or justiciable
rules but foresee at least two types of interventions that the WTO could make; (i)
it could adopt a “Reference Paper” to encourage its members to apply the rules
that apply to standards under the WTO to private standards as well and (ii) as a
“meta-regulator”, it could effectively ensure transparency in the processes through
which private standards are developed and implemented. Mbengue suggests that
private standards could either be “imported” into theWTO (member states to develop
national standards based on private standards) or WTO rules could be “exported”
(WTO to monitor private standards to check their WTO-compliance). A “legalistic”
approachwould push it to only recognize international standards while a “pragmatic”
approach would integrate, through recognition, private standards within the trading
system (Mbengue, 2011).
Calls for inclusion aside, as of date, private standards find no mention in theWTO
Agreements. However, Article 4.1 of the TBT Agreement is often cited as a relevant
provision to address private standards. The text of this Article reads:
Members … shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that
local government and non-governmental standardizing bodies within their territories…ac-
cept and comply with this Code of Good Practice. In addition, Members shall not take
measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such
standardizing bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with the Code of Good Practice (WTO
1994a: Art. 4.1, emphasis added).
A similar provision exists in Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, which makes
a mention of “non-governmental entities”. It has been often asked whether these
provisions could be used to allow “private standards” to be treated as “government
acts” (Mbengue, 2011). While a GATT panel has held that activities that can be
“attributed” to a state should be seen as falling within the ambit of the GATT, the
determination of such attribution would be unique to each case. In addition to the
private–public relationship at the level of governments, the relationship of private
standards and international standards in also not settled. Mbengue points out that
international standardization organizations face competition from private standards
and describes their confrontation as a hostile one, stating, “…the ‘empire’ of inter-
national standard-setting organisations is … determined to strike back if the devel-
opment of private standards goes beyond any normative control” (Mbengue, 2011).
Reciprocal information exchange among the two, transparency in their processes and
attempts at harmonization could be starting points in promoting coherence between
these two types of standards. Given the large overlap between private standards and
sustainability standards, the fate of the former—in terms of legal recognition and
coverage—will impact the future scope for use of the latter.
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4 Sustainability Standards, Developing Countries
and Emerging Economies
The history of the multilateral trading system bears out that unlike tariff barriers,
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade have proved far more difficult to address. Devel-
oping countries, with weaker bargaining power over their terms of trade, are partic-
ularly vulnerable to the potentially trade-restrictive implications of NTBs. NTBs are
projected as protectionist measures that are likely to be highly disputed (Banerjee,
2006, p. 47; Thorstensen and Vieira, 2016, p. 7). While standards and regulations
can perform several vital functions, they can also be used unfairly to become barriers
to trade (Saqib, 2003, p. 270).
The politics of the use of standards beginswith difficulties in agreeing to the appro-
priateness of standards. Different actors may hold differing views on the required
level and nature of standards imposed. The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development recognized this when it stated, “Environmental standards…should
reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply. Standards
applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and
social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries”. (United Nations,
1992, Principle 11).
For the developing countries in general, market access is impacted by standards,
and within the developing countries, especially vulnerable are the small and medium
enterprises (SMEs), whose competitiveness in international markets may suffer due
to the rise in costs associated with standards (WTO, 2016). Middleton explicates,
“The Trade-hampering effects of standards and technical regulationsmay be… those
arising from divergence in the technical specifications and those arising from certifi-
cation and approval procedures” (Middleton, 1980, p. 203). With regard to voluntary
standards, the developing countries face the double burden of acquiring informa-
tion on standards in an environment of “information-asymmetry” and mobilizing
resources to bring process and production methods in line with the requirements
of these standards (Wilson, 2002, p. 428). Developing countries are particularly
vulnerable to the impact of “conformity assessment procedures” (product testing or
plant inspections to ensure compliance with regulations and standards), which are
“…vulnerable to non-transparency, delays, arbitrary inspection, and redundant test-
s…protection by domestic firms” etc. (Saqib, 2003, p. 271).17 It is in this context
that Baldwin warned of the creation of “…a two-tier system of market access with
developing nations in the second tier” (Baldwin, 2000, p. 239).
Numerous studies have examined the impact of standards on developing countries
in particular (Wilson, 2002, pp. 431–432). Both Saqib’s study and Debroy’s paper
discuss examples of specific measures that are presented as quality or environmental
measures but are perceived by Indian exporters to be NTBs (Saqib, 2003; Debroy,
2005; pp. 10–11). A study by Kang and Ramizo (2017, p. 22) shows that the positive
17Debroy (2005, pp. 8–9) lists out, for example, the list of complaints that India has with relation
to standards. These can be seen to be generally reflective of developing country dissatisfaction with
standards.
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impacts of SPS and TBT measures are limited to the advanced economies while the
countries of the South are excluded from the gains of SPS and TBT measures in
international trade. A review of literature carried out at the Institute of Development
Studies (IDS) in order to test whether standards act as “net barriers” or “net catalysts”
to developing country exports showed mixed results: “…standards generally act as a
barrier to developing country trade in agriculture, but have a catalytic effect in certain
manufacturing sectors … the significance and magnitude of this effect varies across
developing countries, sub-sectors and exporting firms … the impact of standards on
developing country trade is highly context specific” (Timmis, 2017, p. 4). It must be
recognized that accurate quantification of the impact of standards is rarely possible
and that perceptions are also key variables to be factored in.
At the WTO, developing countries have remained opposed to the idea of using
trade as an instrument to achieve environmental goals because of the potential adverse
implications for market access. For the same reason, the developing countries have
also harboured suspicions towards the use of standards, fearing their use for protec-
tionist purposes (Banerjee, 2006). “Among the difficulties… identified by the devel-
oping countries are the high costs of adaptation, the irrelevance of foreign standards
to local conditions, the lack of timely and adequate information and consequent
transaction costs, the difficulties in understanding the requirements as well as testing
and monitoring them, the perceived lack of scientific data for specific threshold or
limiting values, and the uncertainty that arises from rapidly changing requirements
in overseas market”. (Saqib, 2003, p. 270). Another concern of the developing coun-
tries is the use of market access barriers that may result from non-product related
production processes and methods (Dutta, Sinha, & Gaur, 2006, p. 348). It has also
been pointed out that the logic of using sustainability standards may, in fact, be
counter-effective for the developing countries, as standards tend to restrict access to
markets that generate additional resources for environmental protection (Dutta et al.,
2006, p. 347). The existing provisions and emerging interpretations on standards,
therefore, require a thorough analysis for the potential implications they hold for
developing country interests.
Both the TBT and the SPS Agreements include special provisions for providing
technical assistance to the developing countries but these are not bound to specific
commitments by the industrial countries and are inadequate. It is in light of this fact
that developing countries have often sought “…a targeted review of the TBT and SPS
agreements in light of development needs” (Wilson, 2002, p. 437). The WTO CTE
addresses, as part of its mandate, the issue of the impact of environmental standards
on market access, in particular for developing countries. The developing countries
themselves also need to monitor the emergence of new interpretations relating to the
use of standards and strategize to assert their own interests at theWTODSS (Wilson,
2002, p. 437).
As far as the international standard-setting bodies recognized by theWTOAgree-
ments are concerned, the need for enhancing developing countries’ engagement in
international standard-setting bodies has been consistently highlighted and devel-
oping countries have long argued for a harmonization of standards formulation
procedures at the international level (Saqib, 2003, p. 295; Banerjee, 2006, p. 57;
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Jansen, 2010). Wilson (2002, pp. 437–438) points out that developing countries
should ensure that they are able to influence the development of global standards
in ways that accommodate their concerns and he suggests the creation of a “global
standards forum”. In the context of private standards as well, the lack of factoring in
of the special needs of the developing countries in their preparation and application
cause them to act as barriers to trade for the developing countries in particular.
Developing countries … have repeatedly expressed their concern about the way in which
international standards are developed and approved in such bodies...Developing countries
do not have the institutional capacities to match the developed world in terms of research
and technical capacities and as a result their participation is very limited from the point of
view of both numbers and effectiveness. As a consequence of the inadequacy of the process,
international standards are often inappropriate for use as a basis for domestic regulations in
developing countries and these countries face problems when they have to meet regulations
in the importing markets developed on the basis of international standards (Banerjee, 2006,
p. 63).
Once standards are set and accepted, there emerges the challenge of enabling
exporters in the developing countries to meet these standards. A fair participation, in
real terms, in the standard-setting bodies coupled with a strengthening of the capa-
bilities to meet standards would contribute to a more balanced impact of standards
on the developing countries. Under the Doha Development Agenda, the WTO had
instructed its CTE to attend to “(i) the effect of environmental measures on market
access, especially in relation to developing countries…(iii) labelling requirements
for environmental purposes” (WTO, 2001, Para 32).
The WTO, taking cognizance of the asymmetries that the developing countries
face, has set up the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF)18—which
describes itself as “…a global partnership that supports developing countries in
building their capacity to implement international sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
standards, guidelines and recommendations as a means to improve their human,
animal, and plant health status and ability to gain or maintain access to markets”. Its
goal is to achieve “increased capacity of developing countries to implement inter-
national SPS standards, guidelines and recommendations and hence ability to gain
market access”.19 The 2018 Annual Report of the STDF was prepared around the
theme Investing in Safe Trade: Supporting Developing Countries to Meet Inter-
national Standards. The actual impact of this well-intentioned innovation awaits
assessment.
Most literature on standards in relation to developing countries tends to focus
on the developing countries at the receiving end of standards driven by the govern-
ments/firms/NGOs located in the Global North. From the perspective of “emerging
economies”, what needs recognition is also the emergence of standards within the
South. It is no longer the case that markets of the South are totally bereft of the
imposition of social and environmental accountability through standards (Schouten
18The STDF is a joint initiative of the FAO, OIE, World Bank, WHO and WTO that was conceived
at the DohaMinisterial Conference in November 2001 and formally established in September 2004.
See http://www.standardsfacility.org/history.
19See STDF website, http://www.standardsfacility.org/vision-and-goal.
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&Bitzer, 2015). For instance, based on the International Trade Centre standardsmap,
which contains data on more than 160 standards, Marx’s listing of number of VSS
per country, lists several emerging economies in the top ten rankings of “highly VSS
active”—China (79); Brazil (77); India (72); and Mexico (71) (Marx, 2017, p. 8).
The questions that call for attention then are the variations between standards of the
Global North and those of the Global South and whether it is an accurate assumption
that Southern market standards will necessarily be more inclusive and locally driven
and therefore more acceptable (Langford, 2019).
As the WTO becomes more accepting of sustainability standards, the developing
countries—and the emerging economies, in particular—will need to adjust to this
reality and rethink their stances accordingly. It is often suggested that acceptance
and implementation of certain standards may sometimes be in the best interests of
the developing countries as “… [e]ffective regulation within their own markets is
important for ensuring consumer safety and promoting technical change” (Wilson,
2002, p. 436). One point of view holds that “emerging economies”, with larger stakes
and shares in global trade, need to undertake effort tomake their exports environment-
friendly. External pressure to bring about changes may not always be a bad thing.
In the case of India, for example, Debroy points out analogies from intellectual
property rights and services to state that while initial reaction tended to be negative,
the external trigger brought about domestic reforms for the better; the same could
be true of standards (Debroy, 2005, p. 14). It is in this context that Grimm, Thomas,
Archna, Christoph, & Jorge Perez (2018, p. 46) highlight “the growing pro-active
commitment of developing countries to sustainability standards…[and] their efforts
in aligning VSS to national priorities…”, indicating that it may be time for them to
move out of a defensive posturing vis-à-vis sustainability standards.
5 Conclusion
It is important to recognize that standards are not simply technical matters, “…
although the considerations of the standard tend to be expressed in rather technical
language, behind this façade of engineering jargon, what is actually happening is an
economic fight, often of the most savage type imaginable because the stakes are so
high” (Federal Trade Commission, quoted in Mattli and Büthe, 2003, p. 1). Taking
the argument further, Mattli and Büthe contest the “technical” nature of standards
and underscore their “political” nature:
The study of international standardization raises the kinds of questions familiar to students of
international relations, including: Who sets international rules? Do international standards
benefit all or are there winners and losers, either in relative or absolute terms?What is the role
of power and institutions in international disputes or bargains over standards? What defines
power and how does it operate? … First movers set the international standards agenda, and
laggards, or second movers, pay the switching costs. (Mattli & Büthe, 2003, pp. 3–4)
Themultilateral trading system (WTO, including itsGATTyears) has evolvedover
its long history of existence, gathering along newer issues into its fold as required by
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the changing landscape of international trade. When the GATT became operational
in 1948, it focused on free trade and did not take on board issues like standards
and regulations. The proliferation of NTBs in international trade caused it to take
cognizance of standards by developing rules to govern their use. TheWTO stands at a
similar crossroads, where it needs to resolve its relationship with private standards in
order to clarify the several issues relating to sustainability standards discussed in this
chapter. The question of whether or not WTO should regulate private standards will,
however, open up larger debates around the appropriateness or otherwise of theWTO
regulating “transnational private authority”, thereby raising fundamental concerns
relating to the very structures of global governance (Du, 2018). With the accep-
tance of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs as the guiding framework for all international
activity, including international trade, global governance frameworks, including the
WTO, need to adjust their capabilities to ensure the optimal use of sustainability
standards. The real challenge, however, will be to effectively achieve not just the
sustainability outcomes of such use but an equitable implementaiton as well that
addresses the challenges arising from differential capacities and power asymmetries.
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Environmental Provisions in Emerging
Markets’ Preferential Trade Agreements
Axel Berger, Dominique Blümer, Clara Brandi, and Manjiao Chi
1 Introduction
The recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nation’s
Agenda 2030 underscore the significance of reconciling economic, social and envi-
ronmental objectives. Transforming our economic activity such that it is consistent
with environmental sustainability is dependent not only on global environmental
rules, but also hinges on the right regulatory framework for the world economy.
One important forum for regulating global economic activities is theWorld Trade
Organization (WTO), responsible for providing, monitoring and enforcing rules for
international trade flows. However, multilateral trade negotiations under the roof of
the WTO have been sluggish over the last years and countries increasingly resort to
bilateral or regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to negotiate trade rules.
PTAs have not only becomemore numerous, they also have become bigger, covering
larger volumes of world trade, and they have become deeper as contracting parties go
beyond the reduction of tariffs and have started negotiating issues such as services,
investment, intellectual property rights and standards. Due to their increasing role in
shaping global trade rules, PTAs potentially can be used as leverage for promoting
environmental issues as well as other sustainability concerns in the global economy.
Moreover, strong environmental provisions in PTAs may provide a context that is
conducive to the effective implementation and use of standards and regulations that
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seek to address sustainability challenges. For instance, environmental provisions in
PTAs might boost the uptake of industry—and product-specific public regulation
or private standards in a given market, including voluntary sustainability standards
(VSS).1
The EU and the USA already seem to promote ‘high-standard’ PTAs to set a
precedent and shape globalization in their interest, presumably also with the aim to
avoid ‘unfair’ competition and environmental dumping from emerging markets that
can take advantage of lower levels of environmental and labour standards to keep
production cost low (Steinberg, 1997). The argument is based on the assumption
that emerging markets have less interest in higher environmental and labour stan-
dards and would be cautious to promote them through their trade policies. However,
there is little systematic evidence about the prevalence of environmental standards
in emerging markets’ trade policies and their PTAs in particular. This chapter aims
to address this question by assessing environmental provisions in emerging market
PTAs and thus contribute to current policy debates about the ‘green’ design of trade
policy. We aim to complement the existing literature at the interface of trade and
environmental governance and investigate how different countries drive and/or react
to the trend of entangling trade and environmental issues. While the EU and USA
are seen as pioneers in including environmental matters in PTAs, we will explore
whether emerging markets follow this trend and ‘go green’ or whether they refrain
from doing so—and what this implies for leveraging environmental standards for
the global economy. We thereby seek to contribute to the emerging literature on the
design of PTAs and their non-trade dimensions (Baccini, Dür, & Elsig, 2016; Dür,
Baccini, & Elsig, 2014; Gray, 2014; Kim, 2012; Kucik, 2012; Postnikov & Basti-
aens, 2014) as well as to the growing literature on the role of rising powers like China
and other emerging economies in global governance (Gray &Murphy, 2013; Kahler,
2013; Kennedy & Cheng, 2012; Stephen, 2014; Wang & French, 2014).
We conduct our analysis on the basis of our original data set mapping environ-
mental provisions in emerging market PTAs. Our findings show that the PTAs of
emerging markets incorporate more and more environmental provisions over time
and that they tend to include more environmental content when they have been
negotiated and signed with OECD countries, which in turn suggests that OECD
countries can still be considered as rule-makers and emerging markets still largely
as rules-takers in the context under consideration.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the existing literature on the nexus between trade and the environment,
with a focus on environmental provisions in trade agreements. Section 3 outlines the
methodology for generating and analysing the data used in this chapter. In Sect. 4,
we provide a bird’s eye view of the different dimensions of environmental provisions
in emerging market PTAs, as well as their development over time and in relation to
partner countries. In Sect. 5, we zoom into specific country cases, namely China,
India, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico, to explore in more detail their stance towards
1So far, there is not much data available on the uptake of private standards by country, by sector
and by year. For first insights, see Marx, Sharma, and Bécault (2015) and the data provided by ITC.
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‘green’ trade rules. Section 6 concludes and discusses what our findings might imply
for shaping environmental standards for the world economy.
2 Background and Related Literature
The relationship between international trade and the environment has been the subject
of debate for a long time (for example, Birdsall & Wheeler, 1993; Cole & Elliot,
2003; Copeland & Taylor, 1995; Levinson & Taylor, 2008). Critics have argued
that trade liberalization stands in conflict with environmental objectives while others
have pointed to the potential of international trade to contribute to addressing environ-
mental concerns. In general, the literature on trade and the environment distinguishes
three effects (Copeland & Taylor, 1994; for empirical results, see Cole & Elliot,
2003; John & Pecchenino, 1994; Managi, Hibiki, & Tsurumi, 2009; Selden & Song,
1994; Stokey, 1998). First, economic integration increases economic activity which
results in higher environmental pressure (scale effect). However, if environmental
quality is a normal good, then the increased income should lead to a higher demand
for high environmental standards and the adoption of new technologies (technique
effect). Finally, trade liberalization may affect the distribution of pollution-intensive
activities, shifting them where preferences to adopt clean technologies are lowest.
As a consequence, pollution intensities in high-income countries may decrease,
while developing countries shoulder most of the environmental burden (composi-
tion effect). Indeed, recent research unveils that much of the carbon embodied in the
developed world’s consumption of goods is imported from the developing world,
rather than being produced at home (Peters, 2008; Peters & Hertwich, 2008). Other
concerns relate to the impact of invasive species or transportation on the environ-
ment (Colyer, 2011). Moreover, there is a discussion on whether trade liberalization
provokes a ‘race to the bottom’ where countries keep environmental standards low
in order to retain their low-cost competitive advantage over other countries in global
value chains (Sheldon, 2006). Irrespective of its direction, the bottom line is that
there is a clear link between international trade and the environment—supporting
the current trend towards regulating certain components of both areas jointly. But
while scholars have long discussed the relationship between international trade and
the environment, they have tended to overlook the potential implications of the design
of trade policy for achieving environmental protection.
Even though the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO names environ-
mental protection and sustainable development explicitly as objectives of the organi-
zation (Johnson, 2015), its main aim remains trade liberalization. As a consequence,
environmental issues mostly show up as exceptions to articles concerning liberal-
ization. More precisely, under certain circumstances, it is permitted to restrict trade
liberalization in order to avoid adverse effects on the environment. Such clauses are
contained already in GATTArticle XX, GATSArticle XIV, as well as the Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
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Rights (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards Agreement (SPS) and Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The idea behind these clauses is that
committing to trade liberalization should neither lead to a deterioration of environ-
mental standards nor hinder environmental protection. However, a country applying
trade-distorting measures has to prove that a removal would indeed harm the envi-
ronment. While this might not be easy to do, it is meant to prevent protectionism
under the veil of environmental concerns.
Beyond such ‘do no harm’ clauses, efforts in the WTO include the liberalization
of environmental goods and services, the removal of subsidies on fossil fuels and
sustainable fisheries, among others. However, as with many other policy areas, the
success of reform at the multilateral level is limited (George, 2014). As a conse-
quence, countries aiming to proceed on the agenda fall back upon negotiations at
the plurilateral level (as in the case with e-commerce, investment and environmental
goods) or at the bilateral/regional level in the form of PTAs.
Since the WTO has not made much progress with respect to environmental issues
up to now, looking at developments at the bilateral/regional level is the natural next
step. Throughout the last two decades, the number of PTAs that incorporate non-trade
issues such as human rights and labour standards has risen notably (Hafner-Burton,
2009; Kim, 2012; Postnikov & Bastiaens, 2014). The same is true for the extent of
environmental content included inPTAs (Morin,Dür,&Lechner, 2018).Our research
contributes to the emerging literature on the design of PTAs, their implementation and
their non-trade implications (Baccini et al., 2016; Dür et al., 2014; Gray, 2014; Kim,
2012; Kucik, 2012; Morin, Blümer, Brandi, & Berger 2019; Postnikov & Bastiaens,
2014).
While the relationship between international trade and the environment has been
the subject of scholarly research, until recently, scholars have often disregarded the
role of PTA design. The empirical literature on environmental provisions in PTAs
is still quite small, but gives important first insights. Jinnah and Morgera (2013)
compare environmental provisions in three EU and 11 US trade agreements since the
mid-2000s by coding their scope and legal dimension. They find that environmental
rules in PTAs have successively moved from reproducing the environmental exemp-
tions stipulated in the GATT to references to Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments (MEAs) and full stand-alone environmental chapters that address enforcement
and implementation issues. Moreover, they classify the EU and US approaches to
addressing environmental issues in PTAs as cooperative and confrontational, respec-
tively. This is in line with the overview on PTAs and the environment given by
Anuradha (2011) and with the methodology of Bastiaens and Postnikov (2014) who
differentiate in their empirical analysis between sanctions (US) and dialogue (EU)
as enforcement mechanisms used for environmental provisions in PTAs. Based on a
comprehensive and fine-grained dataset, Morin et al. (2018) argue that democracies
facing import competition and countries which care about environmental protection
aremore likely to include environmental provisions in their PTAs.Morin et al. (2019)
investigate the diffusion of environmental provisions and show that provisions that
have been integrated in intercontinental agreements are more likely to be picked up
in future agreements.
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Empirical research suggests that the total number of provisions covered in PTAs is
highest for PTAs between developed and developing countries (subsequently referred
to as ‘North–South’ for convenience) (WTO, 2011). In general, developing coun-
tries—among each other—seem to prefer shallow agreements that only cover 1–2
substantive provisions on average, focussing on the elimination of tariffs (Bruhn,
2014). A possible explanation for the greater depth of North–South agreements is
the bargaining power of developed countries that offer valuable market access in
return for concessions regarding PTA content. If this pattern also holds for environ-
mental rules, this would suggest that developing and emerging countries are reluctant
to regulate environmental issues in PTAs among each other, but are more likely to
agree to environmental content when negotiating with more developed partners.
Covering environmental issues within the international trading system can entail
both advantages and disadvantages for different country groups; compared to the
relatively toothless international environmental law, the WTO possesses an enforce-
mentmechanism—namely the dispute settlement body—that it makes use of to settle
inter-country conflicts. This dispute settlement body has also been used for disputes
on trade-related environmental issues (Johnson, 2015). Equally, many PTAs possess
enforcement mechanisms for environmental rules. On the one hand, this can be seen
as an advantage since the availability of sanctions requires more commitment to
agreements on environmental issues and increases their enforceability. On the other
hand, some countries are concerned that the principle of ‘common but differentiated
responsibilities’ meant to adapt developing country commitments to their capacities
is undermined by drawing on agreements that are based on reciprocity (Jinnah &
Morgera, 2013). Moreover, it is far from clear whether developing countries are able
to meet high environmental standards. Their inability to do so could then be used by
more developed countries to prohibit market access to goods that do not meet these
standards (‘green protectionism’).
It is equally uncertain whether incorporating environmental provisions in the
WTO and in PTAs actually has positive environmental effects. According to a survey
in OECD countries, a main objective of ‘green’ PTAs is to prevent the relaxation of
environmental standards which may result in a race to the bottom as a side effect of
competition for trade and investment (George, 2014). Overall, the (scarce) empirical
evidence is rather inconclusive. Gallagher (2004) states that in Mexico, the environ-
ment in terms of soil erosion, municipal solid waste and urban air and water pollution
deteriorated after its accession to NAFTA, without claiming a causal relationship
between trade liberalization and environmental degradation. Baghdadi, Martinez-
Zarzoso, and Zitouna (2013) find a convergence of emissions levels and an overall
reduction for country pairs that have signed a PTA with environmental provisions.
Bastiaens andPostnikov (2014) show that PTAs including sanctions improve environ-
mental performance measured on the basis of the Environmental Performance Index
(EPI),2 so do PTAs based on environmental cooperation when paired with a strong
2The EPI is an aggregation of both environmental health and ecosystem vitality measures including
air quality, water and sanitation, health, water resources, agriculture, forests, fisheries, biodiversity
and habitat, and climate and energy.
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civil society in partner states. One could also imagine that countries having agreed
to environmental standards at the bilateral/regional level are more inclined to also
commit to multilateral environmental agreements. However, much more research is
needed to clearly establish the links between trade rules, environmental governance
and environmental performance. In the following discussion, we contribute to filling
the gaps in the literature and focus on the take-up of environmental content in PTAs
in emerging market PTAs.
This chapter puts the spotlight on environmental provisions of emerging markets’
PTAs and thereby adds to the emerging research on the content and design of PTAs
and their non-trade dimensions. It also contributes to the literature on the implications
of rising powers like China and other emerging economies for the future of global
governance (Gray &Murphy, 2013; Kahler, 2013; Stephen, 2014), i.e. to what extent
emerging economies are rule-makers or rule-takers in the world economy and when
and under which conditions they are willing take over global responsibility (Berger,
2013; Kennedy & Cheng, 2012; Wang & French, 2014).
3 Measuring Environmental Provisions in PTAs
PTAs have been largely treated as ‘black boxes’ in the literature, meaning that most
econometric analyses have not taken their contents and thus their heterogeneity into
account. This shortcoming is important to address, in particular in light of the fact
that PTAs are becoming deeper and are covering more issue areas beyond the mere
elimination of tariffs (Horn, Mavroidis, & Sapir, 2010). Some recent studies and
projects have tried to remedy this situation by developing comprehensive data sets
and providing numerical datameasuring the variance of PTA design (Dür et al., 2014;
Horn et al., 2010; Kohl, Brakman, & Garretsen, 2013). These databases, however,
have the ambition to capture a large number of policy areas and therefore do not go
into the details of a specific issue area. Environmental issues are therefore covered in
a very general way in these databases ignoring the details on the variation of ‘green’
provisions.
We developed a new dataset mapping environmental provisions in PTAs to fill
this gap in the literature. The dataset comprises detailed data on the design of
environmental provisions along nine dimensions:
1. Reference to environmental goals in the preamble or other chapters: PTAs
that cover environmental aspects in their main text often also include preambular
language that highlights the intention of the contracting parties to protect the
environment.
2. Environmental exceptions: PTAs often include a general exception clause that
is modelled on GATT Article XX and specifies that actions by the contracting
parties ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ are not incon-
sistent with the trade-related obligations of the treaty. In addition to these general
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exceptions, some PTAs include specific environmental exceptions in certain
chapters, such as the investment chapter.
3. References to multilateral environmental agreements: some countries use
PTAs to refer to MEAs such as the Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the
OzoneLayer or theWashingtonConventionon InternationalTrade inEndangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). References to MEAs include, among
others, commitments by the contracting parties to ratify or implement those
agreements. At times, the MEAs are even made an integral part of the PTA.
4. Inclusion of a whole chapter on environment or sustainable development:
some recent PTAs include a dedicated chapter on the environment or sustainable
development where the parties specify their commitment to the protection of the
environment.
5. Obligations to uphold environmental law: some PTAs include clauses that
prevent the contracting parties from increasing trade and investment flows by
weakening domestic environmental laws and regulations.
6. Incorporation of the right to regulate in environmental matters: with this set
of provisions, the contracting parties want to preserve their right to go beyond
the existing level of environmental protection by introducing new regulation in
the area of the environment.
7. Cooperation in environmental matters: PTAs at times include provisions that
state the objective that the contracting parties cooperate on environmental issues,
sometimes creating institutions such as intergovernmental committees.
8. Transparency in environmental matters: some PTAs require the contracting
parties to provide public access to relevant information on environmental policies
and policy-making processes.
9. Public participation in environmental matters: often in connection with
the prior dimension PTAs include provisions specifying how the public can
participate in environmental policy-making processes.
For the purpose of this chapter, we have coded and analysed all full free trade
agreements and customs unions established by the emerging markets—China (13),
India (10), Indonesia (7), Brazil (4) and Mexico (16). The full list of agreements
is provided in Annex. The coding scheme that was used to analyse environmental
provisions in emerging market PTAs draws on the broad conceptualization of envi-
ronmental provisions in PTAs provided by OECD (2007). The codebook has been
tested on a smaller set of PTAs signed by various countries (not only emerging
markets) to ensure general validity and has been revised accordingly. On the basis of
the final version of the codebook, each text of emerging market PTAs was manually
coded by two independent persons. In case of differences, a third person coded the
respective treaty.
In order to compare the different agreements to each other, we have calculated
an additive indicator ranging from 0 to 9, which captures the presence of the nine
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Fig. 1 Distribution of environmental dimensions across emerging markets’ PTAs. Source Authors
environmental dimensions in the PTA. The higher the indicator, the more the dimen-
sions covered in the respective agreement.3 In the subsequent section, we use this
indicator to analyse 48 emerging market PTAs signed by China, India, Indonesia,
Brazil and Mexico.
4 Emerging Markets: A Bird’s Eye View
In what follows, we provide a bird’s eye view of environmental provisions in
emerging market PTAs before we zoom into specific country cases in the subsequent
section. Figure 1 illustrates how often the nine dimensions specified above occur
in the PTAs of emerging markets. Almost all of the agreements coded (≈ 90%)
include environmental exceptions. These exceptions, based on GATT Article XX,
allow countries to violate the rules of the PTA if this is ‘necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life’. However, according to GATT Article XX, measures aimed at
protecting human, animal or plant life have to be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner and should not be used as ‘disguised restriction’ on trade. This important
qualification may be the reason why the dispute settlement body of the WTO has
often tended to rule in favour of trade liberalization rather than environmental protec-
tion. It remains to be seen which role environmental exceptions play in the context
of PTAs.
3We emphasize that this indicator only captures the quantity of environmental content, while not
taking into account the quality and strength of different provisions (e.g. there is no weighting of
different dimensions). We acknowledge that this generates only a rough picture of environmental
issues in PTAs, but it is nevertheless a good initial instrument to study the environmental content
in PTAs over time and across partners.
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Importantly, in the context of PTAs, signatories often go beyond the inclusion
of exceptions modelled on the rules of the WTO and include other environment-
related clauses. Roughly two-thirds of the agreements coded also include references
to environmental goals. Most agreements signed by emergingmarkets (75%) contain
provisions that emphasize the countries’ commitment to environmental protection
and sustainable development already in the preamble. While these provisions are
not of substantive nature (i.e. they do not imply any substantive rights or obligations
in environmental matters to the parties), they may have an impact on how the PTA
is interpreted in dispute settlement. References to MEAs, intended to renew the
commitments already made elsewhere, are also frequently found in emerging market
PTAs.
An important part of the debate on standards in the international trading system is
focused on how international agreements interfere with domestic environmental law.
Many critics are concerned about PTAs lowering environmental standards or limiting
the right to pass new environmental legislation. As can be seen in Fig. 1, 16 emerging
market PTAs oblige the parties to maintain, i.e. not lower, existing standards and 21
even explicitly stress the countries’ right to regulate in environmental matters, this
amounts to one third and 44% of the PTAs, respectively.
While cooperation in environmental matters is quite commonly encouraged in
PTAs, transparency and public participation hardly occur at all. An exception is
an agreement between the EU and Mexico of 1997, which includes a provision on
public participation, as well as the agreement between Switzerland and China signed
in 2013, which includes a whole chapter on environment. Notably, both of these
agreements are signed with industrialized/OECD countries. Another PTA that has a
full chapter on environment is the one between China and Korea, signed in 2015.
While the indicator can in principle range from 0 to 9, none of the emerging
market agreements reaches the highest score. The annex to this chapter lists all PTAs
from the lowest to the highest number of environmental dimensions covered. The
‘greenest’ agreements, achieving an indicator of 7, are the PTAs between China-
Switzerland and China-Korea. Three agreements do not mention any environmental
matters, namelyChina–Macao 2003, China–HongKong 2003 and India–Bangladesh
2006.
Table 1 gives the summary statistics for the variable of interest. On average, the
48 emerging market agreements score a 3.19, meaning that roughly three of the
dimensions stated above are included in their PTAs. However, there is quite some
variation between the agreements, as indicated by the standard deviation of 1.89.
In the subsequent paragraphs, we use our original data to shed light on where this
variation comes from.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Number of environmental dimensions covered 48 3.19 1.89 0 7
Source Authors
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Fig. 2 Environmental dimensions in PTAs over time. Source Authors
Figure 2 illustrates the temporal variation of the indicators in emerging market
PTAs. At first glance, we cannot identify a clear time trend, although it seems that
PTAs include more environmental content after the year 2000. An interesting obser-
vation is that Mexico has very early on signed PTAs with significant environmental
content. It is likely that this development was initiated by the conclusion of NAFTA,
signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1994, which was the first PTA that addressed
environmental issues in a more comprehensive way. When Mexico is excluded from
the sample of emerging markets, we see a clear upward trend of the indicator over
time. This indicates that the aggregate picture masks significant trends at the country
level which will be further investigated in Sect. 5.
Another explanation for the variation in the indicator could be found in the type
of partner country, as suggested in Sect. 2. Based on our calculations for emerging
market PTAs, Fig. 3 illustrates that the indicator is slightly higher when emerging
markets sign the agreement with an OECD country.4 This finding is even more
pronounced when excluding Mexico’s agreements, which seems to be a special case
(as explained above). We could interpret this finding as OECD countries pushing for
more environmental content in PTAs and imposing them on emerging markets with
lower bargaining power.
4OECD status at time of PTA signature.
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Fig. 3 Average environmental dimensions by status of partner country. Source Authors
5 Emerging Markets: Zooming In
5.1 China
China has been a latecomer in negotiating PTAs, starting to negotiate them only
after its accession to the WTO (Berger, 2013). While the first two PTAs concluded
by China did not include environmental provisions,5 all subsequent agreements did
include environmental provisions, though to varying degrees. SomePTAs incorporate
a stand-alone environmental clause or a chapter; others incorporate environmental
provisions of various types, such as the clause of general exceptions.
Two general trends may be identified from the provisions of Chinese PTAs.
First, while earlier PTAs contain few or no environmental provisions, more recent
PTAs incorporate more. Second, environmental provisions are more frequently seen
in Chinese PTAs concluded with more developed partners, since those appear to
have stronger policy-making aspirations on environmental protection and sustainable
investment. Such trends can be witnessed by the fact that China–Switzerland PTA
contains multiple environmental provisions and that the China–Korea PTA includes
a chapter on the environment. China experienced rapid economic growth in the past
decades. Yet, the environmental pollution in China deteriorated in the meantime.
5The absence of environmental provisions in the China-Macao and China-Hong Kong PTAs may
be explained by the fact that these PTAs are not truly meant to be ‘international’ agreements. They
are aimed at promoting trade liberalization between the different legal jurisdictions of China. Thus,
it is understandable that they exclude certain issues, especially sensitive ones such as environmental
issues, from the PTAs.
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One may conclude that environmental concerns have become an important consid-
eration in China’s PTA-making nowadays, partly to help address the environmental
challenge. China has sped up its efforts in concluding PTAs recently, and the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) newly proposed by China would inevitably necessitate the
conclusion of more PTAs with the countries involved. It remains to be seen to what
extent environmental issues will also feature in China’s future South–South PTAs,
where China can be expected to be the rule-maker.
5.2 India
India embarked on the path of economic liberalization in the early 1990s. While
first initiating national reforms, India has subsequently, slowly but steadily, removed
barriers to international trade and foreign direct investment throughout the last two
decades (UNCTAD, 2012). Even though India is carefully embracing liberalization,
the country takes the position that trade and investment agreements, be it under
the roof of the WTO or within bilateral and regional PTAs, should not be mingled
with issues not directly related to trade, such as human rights or the environment—
rather, these topics should be discussed in other international fora (ICTSD, 2010).
In a 2001 press release, India voiced concern that ‘environment was being used as
some sort of a Trojan horse to provide legitimacy to protectionist trends’ on the part
of industrialized countries (Government of India, 2001). Similar concerns remain
until today. Besides colliding interests in the strength of intellectual property rights
protection, India’s reluctance to include environmental provisions in the EU-India
PTA was a contentious issue during the negotiations and later one of the reasons for
the temporary suspension of the negotiations (Khandekar, 2011; Singh, 2015).
However, experts argue that India, in order to be attractive and credible as a
partner in global value chains, may need to rethink its strategy. Recent regional trade
deals—the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (CPTPP) being of particular importance in this context—regulate not only trade
but also many behind-the-border issue areas such as investment, intellectual prop-
erty rights and the environment. Indian producers will have to adjust to these new
standards if they wish to participate in the production networks governed by these
agreements (Meltzer, 2015).
In fact, despite the strongnational narrative of separating trade fromenvironmental
issues, the data shows that the case of India reflects the global trend of PTAs becoming
greener over time, the agreements with the largest environmental content being those
with South Korea and Japan, signed in 2009 and 2011, respectively. South Korea and
Japan both have a higher level of economic development and play a significant role in
Asian and global production networks. However, so far none of India’s PTAs includes
a whole chapter on trade and the environment or sustainable development. Whether
India’s stance towards mixing trade and environmental matters has and will become
more reconciliatory therefore remains an open question. In any case, the negotiations
for the PTA between the EU and India, resumed in January 2016 (Suneja, 2015), will
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require a discussion about this topic—the outcome could be an indication on India’s
future direction of trade policy.
5.3 Indonesia
Indonesia has been a long-standing participant in the multilateral trading regime and
is a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In
fact, Indonesia concluded all its PTAs—with the exception of the bilateral agreement
with Japan in 2007—as a member of ASEAN. The adoption of liberal trade and
investment policies at the end of the 1990s in Indonesia and across the South Asian
region can be attributed to a variety of factors, most importantly the increasing
competitive pressure fromChina, the Asian economic crisis as well as the conclusion
of important regional integration initiatives in North America (NAFTA) and the EU
(single market). Liberal economic policies at the national level were accompanied
by a wave of PTAs signed at the end of the 2000s.
While negotiated within a rather short period of time, Indonesian PTAs display a
relatively high variation in terms of the coverage of environmental issues. The two
most comprehensive agreements in this regard are the 2007 bilateral agreement with
Japan and the ASEAN Free Trade Area concluded in 2010, covering four environ-
mental dimensions. The ASEAN agreements with Korea, Japan and India, on the
other hand, only cover two dimensions. All PTAs concluded by Indonesia include an
environmental exception modelled on GATT Art. XX and most PTAs include provi-
sions on cooperation. Compared to North American and European PTAs, none of the
Indonesian agreements included an environment chapter or provisions on cooperation
and participation in environmental matters. This restraint to include comprehensive
environmental provisions is not only characteristic for Indonesian or ASEAN PTAs,
but also for other Asian industrialized countries like Japan (Yanai, 2014). Indonesia
is currently negotiating a PTA with the EU and has been considering an accession to
the CPTPP. It is therefore likely that Indonesia will come under pressure to sign up
to more comprehensive environmental provisions in the near future.
5.4 Brazil
Brazil considers the WTO to be the main arena where the most pressing issues in
international trade should be discussed (Fishlow, 2004; WTO, 2013). Brazil has
focused strongly on the multilateral trade liberalization track and has not put much
emphasis on PTAs so far. Indeed, Brazil remains among the most closed economies
as measured by the share of exports and imports in GDP. One explanation for the
country’s limited openness to trade is that Brazil has strongly relied on domestic value
chain integration rather than participation in global production networks (Canuto,
Fleischhaker, & Schellekens, 2015).
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The limited number of PTAs signed by Brazil illustrates the reluctance to open
up and the lack of focus on bilateral and regional trade agreements. Brazil, however,
is part of Mercosur (Southern Common Market), the Latin American regional
bloc established in 1991, which also includes Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and
Venezuela as full members. Mercosur is Brazil’s main preferential agreement in
terms of value of trade (WTO, 2013). As member of Mercosur, Brazil has signed a
number of PTAs.
Whereas the founding treaty forMercosur did not include any provisions on labour
or environmental rights, the subsequent developments that occurred in Mercosur in
the 1990s brought about a recognition of these rights (Giupponi, 2014). Still, analyses
of the environmental components in the Mercosur agreement indicate that they are
weak (Hochstetler, 2003). At the same time, Mercosur does include rather elaborate
provisions on cooperation for the implementation of MEAs (OECD, 2007, p. 5).
The PTAs Brazil signed as a member of Mercosur, do not include many environ-
mental provisions, let alone a whole chapter on trade and environment or sustainable
development.
It is likely, however, also in light of the possible end of the multilateral Doha
Round as well as the proliferation of PTAs around the world and the recent rise of
mega-regional trade agreements, that Brazil will review its prevailing trade strategy
where efforts have so far focused on multilateral rather than bilateral or regional
negotiations (Canuto, 2015). Negotiations with the European Union on a free trade
agreement with Mercosur were relaunched and a number of new PTA negotiations
have been initiated. It remains an open questionwhich stance Brazil will take towards
environmental provisions in its upcoming PTAs, both in the context of Mercosur and
beyond.
5.5 Mexico
Mexico’s free trade policy has been influenced heavily by its participation in the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Subsequently, Mexico has been
one of the most active emerging markets with respect to the negotiation of PTAs.
The coverage of environmental provisions in Mexican PTAs displays a peculiar
pattern distinct from other emerging markets. While environmental provisions got
more numerous over time in other emerging economies’ PTAs, Mexico experienced
a reverse trend. Mexico’s early and comprehensive commitment to environmental
provisions stems from its membership in the NAFTA which, at the time, was the
most comprehensive PTA and covered five of the nine dimensions of our data set.
Beyond the environmental provisions included in the main text, the three NAFTA
member countries also signed an environmental side agreement on environmental
cooperation which triggered a number of legal measures and increased the level of
cooperation on environmental matters in North America (Gallagher, 2009).
NAFTA included references to environmental protection in the preamble, a GATT
Article XX-type environmental exception, references to MEAs, commitments to
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uphold environmental laws and provisions on the right to regulate in environ-
mental matters. Mexico’s experience with NAFTA had repercussion for the PTAs it
concluded in the years following the landmark agreement. The PTAs Mexico nego-
tiated during the 1990s with other developing countries such as Costa Rica (1994),
Bolivia (1995), Colombia andGuatemala (1995), Nicaragua (1997) and Chile (1998)
included similar commitments on the environment as NAFTA and in some cases even
incorporated provisions on cooperation in themain text. In otherwords, towards other
developing countriesMexico acted as a rule-maker transferring its experience gained
in negotiations with the USA. The PTA Mexico signed with the EU in 1997, on the
other hand, included less comprehensive commitments on environmental protection
than Mexico’s agreements with its NAFTA partners and other developing countries.
The same is true for two subsequent PTAs Mexico concluded with industrialized
countries. The PTAs with the countries of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) and Israel included even fewer environmental provisions than the agreement
with the EU.
While Mexico’s treaty-making practice during the 1990s was to a large extent
influenced by NAFTA, the influence of this landmark deal decreased after the turn
of the century. The environmental commitments in Mexican PTAs negotiated with
industrialized and developing countries after 2000 were more diverse and less ambi-
tious compared to those of the 1990s. The atypical development with regard to the
inclusion of environmental provisions in Mexican PTAs can, therefore, be mainly
attributed to the impact of NAFTA.
6 Conclusion
The coverage of non-economic commitments in PTAs has received comparatively
little attention in the academic literature. In this chapter,wehave addressed this gap by
making use of a novel dataset including nine dimensions of environmental commit-
ments in PTAs: reference to environmental goals in the preamble or other chapters,
environmental exceptions, references to MEAs, inclusion of a whole chapter on
environment or sustainable development, obligations to uphold environmental law,
incorporation of the right to regulate in environmental matters, cooperation in envi-
ronmental matters, transparency in environmental matters and public participation
in environmental matters.
With regard to the PTAs of emerging markets, there are two main conclusions.
First, in the aggregate, the PTAs of emerging markets have become greener over
time. Second, their PTAs tend to include more environmental content when signed
with OECD countries. This, in turn, indicates that OECD countries are still rule-
makers and emerging markets still largely rules-takers with regard to environmental
provisions in trade agreements.
However, the general patterns mask some heterogeneity at the country level.
China’s recent PTAs indicate that the country is already embarking on a path towards
agreements with more environmental content. India is still very reluctant to combine
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trade and non-trade issues in the same agreement, but things seem to have started
moving as well. Indonesia is mostly negotiating PTAs with weak environmental
content as a member of ASEAN, but has signed a ‘greener’ agreement with Japan.
Brazil is not very active in the conclusion of PTAs in general and the agreements
signed through itsmembership inMercosur are ratherweak in terms of environmental
content. Mexico, as a consequence of NAFTA, signed relatively ‘green’ agreements
early on, but its PTAs show more variation in recent years. Both the rise of compre-
hensive mega-regional agreements and the expansion of global value chains are
likely to further shape the future of the trend towards incorporating environmental
provisions in trade agreements.
Our findings show that environmental considerations play an increasingly impor-
tant role in trade—both the spread of voluntary sustainability standards (e.g. Brandi,
2016; Fiorini et al., 2018; Marx et al., 2015) and public regulation that seeks to
address sustainability concerns for a specific sector or product, as discussed in other
chapters in this book, are an expression of this. More research is needed in order to
provide a more detailed picture of the interlinkages between international trade and
the environment, both in emerging economies and beyond. More particularly, there
is a need for more research on the diffusion of environmental provisions in PTAs,
the relation between environmental provisions in PTAs and the uptake and effective
implementation of public regulation as well as private standards that contribute to
tackling environmental concerns and types of sustainability challenges.
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China-Hong Kong 2003 2003 Non-OECD 0
India-Bangladesh 2006 2006 Non-OECD 0
China-Macao 2003 2003 Non-OECD 0
MERCOSUR 1991 1991 Non-OECD 1
South Asian Free Trade
Agreement (SAFTA)
2004 2006 Non-OECD 1
India-Sri Lanka 1998 2000 Non-OECD 1
(continued)
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(continued)









India-Bhutan 2006 2006 Non-OECD 1
MERCOSUR-SACU 2009 2008 Non-OECD 1
MERCOSUR-Chile 1996 1996 Non-OECD 1
Mexico-Israel 2000 2000 Non-OECD 1
India-Thailand 2003 2003 Non-OECD 2
China-Pakistan 2006 2007 Non-OECD 2
EFTA-Mexico 2000 2001 OECD 2
ASEAN-Korea 2007 2006 Non-OECD 2
ASEAN-India 2010 2009 Non-OECD 2
MERCOSUR-Israel 2007 2010 Non-OECD 2
Mexico-Uruguay 2003 2004 Non-OECD 2
ASEAN-Japan 2008 2009 OECD 2
China-Australia 2015 2015 OECD 2
China-Iceland 2013 2014 OECD 3
India-Singapore 2005 2005 Non-OECD 3
China-New Zealand 2008 2008 OECD 3
Mexico-Peru 2011 2012 Non-OECD 3
ASEAN-China 2005 2004 Non-OECD 3
EC-Mexico 1997 2000 OECD 3
India-Malaysia 2011 2011 Non-OECD 3
Mexico-Bolivia 1994 1995 Non-OECD 3
ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand
2009 2009 OECD 3
China-Singapore 2008 2009 Non-OECD 4
China-Costa Rica 2010 2011 Non-OECD 4
Mexico-Panama II 2014 2015 Non-OECD 4
Mexico-Central America 2011 2013 Non-OECD 4
Indonesia-Japan 2007 2008 OECD 4
Mexico-Japan 2004 2005 OECD 4
ASEAN 2009 2010 Non-OECD 4
China-Peru 2009 2009 Non-OECD 4
NAFTA 1992 1994 OECD 5
China-Chile 2005 2006 Non-OECD 5
Mexico-Colombia-Guatemala
(G3)
1995 1994 Non-OECD 5
(continued)
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(continued)









Mexico-Chile 1998 1999 Non-OECD 5
India-South Korea 2009 2010 Non-OECD 5
Mexico-Nicaragua 1997 1998 Non-OECD 6
Mexico-Northern Triangle 2000 2001 Non-OECD 6
Mexico-Bolivia 1995 1994 Non-OECD 6
India-Japan 2011 2011 OECD 6
Mexico-Costa Rica 1994 1995 Non-OECD 6
China-Switzerland 2013 2013 OECD 7
China-Korea 2015 2015 Non-OECD 7
aOECD status at year of signature
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The last two decades of the last century were marked by several economic crises
that started in the mid-1970s and resulted in a change from closed and protected
economies to an open and export-oriented view. This new model was applied by
several economies—developed and developing—and was understood in the termi-
nology of ‘neoliberalism’ or the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 1990). This
change of paradigm sped up the globalization process in the 1980s and the 1990s, as it
implied the liberalization of trade, finance, technological change, and the internation-
alization of firm activity (WTO, 1998). Among other things, it resulted in a rise in the
number of free trade agreements, a consolidation of regional integration processes,
and a renewed multilateral impetus signified by the rebirth of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.
This changing landscape had two significant implications for the concerns about the
private sector.1 In the 1980s, the main concern was around the adverse effects of
firm activity, technological changes and a new environmental agenda. In the 1990s,
concern was focused on the increasing competition among countries (developed and
developing) and the role of governments in promoting good environmental policies
for transnational corporations (TNCs) (Dunning, 2005; Fischer, 1999, p. 79).
1As has been pointed out in many sources, the ‘private sector’ can be broadly understood, including
not only large enterprises or firms of many sizes, but also chambers of commerce, firm associa-
tions, philantrophic foundations, worker-owned cooperatives, self-employed etc. (CCIC, 2001, p. 4;
Pingeot, 2014, p. 17). In this chapter, by ‘private sector’ we mean mainly transnational companies
since they are closely associated with global standards and regulations, However, it must be said that
some small-medium-micro enterprises, and other private firmsmay also adopt, directly or indirectly,
the same kind of norms and regulations.
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In this period, as Dunning (2005) states, intergovernmental organizations such as
the United Nations (UN) became more and more concerned about how the activi-
ties of governments, international organizations and TNCs could jointly contribute
towards reaching social objectives and strengthening the benefits of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and globalization in recipient countries. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant manifestation of such concern was the launch of the Global Compact by the UN
in the year 2000 to support the development agenda as articulated in the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).
Nowadays, the role of the private sector in the context of globalization, interna-
tional cooperation and global governance is well recognized and the private sector
is also a part of the current debates around sustainability (Rio+ 20, green economy,
green growth) and development [MDGs as well as the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs)], which bring these two strands of discussion together. In reflecting
economic, environmental and social goals, standards play an important role in a
broadened sustainable development agenda as they provide a common ground for
different actors formally and informally linked to global governance.
The aim of this chapter is to review the role of the private sector at the beginning
of the current century and to link it with the debate over social and environmental
standards and regulations in the context of global governance. The chapter seeks
to address the following guiding questions: what context best explains the current
use of social and environmental standards and regulations by the private sector?;
what conceptual approaches can help understand the current use of standards and
regulations by this actor?; and what are the policy implications and trends around
norms and standards for the international debates and the relevant actors?
The chapter is divided into two sections that cover the first two questions. In the
first, the context is reviewed, and in the second, the framework of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) as an interface of the private sector with standards and norms
is discussed. Finally, some concluding remarks relating to policy implications are
presented.
2 The Relevance of the Private Sector
To understand the role of the private sector in the current use of social and environ-
mental standards and regulations, we need to understand the context and evolution
of this relationship. It is well recognized that firms bring positive outcomes for
society, particularly through FDI and related effects on employment, technology
transfer, balance of payments, market development and spillover effects. However, it
is equallywell-known that firmsmay bring negative impacts, also related to FDI, such
as unemployment, delocalization of investment, low wages, pollution, and depletion
of resources (Aziz, Lerche, & Lerche, 1995; Dunning, 1992; Stiglitz & Charlton,
2005).
Dunning (2005) identifies the evolution of TNCs and their influence at the global
level, as well as some of the global initiatives to regulate them:
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• In the 1970s, the main concern was focused on the role of FDI in recipient coun-
tries and on the negative effects of TNCs. This opened the door to the first initia-
tives to regulate firm activity through guides, codes of conduct and multilateral
agreements, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, or the
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning the Multinational Enterprises of
the International Labor Organization (ILO).
• The 1980s were influenced by a deep technological change, trade openness
and the new approach of ‘sustainable development’. This context facilitated a
change of economic model towards a market-oriented approach, resulting in the
strengthening of the private sector vis-à-vis state power.
• By the 1990s, the international agenda started to get involvedmore closelywith the
private sector in order tomake globalization and the effects of trade and investment
a more balanced process, given the emergence of strong middle-income countries
such as theBRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, SouthAfrica) and the competitive
environment created as a result.
• In the post-2000 phase, the context shows a clear and close involvement of the
private sector with the international agenda, particularly oriented to a sustainable
approach. Some of the most relevant initiatives in this period include the UN
Global Compact that sought to incorporate the principles of human rights, labour
standards, environment and anti-corruption in firm activity, and some other initia-
tives such as the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, developed
by John Ruggie in his role as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative
on Business and Human Rights and endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council
in 2011.
As Schäfer, Beer, Zenker, and Fernandes (2006) and Elkington (1998) point out,
since the 1990s, there has been a big movement, where the private sector has bene-
fitted from the change in the economic model that has increased the volumes of trade
and investment around the word. This expansion of firm activity has provided more
profits to enterprises, more political power through lobbying, and more capacity to
mobilize support for their processes worldwide. Such an expansion of the businesses
implies a new division of labour at the international level and an expansion in the
value chain of the firm. In this context, governments, civil society and different stake-
holders demand more transparency, ethics and accountability from the private sector
in its activities.
On similar lines, Dembinski (2003, p. 39) identifies three main issues where we
can weigh the current relevance of the private sector at the international level: the
aggregate weight of the non-financial enterprises in the world economy, comparing
their weight with the poorest countries, and considering categories such as the ‘very
big enterprises’ as forces of globalization. Based on this proposal, the relevance of
such categories is examined in Fig. 1 and Table 1.
In order to demonstrate the current weight of the private sector compared with
that of the public sector, a couple of examples may be cited; first, the comparison of
FDI flows from the North to the South and the public flows of official development












Total ODA FDI to developing countries
Fig. 1 ODA versus FDI flows, 1970–2013 (millions USD, current). Source For FDI, UNCTAD
statistics, http://unctadstat.unctad.org, and for ODA, OECD statistics, http://stats.oecd.org
assistance (ODA) in recent years. As is clearly seen, private flows have overtaken
the public flows, pointing at the new strength of the private sector (Fig. 1).
A second example compares the richest TNCs—or multinational enterprises
(MNEs)—of the world by foreign assets (Table 1) against the gross domestic product
(GDP) of some poor and low-income countries.2 It is clear that the value of some non-
financial TNCs—from developed and developing countries—is many times superior
to the GDP of some countries, showing the economic power that firms have acquired
as compared to countries (on the lines of Dembinski). For instance, the GDP of
Samoa is roughly 964 times smaller than the foreign assets of General Electric and
roughly 131 times smaller than those of Hutchison Whampoa Limited.
In addition, it should not be forgotten that firms cause increasing damage to the
environment as part of their economic activity and patterns of consumption. The
climate change consequences of firm activity have been widely documented since a
couple of decades by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)3 and by the Stern Review. Such
a landscape requires a clear response from the public and private sector to strengthen
social and environmental standards and regulations. One framework that facilitates
the analysis of sustainable development, in the context of the relationship among
different actors, such as the private sector, is the framework of ‘global governance’.
2A list of the poorest countries was considered to illustrate the magnitude of difference in the value
of some of the biggest non-financial TNCs against the income of some developing countries’ GDP.
This can help illustrate the distance in economic value from firms to countries. This comparison
may not be so relevant if we select developed countries or middle-income countries. Data is based
on World Bank statistics.
3Some recommended readings on this include the Climate Change Reports from the IPCC, https://
www.ipcc.ch/, and the Emissions Gap Report published by UNEP, http://web.unep.org/climatech
ange/cop21/publications.
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Authors such as Rosenau (1995), Finkelstein (1995), Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006)
are representatives of different approaches to this framework and most of them build
upon the definition provided by the Commission on Global Governance that defined
global governance as:
… the sum of the many ways in which individuals and institutions, public and private,
manage their common affairs […] At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily
as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and
the global capital market. (1995, pp. 1–2)
As per Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006, p. 189), global governance can be under-
stood in two different ways. The first is as an analytical concept to explain the
contemporary reality and the second as a normative view on how political institu-
tions should react given the diminished strength of governments. Most importantly,
‘global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human
activity—from the family to the international organization—in which the pursuit
of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions’ (Rosenau,
1995, p. 13). It is useful to conduct the analysis of social and environmental standards
and regulations for the private sector using the concept of global governance as a
framework of reference. As Levi-Faur points out, ‘… scholars of global governance
tend to focus on standards and soft norms’ (Levi-Faur, 2011, p. 3).
The negative effects of firm activity on the environment started to be recognized
as a serious concern at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Examples
of the multifarious problems included depletion of the ozone layer, the rational use of
natural resources (forests, oil, water, etc.), and ecological disasters (oil spills, chemi-
cals, nuclear energy disasters). The international regimes on environment, sustainable
development and climate change have become a relevant pathway to bring firms to
be more accountable to the needs of the planet (dimensions related to the sustain-
able development approach). Some of the most relevant developments in this context
include:
• Creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1972
• Adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
in 1987
• Brundtland Report that conceptualized ‘sustainable development’ in 1987
• Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro that introduced the Agenda 21 in 1992
• Kyoto Protocol in 1997
• Johannesburg Summit in 2002
• Rio + 20 in 2012
• SDGs and the 2030 Agenda in 2015.
Concerns regarding the effects of firm activity would not be so significant if the
influence of such activity were not so deep. What is needed is an approach that
can help firms align their work with social and environmental standards and norms
relating to the current agenda (Bruce Hall & Biersteker, 2002). The CSR framework
can act as a bridge to facilitate this linkage.
5 Corporate Social Responsibility: The Interface … 89
3 The Corporate Social Responsibility Interface
In this section, the relevance of two relationships is examined—the linkages of social
and environmental norms, standards and regulations with the private sector, and the
linkages of the sustainable development approach with the CSR framework. These
links seem to point to the same set of solutions to create new rules for different
stakeholders to align their activities with the new sustainable development agenda
based on the SDGs to be achieved by 2030.
First, when we refer to the private sector and link it with norms, regulations and
standards, following ITC (2011, p. 1), we must consider the framework of public
rules within which producers, exporters and buyers operate, as well as its growing
interplay with private rules. Possible categories of research as identified by the ITC
include:
• private standards in global value chains
• private standards’ impacts on producers and exporters
• public and private standards interplay
• public standards’ benefits for producers and exporters.
There is also a possibility of differentiating between public and private standards
in the following ways (ITC, 2011, p. 1), even though there are overlaps:
• Private standards tend to include requirements related to wider social and envi-
ronmental aspects of production, e.g. working and living conditions at the
farm/factory or even community level.
• Public standards may focus on narrower aspects such as product and food safety
as well as quality, but they also go beyond to address environmental (and worker)
protection, for instance.
Büthe and Mattli further explain the differences between norms, standards and
regulations, to appreciate their utility, in the following sense:
Like norms and regulations, standards are instruments of governance. But standards differ
frommost social norms in that they are more explicit. At the same time, standards differ from
governmental regulations in that the use of, or compliance with, a standard is not mandatory.
Only if a standard becomes the technical basis for a law or regulation – which often and
increasingly occurs – does it become legally binding. (2010, p. 455)
On the same lines, the above-mentioned authors (Büthe & Mattli, 2011), quoted
by the ITC (2011, pp. 5–6) propose the following typology of standards, whether
public or private:
• public non-market-based standards and norms developed by international orga-
nizations or domestic regulators (such as ILO labour standards)
• public market-based standards established by competing public regulatory agen-
cies of individual states or regional and multilateral standard-setting bodies (such
as Codex Alimentarius)
• non-market-based private standards set up by major private bodies (such as ISO
26,000, ISO 14,000, etc.)











Fig. 2 What to regulate or standardize? Source Levi-Faur (2011, p. 9)
• market-based private standards developed by firms, NGOs, academia, industry
associations, etc. (such as Fairtrade).
Once we can differentiate between public and private rules at the global or local
level, a keyquestion is ‘what to regulate?’, particularly by theprivate sector. Levi-Faur
(2011) proposes that not only the private sector (market), but also the society (civil)
or governmental actors (state), as regulators, can be categorized in eight ways in any
governance system (Fig. 2). If we place the private sector at the core of the figure, we
see through the diagram how firms create value for their different stakeholders, and
by extension, the possibility of identifying what are the main aspects to be regulated.
Figure 3, taken from the Stakeholder Theory (Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, &
De Colle, 2010), illustrates this relationship between the firm and the value creation
for others.
As part of the stakeholder theory, CSR becomes a helpful tool to develop social
and environmental standards and regulations under the sustainable development
approach. In addition, as Nuñez (2003, p. 5) points out, most of the CSR aspects
are already included to some extent in the international standards4 relating to new
concerns such as environmental protection. To contextualize briefly, CSR can be
4In this case, the reference is to standards related to human rights or labour issues, which have had
a longer tradition within the UN and ILO. The Global Compact incorporates these two fields, plus




















Fig. 3 Whom to regulate or apply standards to? Source Freeman et al. (2010, p. 24)
understood in its classical definition as ‘… the economic, legal, ethical, and discre-
tionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time’ (Carroll,
1979, p. 500; Carroll, 2008). While linking it with sustainable development, it has
been proposed that the most accurate definition of CSR must incorporate not only
dimensions of analysis like those identified by Carroll, but also incorporate the
concerns of the different stakeholders of the firm (primary and secondary), at least in
four main areas: government (states and public administration), society (consumers,
NGOs and citizens), market (industries and competition) and nature (the environ-
ment) (Elkington, 1998; Nuñez, 2003; Raufflet, Lozano, Barrera, & García de la
Torre, 2012).
The main theoretical frameworks that can be used to understand CSR include: the
economic approach (Friedman [1962] 2002), the social performance theory (Carroll,
1979), the stakeholder theory (based on an ethical view) and the corporate citizenship
approach (Melé, 2008, pp. 48–49; Mutz, 2008). Similarly, many initiatives related
to norms and standards that incorporate different concerns around sustainable devel-
opment can be identified. It is important to note that such initiatives under CSR go
beyond many of the norms and standards with a social and environmental focus as
they also include economic and financial dimensions.
Nuñez (2003) proposes a three-level classification of initiatives of CSR—global,
regional and national—to guide the private sector under a sustainable development
twomore contemporary concerns—environment and corruption. This is an example of international
standards and principles for the private sector in the global governance context.
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Table 2 CSR initiatives
Global level




DJSI, FTSE 4 Good
Norms and technical standards
ISO 14,000,   AA1000, SA800
Caux principles for business, Sullivan principles, Equator principles (Banking), OCDE 
guidelines, Global Reporting Initiative, Global Compact, ICGN, Boston College, 
UNCHR Human Rights Code of Conduct for Companies, Consumers Int. Business 
Charter, ILO principles, Universal declaration of human rights
WBCSD  EMPRESA
Local initiatives through local institutions related to private sector, chambers of 
commerce,  private foundations related to WBCSD (such as CEADS en Argentina, 
CESPEDES in Mexico, CEBDS BCSD Brazil, among others), and to EMPRESA (such as 
CBSR in Canada, Instituto Ethos Brazil, Acción Empresa Chile, CEMEFI Mexico, among 
others) 
Source Nuñez (2003, p. 17)
approach through norms, standards, principles, guides, codes of conduct, global
indexes, and reports (Table 2). Table 2 can be complementedwith later initiatives such
as the ISO 26,000 on social responsibility for organizations, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and its standard, or, at the local level in the Mexican
case, the Sustainable IPC for the Mexican Stock Exchange and initiatives such as the
ESR emblem provided by the Mexican Center for Philanthropy (CEMEFI) (Pérez,
2011) .
To illustrate the interface between the private sector, and social and environ-
mental standards and regulations, through CSR, three key institutions in México are
considered—TheMexican Center for Philanthropy (CEMEFI), The Global Compact
Mexican Chapter (GCMC), and the Caux Round Table Mexican Chapter (CAUX)—
as examples of the influence of CSR strengthening standards, norms and regulations
locally. Themain findings are listed in the Annex, and can be summarized as follows:
1. There is a perception that CSR is influencing the strengthening of standards at
value chain level, however, it seems this influence is limited to reputational rather
than strategic considerations. Even then, some local institutions are promoting
international initiatives around social and environmental norms and standards,
such as the SR10 from IQNet adopted by the Mexican private sector.
2. Related to the current state of social and environmental standards and regulations
in México, new alternatives have been emerging lately. On the government side,
institutions such as theMexicanMinistry ofLabour (STPS), theNational Institute
for Women (INMUJERES), or the National Council to Prevent Discrimination
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(CONAPRED) have launched, in the last few years, initiatives such as the Norm
NMX-R-025-SCFI-2015 against discrimination and labour inequality. Fromcivil
society and the international community, alternatives such as the certification
of family-friendly enterprises (EFR) and the GCMC have emerged. A direct
relationship can be perceived between each component of CSR and the local
implementation of international standards and norms that cover all those areas,
such as SA 8000 or ISO 9000 and some others. However, the coverage is still
low, as Global Compact figures show (Annex).
3. Finally, relating to broader initiatives or national platforms such as the ones
promoted by the United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS),
there is a lack of knowledge of such work at the level of local stakeholders.
However, local institutions such as the Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources (SEMARNAT) have been working on the launch of labels and certifi-
cations on responsible consumption. The 2030 Agenda is likely to influence the
implementation of social and environmental standards to attain the SDGs.
It is perceived, in general, that given the SDGs and the increasing involvement
of the private sector in the sustainable development agenda, many other initiatives
will appear at this interface, such as the Emerging Market Multinationals Network
for Sustainability, the movement around impact investment linked, among others,
with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, the
work of the UN around the promotion of the Global Compact, development agencies
such as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and
their work promoting business models for sustainable development, or the efforts
around business and development carried out by the World Business Council for
Social Development (WBCSD), the UNDP, the OECD or the International Institute
for Sustainable Development (IISD).
As a concluding example in this context, we can consider a given ministry related
to any environmental topic (water, forest, seas, lakes, etc.) in any developing country
or emerging economy. Its technical department may manage a pool of contractors
that can contribute, with their technology, to improve certain aspects regulated by
this ministry (water filters, pipes, paper and packing materials, renewable energy
technology, etc.). In collaboration with the international cooperation department,
which also interacts with development agencies and engages in global debates, such
pool of firms could increasingly be filtered based on general (or specific) norms and
standards adopted by the international community in the labour and environmental
areas.Applying theCSRapproach, requirements that can be imposed include: that the
firm belongs to the Global Compact; that the firm produces an Annual Sustainability
Report that has been certified by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); or that the
firm has achieved a local or international standard or certificate, such as the ISO
14,000 family, ISO 26,000, or in the Mexican case, the NOM-120-SSA1-1994 on
health and sanitation practices in the processing of food, alcoholic and non-alcoholic
beverages etc.
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4 Conclusions
Themain aim of the chapter was to underline the relevance of the private sector in the
context of social and environmental norms, standards and regulations in the world
economy. In particular, the chapter sought to show that in the current situation, the
evolution of the private sector must take place in a way in which, through the creation
of certain norms and standards, the goals of the private sector can be aligned with
the goals of society in order to guarantee sustainable development.
It was shown that the main activities of a firm along many of its processes
(production, distribution and consumption) intersect with relevant aspects of the
sustainability approach, i.e. to take care of the economy, of the society and of the
environment. In this context, corporate social responsibility appears to be a frame-
work that can help integrate the use of social and environmental standards into firm
activity in the context of global governance, promoted both by public and private
initiatives. This needs to be done not only for the sake of the local environment, but
for the provision of global public goods. The 2030 Agenda can be an opportunity to
promote the convergence of social and environmental standards and regulations with
CSR, with the aim of better aligning the private sector’s and other actors’ activities
with the SDGs. The Mexican experience shown here briefly can work as an example
of how such convergence is in fact happening and contributing to the 2030 goals.
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Annex
Apart from literature, this chapter builds upon interviews on the relationship between
CSR and social and environmental standards and regulations in Mexico with three
experts from key local institutions:
• Ms.LorenaCortes (LC),Head ofResearch at theMexicanCentre for Philanthropy
(CEMEFI)
• Marco Pérez (MP), Coordinator of the Global Compact’s Mexican Chapter
(GCMC)
• Walter Zehle (WZ), Representative of the Mexican Chapter of the Caux Round
Table (CAUX).
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The interviews focused on three main aspects:
• Question 1—What is the role of CSR in the strengthening of standards inMexico?
• Question 2—What is the current state of social and environmental standards and
regulations in Mexico?
• Question 3—Is there any progress on the configuration of a national platform
on (private) sustainability standards like the one recently launched in India?
(Note: The Mexican National Platform on Voluntary Sustainability Standards
was subsequently launched in April 2018).
The following table summarizes the main findings of the interviews:
Q1 Q2 Q3
LC • CSR is currently influencing the
strengthening of standards in Mexico,
particularly at the value chain level
• Defining a common concept of CSR
and establishing its link with standards
is still difficult
• In many sectors such as agriculture or
construction, there is a debate on the
implications for corporations and their
collaborators if CSR is implemented in
those sectors. Small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) implement
international standards as they are
obliged to comply with the
international benchmarks of
multinational corporations in order to
be accepted as part of their value chains
• There is still the feeling that CSR
standards can only be complied with by
big corporations and not by local and
small companies
• It is possible to identify a number of
initiatives driven by different actors,
but particularly the Mexican
government through the Ministry of
Labour (Secretaría del Trabajo y
Prevision Social—STPS), has been
recently promoting different labelling
initiatives linked to the value chain of
different sectors, e.g. for:




– enterprises promoting inclusive
labour (Gilberto Rincón Gallardo),
and






• Another example is the recent creation
of the NMX-R-025-SCFI-2015 norm
against discrimination and equal
labour, developed by three
governmental institutions:





• Finally, the private Fundación Más
Familia awards the EFR certification to
family-friendly enterprises based on
CSR principles. It is a management
model with presence in more than 20
countries and three core areas: family
and labour conciliation, support for
equal opportunities, inclusiveness. The





The interviewee had no information
regarding this question
(continued)
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(continued)
Q1 Q2 Q3
MP The general opinion is that currently,
CSR is still limited more to philanthropy
and voluntary services rather than to
sustainable business strategies. In
practice, there is not yet an alignment
between CSR and standards. CSR for
many Mexican firms (mostly SMEs) still
is a means and not an end
Although the number of norms has grown
in the recent years, the challenge is still
too big, because firms use them very
little. Even though the Global Compact
(GC) is one of the biggest movements
worldwide related to CSR and some
social and environmental standards, the
number of firms engaged in the GC at
country level (around 781 organizations
and among them around 530 firms) is still
low considering that there are almost five
million firms in Mexico (The country has
the third biggest GC network in the
world, and the first in the Latin-American
region. At global level, the GC accounts
for 9000 firms and 3000 non-businesses
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-
is-gc/participants). There is a need to
align initiatives such as GC, Global
Reporting Initiative, etc.
The interviewee had no information
regarding the specificities of social and
environmental standards
However, there was a perception that the
2030 Agenda and the SDGs offer new
potentials for standards and indicators
development as well as for their
alignment with these global goals
WZ The CSR movement has influenced many
local institutions and initiatives around
standards and norms, for example:
• Under ISO 26,000, IQNet (The
International Certification Network)
developed the SR10 certificate, an
international standard on responsible
and sustainable management that is
supported and operated in Mexico by
the Instituto Mexicano de
Normalización y Certificación A.C.
(IMNC) and by the Asociación de
Normalización y Certificación A.C.
(ANCE). (Private, independent
multisectoral organizations that support
the industry). Another case is the ‘Etica
y Valores’ award presented by the
Confederation of Industrial Chambers
of Mexico (CONCAMIN) since around
15 years
There is a big influence of international
standards on local standards and norms.
In the case of CSR, for each CSR topic
we can identify a particular standard,
some of them international (e.g. SA
8000, ISO 9000 and many environmental
standards) but at the same time referred
to in Mexican laws and standards. For
this reason, it does not seem clear why to
consider the creation of (new) standards
when most of the international standards
are represented in local laws, norms or
standards
There are no clear initiatives in this
regard; however, the government will
launch standards and norms relating to
CSR (e.g. on responsible consumption)
through institutions such as the Ministry
of Environment and Natural Resources
(SEMARNAT). These are intended to
complement regulations in promoting
sustainability
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Chapter 6
Advances in Sustainability Reporting:
What Is Missing?
Ana Carolina Mendes dos Santos, Ayuni Larissa Mendes Sena,
and Vana Tércia Silva de Freitas
1 Introduction
Social and environmental global challenges have generated pressure on companies to
be more proactive in social and environmental responsibility. Because of their polit-
ical and economic influence and the impact of their activities, corporations have an
important role to play in sustainable development.Agrowingnumber of companies—
especially large and midsized ones—understand the need to address sustainability
issues and go beyond short-term gains if they want to survive in the long run, because
their reputation among stakeholders and market value varies depending on their
involvement with social and environmental issues, as shown by KPMG (2011). As
corporate social responsibility (CSR) emerges as a new business paradigm, sustain-
ability reporting (SR) is increasingly recognized globally as an important instrument
of transparency and accountability, contributing to companies’ efforts to achieve
sustainability.
Althoughwe recognize the importance of disclosing information,we go further. In
our understanding, more than being an end in itself, SRmust play the most important
role of serving as an instrument to monitor companies’ activities regarding social and
environmental impacts—and as an instrument of good governance. One can naturally
expect governments and civil society organizations to play a principal role in this
process of holding companies responsible for their activities. However, one may
question the level of seriousness with which the process of SR is taken and whether
this tool is utilized to its full potential. We argue that stakeholder involvement is the
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missing link that needs to be strengthened in order to make SR a strong instrument
of good governance for sustainability.
After a brief historical description of the evolution of SR and an analysis of the
concepts of sustainability standards and good governance found in literature, we
discuss the potential of SR as an instrument for strengthening corporate social and
environmental standards. In doing so, and based on some case studies also found
in the literature, we identify what we believe is a condition for using this tool to its
full potential—stakeholder involvement, or more specifically, government and civil
society use of information disclosed to influence companies’ actions. Special focus is
given to the Group of Friends of Paragraph 47 (GoF47), a voluntary group of national
governments that are in the forefront of the discussions on SR and the necessary
legal framework to promote disclosure about sustainability-related information. We
conclude the paper with a discussion of some elements that we believe can directly
affect the use ofSR—i.e. governanceprocesses that lead to improvements in reporting
practices and corporate policies—and finally, we provide some recommendations to
policymakers and civil society organizations in order to promote a more effective
use of SR.
2 Historical Background and State of the Art
From a historical perspective, the development of SR has witnessed several shifts. In
the 1970s, traditional financial reportingwas complemented by supplementary social
information. In the 1980s,with the launch of the first principles of SRby theCoalition
for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), reporting increasingly began
to include the social and environmental dimension, usually in a joint report published
alongside the traditional financial report (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). Today, the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) is themost usedguide forSRdue to thebroad acceptanceof
its principles and indicators. More than 5000 organizations comply with it—over 80
per cent of the world’s 250 largest corporations across more than 90 countries (GRI,
2014). The well-known GRI Guidelines have recently been transformed into a “set
of modular, interrelated GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards (GRI Standards)”,
mainly to improve the structure and format of contents (GRI, 2017).
Widespread acceptance of SR has stimulated many individual and collective
efforts towards developing and exchanging best practices and guidance in this area,
such as the UN Global Compact, Ethos Institute for Business and Social Respon-
sibility, ISO 26000, GRI, UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, which contribute to increased compliance levels among countries and
sectors.
Although SR is basically a voluntary process, there is a growing tendency to
make it mandatory, as shown in the recent Directive 2014/95/EU of the Euro-
pean Parliament on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain
large undertakings and groups. Other countries leading in the use of SR have also
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Table 1 Sustainability reporting and current national policies in GoF47 member countries
(Argentina, Austria, Colombia, Norway and Switzerland did not participate in the study)
Country National policy on SR
South Africa Mandatory for listed companies (since 2010)
Brazil Mandatory for the electricity sector (distributors, transmitters, permit holders and
generating companies (since 2006)
Denmark Mandatory for listed companies and state-owned companies and any other
exceeding at least two of the following: (a) balance sheet total of EUR 19.2
million; (b) net revenue of EUR 38.3 million; (c) more than 250 full-time
employees (since 2009)
France Mandatory for listed companies and for non-listed companies from December
2011, as follows: (a) from 31 December 2011, for non-listed companies with over
5000 employees and a turnover or total balance sheet above EUR 1 billion; (b)
from 31 December 2012, for non-listed companies over 2000 employees and a
turnover or total balance sheet above EUR 400 million; (c) from 31 December
2013, for non-listed companies over 500 employees and a turnover or total
balance sheet above EUR 100 million
Chile Mandatory for state-owned companies and voluntary for listed companies under
the “comply or explain” approach (under implementation)
Source Authors’ compilation based on UNEP and GoF47 (2015)
adhered to mandatory approaches (Table 1). The general trends in the practice of SR
have demonstrated the importance of integrating it with traditional financial reports,
providing a more holistic view of companies’ policies. The so-called integrated
sustainability reports have gained popularity among different sectors and stake-
holders based on the recognition that efficient investments are necessary to make
sustainable transformation appealing.
A recent initiative is the GoF47, founded in 2012 by the governments of South
Africa, Brazil, Denmark and France, later enlarged to include Argentina, Austria,
Chile, Colombia, Norway and Switzerland, while other countries have expressed
interest to join (Morocco, Sri Lanka and Vietnam). UNEP and GRI support this
group, whose name comes from Paragraph 47 of the final document “The Future We
Want” of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +
20), in which governments pledged to encourage companies to consider integrating
sustainability information in their periodic reports.
The special feature of this group is its government-led nature. It aims at pushing
forward the discussions about SR, promoting the practice globally and developing
and exchanging best practices and policy guidance in this area. GoF47 is dedicated to
strengthening an international culture of corporate transparency and accountability
as key elements of a well-functioning economy that enhance the private sector’s
contribution to sustainable development. The group believes that the widespread
practice of SR has the potential to contribute to the assessment of sustainability
impacts by the corporate sector and to encourage sustainable business practices.
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In 2014, in its Position Paper,1 GoF47 committed to advancing the implementa-
tion of Paragraph 47 and strongly recommended that SR should be retained within
the framework of the 2030 (then “post-2015”) Agenda on Sustainable Develop-
ment. Considering that monitoring and accountability frameworks are crucial for the
implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the group has been acting as a global player
in promoting SR as a tool to generate data and measure progress and companies’
contribution towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
In this sense, one of the most remarkable results of GoF47 was the strong partic-
ipation of its member countries during the negotiations to build and maintain target
12.6 (“Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt
sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their reporting
cycle”) in the SDGs document, showing an evolution from a recommendation
(Paragraph 47) to a global development goal (SDG 12).
Based on previous experiences at the national level of some leading member
countries (Table 1), GoF47 encourages policymakers to consider a combination of
mandatory and voluntary policies, striking a balance between the strong need for
standardization and comparability (typical of mandatory reporting) and the desire to
allow flexibility and innovation in SR (characteristic of the voluntary approach), as
is the case for listed and non-listed companies on stock market sustainability indexes
(UNEP & GoF47, 2015). More recently, with the support of UNEP, GoF47 country
members from Latin America and the Caribbean region—especially Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Colombia—have been engaging in regional projects in order to
enhance governmental capacities to manage information from CSR—promoting a
follow-up approach in CSR policies, encouraging comparability of current reporting
procedures and targeting better alignment of corporate activities to SDGs (SDG
12.6).
Table 1 shows some GoF47 member countries and their current policies on SR.
According to UNEP and GoF47 (2015), in 2013, 45 countries had sustainability
reporting-related policies in place—an increase of 26 countries since 2006. This
rapid growth demonstrates a strong recognition of the positive role of SR and its
importance in addressing society’s needs for transparency. Notwithstanding this,
most of the cases and discussions still centre on the issue of promoting the adoption
of SR. There is little focus on how SR is really changing companies’ performance
or improving social and environmental standards. Once reports are published, it is
also important to see who is assessing them and what end they are serving.
3 Concept and Principles of Sustainability Reporting
Sustainability standards can be understood as “a set of criteria defining good social
and environmental practices (…), bringing about better production practices and
1GoF47 Position Paper was an internal document to endorse a position, as a group, to present to
the Permanent Missions of New York at the 11th Open Working Group.
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driving long-term sustainability improvements” (ISEAL, 2015). This means that in
an interconnected world, there are certain minimum expectations for any activity
to consider potential social and environmental impacts and to ensure that adverse
social and environmental risks and impacts are avoided, minimized, mitigated and
managed.
Based on this definition, SR can be understood as a standard (there are many
international SR standards: UN Global Compact, Ethos Institute for Business and
Social Responsibility, ISO 26000, GRI, UNEP and OECD guidelines), but—at the
same time—as an instrument of change. We argue that the most import role of SR is
to serve as an instrument to improve corporate social and environmental behaviour
in the wider sense; therefore, the exact SR standard or methodology applied is not
the focus of this chapter. Although in order to be effective, the adopted methodology
must be easy to understand, focused on important issues and able to generate easy
to compare corporate results (Mohin, 2014).
By requiring companies to report their performance according to the most
advanced methodologies, SR criteria may provide a basis for good business prac-
tices, i.e. the common rules that should be followed in order to achieve sustainability.
Reporting practices result in a long-term learning and improvement process in which
companies have the opportunity to review their internal procedures, public relations,
resource use, production efficiency and social and environmental impacts, which,
aligned with CSR policies, can lead to more responsible business.
We view SR as a set of principles and practices—the act and process of reporting
performance—rather than a specific document or methodology (Fig. 1). This is why
we prefer the term sustainability reporting rather than report. Applying a broader
understanding of SR allows for discussions and policies that may foster the adoption
of reporting practices by other institutions, such as small and medium enterprises,
Fig. 1 Common principles and practices of good governance and sustainability reporting. Source
Authors
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governmental institutions and civil society organizations, since their engagement
with SR requires adaptation in order to make it more attractive, simple and cost
efficient. In this sense, we understand SRmore as a practice than a report, embracing
the principles of good governance. Reporting methodology should be understood
as a means towards standardization, which at the same time needs to be adapted to
specific contexts and institutions.
Even though there are still bottlenecks to be overcome in terms of indicator
comprehension and use (Moneva, Archel & Correa, 2006; Azcárate, Carrasco &
Fernández, 2011; Camargos, Jannuzzi & Gavira, 2014), SR practices have shown
significant improvements (KPMG, 2013). This suggests that the focus can now shift
to a broader discussion about whether companies follow all means to be accountable,
transparent and inclusive towards broader stakeholders such as the government and
civil society, which tend to face more difficulties in appropriating SR, as shown in
this paper.
Although the term governance—usually related to the “process of governing”—
has a variety of definitions, depending on the context and the objectives that are
pursued (Guisselquist, 2012), principles of good governance seem to be well agreed
upon. We argue that they overlap to a large extent with principles and practices of SR
as illustrated in Fig. 1. In the context of sustainability standards for the economy, good
governance also requires a strong commitment to sustainable development (Sachs,
2015) or what some call governance for sustainability (Bosselmann, Engel & Taylor,
2008).
SR, as we see it, has a high potential to promote good governance schemes as
well as social and environmental standards, given its emphasis on transparency and
accountability criteria required for an active participation of various actors. More-
over, SR boosts commitments to institutional learning and transformation processes
through data collection and information disclosure.
4 Stakeholder Involvement: The Missing Link
If we recognize that one of the most important roles of SR is to provide information
to stakeholders in a way that they can monitor social and environmental impacts of
companies’ activities, it is important to understand how those stakeholders effec-
tively use SR as an instrument of change. This requires an active participation of
those actors that are most closely concerned with the social and environmental
impacts of corporate activity—government and civil society (especially environ-
mental and human rights-oriented NGOs and consumer organizations). Business
groups (investors, shareholders, etc.)—profit stakeholders—show more interest in
sustainability information that has an added value for the direct assessment of a
company’s value now and in the future.
Nonetheless, evidence on how these stakeholders use SR—understood as
“assessing the reports with the aim of making a decision or taking an action”—
rarely appears either in the literature or in practitioners’ experience. The 2008KPMG
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Sustainability study on the perspective of report readers (KPMG, 2008) and, later,
the GRI study about how different stakeholder groups use sustainability data (GRI,
2015) are some of the few in-depth and global studies undertaken in this field, which
reveal that SR is not used to its full potential.
The quality of SR has been especially criticized by academics. Garcia & Lima
(2019) point out that the quality aspects usually presented in the reports are limited
to adherence to disclosure protocols, with little follow-up regarding the accuracy and
usefulness of the reported information, the balancing of positive and negative aspects
and the possibility of comparability of performance from one period to another.
During this research, we identified that governments and civil society represen-
tatives do not appropriate information disclosed through SR as much as other actors
closely related to companies—such as investors, shareholders and labour unions—
do. This underutilization of sustainability data is particularly noted in the case of
governments. Although always recognized as an important stakeholder group in
promoting CSR, they are not well equipped to use SR optimally. The ineffective
and weak impact of governments on SR is the result of state inability (financial and
personnel) to monitor and enforce, and to downsize traditional command-control
roles while promoting market forces to encourage better behaviour in industry and
civil society (Mai-Lan, 2012). This imposes more and more responsibility on civil
society and citizens to fulfil governments’ roles.
An interesting case is the use of data by state and local governments of North
America (the city of Seattle, Washington; Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth,
Ontario; and the province of British Columbia) studied by Maclaren (2014); they
began to adopt sustainability as a goal in their plans and other planning activities:
Urban sustainability reports include a range of information about environmental, economic,
and social conditions and policies in the local community and use that information to make
judgments aboutwhether the community ismaking progress towards sustainability. Evidence
of positive progress is important for justifying past expenditures on sustainability initiatives.
Evidence of lack of sustainability can provide ammunition for community groups in local
government, other levels of government, or the private sector. Individuals in the community
can use sustainability reports to educate themselves about sustainability trends and evaluate
how their own actions may improve sustainability. (Maclaren, 2014, p. 368)
Our research revealed that, in principle, there is no difference between countries
that are part of the GoF47 and those who are not in terms of the use of SR and also
in terms of reporting practices by governmental institutions, as shown in Table 1 and
in the cases described above.
Literature shows sparse evidence pointing to civil society use of information
available from SR, suggesting that these are rather timid approaches in, at times,
precarious situations. Yakovleva and Vazquez-Brust (2012) examine the conceptu-
alization of CSR in the context of multinational mining enterprises in Argentina,
presenting the main conflicts with local communities, the organization and strategies
adopted by them and the main results achieved.
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On the other hand, in 2012, the International Movement of People Affected by
Vale Company2 launched a document called Vale Unsustainability Report, which
uses the same structure as the company’s SR to show independent counter-data about
the reality of workers, affected communities and environmental impacts, countering
information released in the company’s reports and advertising campaigns. The second
version of the Vale Unsustainability Report was launched in April 2015, which gath-
ered information on more than thirty cases of conflict involving the entire production
chain of the company in different countries such as Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Peru
and Mozambique. The Vale Unsustainability Report represents a counterbalance to
corporate governance and represents a more proactive example of civil society’s use
of SR. Its effectiveness relies on the capacity to affect the company’s image and,
consequently, to threaten profitability. Even though changes are not yet documented,
this strategy will most likely affect not only the company’s actions, but also the way
SR is carried out (Adams & Whelan, 2009).
It is to be expected that the reports contain only what has been done. Unfortu-
nately, practice shows a different reality. According to Moneva et al. (2006), some
organizations that label themselves as GRI reporters do not behave in a respon-
sible way concerning sustainability questions. This means that if SR is not used and
checked by specific stakeholders, one can expect neither a guaranteed quality of
reports nor improvements in corporate activities. A representative example comes
from Vale Company—the second largest mining company in the world. Despite all
its marketing concerning sustainability, and the publication of SR since 2006 on a
voluntary basis, its 2016 and 2017 reports do not disclose information concerning
effluents and wastes (topic of GRI-306), since this topic was not considered material,
i.e. relevant to be included in the report (Garcia & Lima, 2019). Again, despite the
mining dam accident inMariana in 2015, Vale Sustainability Reports still offer super-
ficial information about dam risks and ways to mitigate them. The extent to which
these facts influence government or civil society’s ability tomonitor company’s activ-
ities is still unknown, but one can expect that SR could help stakeholders investigate
and take actions towards environmental risks and problems, such as in the recent
accident in Brumadinho in 2019.
Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero and Ruiz (2014) demonstrated that the pressure by
some stakeholder groups (consumers, clients, employees and environment) has
increased the quality and transparency of reports, and Quaak, Aalbers and Goedee
(2007) observed a similar effect with large breweries in the Netherlands, although
not on a regular basis. These results do not show how stakeholders appropriate infor-
mation disclosed in reports to claim better corporate governance but rather, how
powerful their participation is in promoting better governance.
We could say that to be completely able to improve social and environmental
standards, SR needs to be increasingly used by people who are interested in such
improvements. Stakeholders’ participation is the missing link between SR practices
2The International Coordination of People Affected by Vale is a result of network cooperation
between stakeholders directly affected by Vale activities in mentioned countries. Vale is a global
mining company with headquarters in Brazil and is a leading producer of iron and nickel.
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Fig. 2 Factors that directly affect the use of SR and, in turn, the governance processes leading
towards improvements in reporting practices and corporate policies. Source Authors
and social and environmental improvement. According to UNEP (2015), there is
a need for better collaborative reporting to transform SR from the current one-way,
broadcast-type format to a more multi-directional, dynamic, ongoing exchange with
all relevant stakeholders.
Unfortunately, participation in most cases is wanting. Stakeholders do not get
involved or do not use SR for many reasons: complexity and length of the reports,
making them inaccessible to most people, lack of a report’s visibility, lack of human
or financial resources, lack of relevance or reliability of the information disclosed,
absence of an open communication channel with the company. Figure 2 illustrates the
three factors or elements that we believe directly affect the use of SR by governments
and civil society, and the governance process that leads to better CSR.
We argue in this chapter that discussions at the national and international levels
still focus on the technical implementation of SR practices in a business environment,
while neglecting the broader role of stakeholders such as the government and civil
society. If we want SR to become a strong instrument of assessing companies’ activ-
ities or performance in relation to sustainability issues, a particular challenge lies in
providing those stakeholders with the conditions for better use of disclosed infor-
mation. At the same time, there is need for starting a discussion at the international
level to simplify corporate sustainability reports in order to generate meaningful
and comparable data. For instance, even though the GRI is the most accepted and
used methodology, its use of about 90 key performance indicators and a myriad
of measurements renders its comprehension and comparability between companies
difficult, if not impossible, for most people.
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In order to achieve sustainability in business aswell as better coordination between
companies, governments and civil society on issues of standards and regulation, we
believe that GoF47 and other leading international initiatives should engage in a
post-SR debate, i.e. how to transform SR into better governance. Such a discussion
would involve the elements presented in Fig. 2 through an ongoing dialogue with
different stakeholders, especially the public sector and civil society.
5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
SR is an important instrument of transparency and accountability; it demonstrates
companies’ efforts to achieve sustainability and it has been increasingly adopted
and fostered. We are not only witnessing a steady increase in reporting companies
globally, but also in SR-related policies at the national level. Significant improvement
in the implementation of SR polices worldwide is evident, which means there is no
turning back in the process—SR is here to stay
In this chapter, we argue that the most important role of SR is to provide infor-
mation to stakeholders in such a way that they can monitor social and environmental
impacts of companies’ activities and, as a consequence, to serve as an instrument to
improve corporate social and environmental behaviour. But we also recognize that
this requires the active participation of those actors most concerned with social and
environmental impacts of corporate activities. Literature has shown that SR has not
been fully and effectively utilized by stakeholders from government and civil society,
who should be the most interested parties in ensuring that companies’ activities do
not result in negative social and environmental impacts. Stakeholders’ participation,
in this sense, is the missing link between SR practices and social and environmental
improvements. The present study identified the sparseness of registered cases on
the use of SR, which demonstrates that the debate needs to move forward. Discus-
sions on SR both at the national and international levels are still more concentrated on
implementing and strengtheningSRpolicies.Despite the recent advances in reporting
practices, the focus remains on stimulating companies to disclose sustainability infor-
mation, rather than on the effective use of the information so provided. We believe
that GoF47 has a great potential in leading this advanced debate.
By analysing a few cited cases, we could identify a group of elements that directly
affect the use of SR and, in particular, the results achieved by stakeholders making
use of the information disclosed. This is an interesting aspect to be addressed by
national and international entities in future discussions on SR if we want to foster
the use of SR as an instrument of change. Finally, we recommend a set of actions to
governments and civil society to make better use of SR (Table 2), since we believe it
has a big potential to improve governance models that favour the emergence of social
and environmental standards for the world economy. But this can only be achieved
if key stakeholders participate in this process and make use of SR to take decisions
and action.
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Table 2 List of recommendations to policymakers and civil society organizations to promote a
better use of sustainability reports
Government Civil society
• Develop legislation with minimum
requirement of social and environmental
standards for public and private companies to
report on their performance, considering
different challenges faced by companies of
different sizes in different sectors
• Set clear results to be achieved in SR policies
and create institutional conditions to make
effective use of the reports
• Establish an ongoing multi-stakeholder
dialogue
• Make use of up-to-date technologies and
social media
• Create mechanisms to stimulate and reward
best practices on SR
• Lead by example and publish information
about own sustainability performance
• Use reports to urge companies to improve
CSR and governments to improve national
policies
• Consolidate, strengthen and expand the
discussion arena on SR in order to qualify
the proposals of civil society representatives
• Rank and disseminate best practices of
companies that produce and disclose their
sustainability reports according to
socio-environmental standards
• Since civil society organizations are
generally non-profit entities, it is important
that they lead by example and publish
financial and non-financial information
• Work in partnership with governments in
order to strengthen capacities and to monitor
social and environmental impacts of
companies’ activities
• Raise consumer awareness to encourage
responsible consumption on the basis of SR
Source Authors
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Chapter 7




Labour interests in high-standards countries argue that low labour standards are
an unfair source of comparative advantage, and that increasing imports from low-
standards countries will have an adverse impact on wages and working conditions
in high-standards countries, thus leading to a race to the bottom of standards. Low-
standards countries fear that the imposition of high labour standards upon them is
just a form of disguised protectionism and is equally unfair since it will erode their
competitiveness, which is largely based on low labour costs. There exists extensive
literature on the potential impact of labour standards on trade (Anderson, 1996;
Brown, 2000; Dion, Lanoie, & Laplante, 1997; Krueger, 1996; Mah, 1997; Maskus,
1997; Sengerberger & Campbell, 1994; Srinivasan, 1998; Stephenson, 1997; White,
1996). The objective of this chapter is to empirically investigate the effects of labour
standards on the export performance of a country. If the popular views on the issue
of trade and labour standards are correct, one should expect low-standards countries
to enjoy a better export performance, ceteris paribus. This chapter also discusses the
ways in which the emerging economies and the public and private sectors within
them are likely to emerge as setters of standards that affect producers and consumers
across the world. The structure of the chapter is as follows: Sect. 2 is an overview of
emerging economies and their participation in global standards setting, Sects. 3 and
4 discuss the data, empirical analysis and results and Sect. 5 concludes.
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2 Emerging Economies and Global Standards
Weiss and Thakur (2006) have defined global governance as “the complex of formal
and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and
among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental,
through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, duties, obliga-
tions and privileges are established, and differences are mediated through educated
professionals”. In other words, “global governance” can be identified as a move
towards the political co-ordination of transnational actors aimed at negotiating
responses to transnational issues or problems. With economic liberalization, global
governance is increasingly relevant for achieving sustainable development. Global
standards are one of themost important tools for this governance. They aim to develop
a set of common principles and standards for propriety, integrity and transparency
in international business and finance.
There is a growing recognition that the rise of the emerging economies will
change the contours of global governance. Many commentators suggest that this is
a transformative moment in global history and these economies will bring about
structural changes in global production, trade and aid relationships (Brautigam,
2009; Henderson, 2008; Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008; Power, Giles, & Tan-Mullins,
2012; Yeung, 2009). How these countries might influence the “rules of the game”
that pertain to international trade, particularly those relating to process standards
associated with labour conditions and environmental impacts will be interesting to
observe. The fundamental questions are, asNadvi (2014) puts it, “(i) are the emerging
economies moving from being “standard-takers” to becoming “standard-makers”?
and (ii) if so, what kinds of standards will be shaped by the emerging economies and
what will be the implications of those standards for the overall trajectory of global
labour and environmental standards?”
Before we start looking for answers to the above questions, it will be useful
to identify the emerging economies. The definitions of “emerging economies” are
multiple and continually evolving. Initially, in the early 1980s, the fast growing and
export oriented Asian and Latin American economies were named the “newly indus-
trializing economies” (NIE). But by the 1990s, most developing countries adopted
globalization/liberalization; therefore, a broader term “emerging market economies”
was introduced. Along with the Asian and Latin American countries, this group
included countries from Africa andWest Asia. In the beginning of the 2000s, Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) were identified as the new drivers
of global economic growth (O’Neill, 2001). But since other large economies have
embarked on a similar growth path, some other terminologies have been coined to
include them, e.g. Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey and South Africa (MINTS),
Next Eleven (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam), Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt,
Turkey and South Africa (CIVETS). There are no common criteria for the classi-
fication of these countries. Different sources list different countries in their list of
emerging economies. Some authors have tried to provide a categorization of such
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powers using criteria of growth, intermediate income, institutional transformations
and economic opening. According to Nadvi (2014), the following six factors make
the ‘emerging economies’ different from other developing countries:
• strong economic growth since the 1990s
• significant participation in global trade
• a large domestic market
• strong state involvement in the economy
• availability of local private and public capital for investment
• growing space for civil society in public-private discourse.
How these emerging economies will affect the global standards making process
will depend mainly on two factors: (i) what are their preferences and how they wish
to (if they wish at all) to participate in the process. (ii) whether they have the capacity
to influence the global standards making process. Increasing economic weight may
not be enough; appropriate strategy may prove equally important. Nadvi (2014) has
identified the main processes and channels through which the emerging economies
can engage with the global standards setting process.
2.1 Via Supply-Side Participation
Two most important phenomena of the global economy in the past two decades have
been the shift in geography of global production and the increasing fragmentation of
production across borders. The presence of the emerging economies in global value
chains (GVCs) is rising (Lee &Gereffi, 2015). The production of goods and services
is increasingly carried out wherever the necessary skills and materials are available
at competitive cost and quality (OECD, 2013). The share of richer countries in total
value added that was generated in all manufacturing GVCs declined from 74% in
1995 to 56% in 2008; the share of Japan and East Asian NIEs dropped from 21 to
11%; emerging economies’ share of value added inmanufacturing increased by 18%.
Half of this increase can be accrued toChina. China’s global share rose from4 to 13%.
Brazil, Russia, India andMexico also increased their global share. During this period,
42 million manufacturing jobs were added in China, 20 million in India, 6 million in
Brazil and 2 million in Mexico (Timmer, Erumban, Los, Stehrer, & de Vries, 2014).
This shifting pattern was exacerbated by the 2008–2009 global recession. The major
brunt of this recession was borne by the developed countries, whereas large emerging
economies such as China, India and Brazil suffered relatively less. In 2005–2010, the
merchandise imports of the European Union and the USA increased only by 27 and
14%, respectively, while emerging economies expanded their merchandise imports
much faster: Brazil (147%), India (129%), China (111%) and South Africa (51%)
(WTO, 2011). The import growth in emerging economies is also driven by rising
demand for intermediate goods and raw materials because manufacturing GVCs
are concentrated in those economies, as discussed above (Kaplinsky, Terheggen, &
Tijaja, 2011).
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This phenomenon is already impacting trade and investment patterns and policies,
and it has also triggered concerns about standards. In a world dominated by GVCs,
protecting final consumers through appropriate quality standards and on the supply
side protecting the interests of the labourers by enforcing occupational safety and
health becomes complicated. The richer countries have already faced challenges over
the governance of labour and environmental standards. The insertion of emerging
economies in the global value chains is expected to change the standards making
process. But to predict exactly how it will change requires more evidence-based
research. It has also to be borne in mind that the emerging economies are not only
suppliers in these value chains but also they are increasingly becoming organizers
and value chain leading firms. Now, it remains to be seen if the emerging economy
firms face the same pressure that western firms have been facing to address the issue
of labour and environmental standards and if so, how they tackle it.
2.2 Via Demand-Side Participation
Not only in the production process but also on the consumption side, the emerging
economies have emerged as major consumers in the global market. During the recent
global recession, markets shifted from Europe and North America towards the East
and the Global South. The fact that a significant proportion of the global middle
class is located in the emerging economies will have significant consequence on the
process of global standards (Guarín & Knorringa, 2014). The implications of this
will depend upon the behaviour patterns of global consumers. Western consumers
have already shown their sensitivity towards health and safety criteria, and quality
of labour and environmental conditions of the production process. Whether the
emerging economies’ consumers’ behaviour will converge and create a “global
consumer culture” where social and environmental impacts, along with price and
quality, impact consumption decisions (Alden, Steenkamp, & Batra, 1999), remains
to be seen. As Elliott and Freeman (2001) put it:
The sine qua non of activist efforts to improve labour standards around the world is that
consumers care about the conditions of the workers who make the items they consume. If
consumers do not care or do not associate the conditions with their consumption, human
rights vigilantes could not pressure firms to improveworking conditions. (Elliott & Freeman,
2001, p. 48)
There is evidence that this has happened in the developed world. Organized
consumer pressure and effective state action have been able to improve working
conditions of labourers (Trumbull, 2006). But Guarín and Knorringa (2014) claim
that none of these conditions can be assumed for the emerging economies for various
reasons. First, organized consumermobilization is still relatively weak in these coun-
tries and the presence of NGO and other civil societies is not significant. Kaplinsky
andFarooki (2010) share a similar perspective. The fact that developing and emerging
economies have relatively low incomes and weak state institutions will prevent
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them from developing private standards and they will continue to demand cheap
undifferentiated commodities.
2.3 Via Civil Society and State and Private Actors
The other channels through which emerging economies can impact global standards
are state, private actors and civil society bodies. Studies like Bartley (2007) and
O’Rourke (2003) found that civil society has emerged as one of the most effective
proponents of strong labour and environmental standards. Inmanywestern developed
economies, these work as a primary stakeholder in negotiating labour, health and
safety and environmental standards. But it is still not certain whether the same thing
will happen in the emerging economies. Towhat extent civil societies in the emerging
economies will be able to perform an active role is yet to be seen.
While much of the recent agenda on labour, environmental and social standards
in production has been driven by private actors (private firms and NGOs), the impor-
tance of state in global governance is increasing. The state provides the regulatory
framework, promulgating laws and ensuring their judicial enforcement, under which
labour and environmental considerations are structured. It will be interesting to see
how the governments of the emerging economies address these issues.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Description of Data
For the econometric analysis, I estimate the effect of labour standards on the export of
manufacturing goods. The intention is to see if there is any significant effect of stricter
labour standards on exports and also to check if this effect is different across countries
at different levels of economic growth. Following the specifications in Dehejia and
Samy (2008), my dependent variable in the econometric analysis is lexm, which is log
of exports of manufacturing goods as a percentage of merchandise export. The data
for lexm was collected from the World Development Indicators data set of the World
Bank. The control variables of this analysis are lpop and lenroll. The lpop variable is
the log of working age population to land ratio of a country. The lenroll variable is the
laggedmeasure of log of gross enrolment in secondary education based on secondary
education duration in each country. This is considered as a proxy of the human capital
stock in a country. Although average years of education as computed by Barro-Lee
are a better measure of human capital, their data set is on a five-yearly basis. A
yearly estimate of average years of education is available only for EU countries.
Since for my purpose, I require yearly data, I have used the log of gross enrolment in
secondary education lagged based on secondary education duration in each country.
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The purpose of taking lagged measure of this variable is that any change in gross
enrolment in secondary education will have an impact on the stock of human capital
only after the cohort passes out at the end of secondary education. There are some
obvious problems with using this as a measure for human capital. It does not take
into account that many students will actually not complete their secondary education.
Despite this problem, it has been used previously in the literature as proxy of human
capital.Both lpop and lenroll are proxy for thedeterminants of comparative advantage
and they are expected to have a positive relation with lexm. The data for lpop and
lenroll were collected from the World Development Indicators data set of the World
Bank as well. Labour standards are our main dependent variable. To measure labour
standards, I have first looked at whether ILO labour conventions have been ratified
or not. There are eight basic labour conventions (Table 1). The variable of interest
is “fundamental”, which is an index measuring the number of conventions that have
been ratified or not. If a country has not ratified any of these conventions, its score
is 0, while if it has ratified all, its score becomes 8.
For labour standards, I looked at different sources and used different types of
measurements. The first set of variables describes whether the countries have ratified
the eight core ILO conventions namely:
• C87—Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Conven-
tion, 1948
• C98—Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
• C100—Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
• C111—Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958
• C29—Forced Labour Convention, 1930
• C105—Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
• C138—Minimum Age Convention, 1973
• C182—Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
This data is collected from the ILOLEXdata set of the ILO. I first created four vari-
ables, namely free_asso, disc, forced_lab and child_lab. If any of the core conventions
are ratified in a country, it takes value 1 in that country and otherwise 0. free_asso is
C87 + C98 and measures out of two core conventions regarding free association of
labour how many have been ratified. It can take values 0, 1 or 2. If neither C87 nor
C98 is ratified, free_asso is 0 and if both are ratified, then free_asso is 2. If only 1 of
the 2 is ratified, then free_asso is 1. Similarly, disc = C100 + C111, forced_lab =
C29+ C105 and child_lab = C138+ C182. Then, there is another variable which is
fundamental and it measures howmany of all 8 fundamental labour conventions have
been ratified by a country. It takes value from 0 to 8 and it is the sum of free_asso,
disc, forced_lab and child_lab.
Besides using these variablesmeasuring howmany of the labour conventions have
been ratified, I also look at actual measures of labour standards. Ratification does not
mean that labour standards have actually been made stricter. So I have considered
other variables and indices thatmeasure actual condition of labour rights. Theprimary
reason being that ratification of a labour convention does not imply that it is actually
being implemented. The other variables that I look at are linj, lstrike, lunion and lhou.



















































































































































































































































































These variables have been constructed following Dehejia and Samy (2008) and the
source is the ILO database LABORSTA. The linj variable is the log of the number
of fatal injuries in the manufacturing sector per 100,000 employees. It is an indicator
of the safety of labour at the workplace. The lstrike variable measures the number of
strikes and lockouts in the manufacturing sector in a year. While the lunion variable
is the log of trade union density in the manufacturing sector of a country. Both these
variables express the extent to which labourers are free to associate and organize
themselves and to what extent they are able to express their concerns and opinions.
The lhou variable that I use is the log of average hours actually worked in a week
for the manufacturing sector. The lhou variable is a proxy of the extent to which
labourers have rights and are not overworked and exploited.
Along with these variables that indicate the actual condition of labourers in a
country, I use another index of labour rights called labuno. The index is taken from
the Mosley Uno data set that they use in their “Globalization and Collective Labour
Rights Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and
Collective Labour rights”, Comparative Political Studies (2007). They created the
data set “which consists of annual observations from 1985 to 2002, focusing on
the legal rights of workers to freedom of association and collective bargaining, key
elements of core labour standards, and respect for these rights (when present) in
practice”.
Following Kucera’s (2002) template, they record 37 types of violations of labour
rights in six categories. If there is at least one violation of any particular type out of
the 37, the country is given a score of 1 for that year, otherwise 0. Then that score
is multiplied by a weighting factor, before adding all 37 together. They also then
reversed the index so that lower values of the index mean higher labour standards.
This makes interpretation of results easy. Theoretically, their index can range from
0 to 76.5. They collect the data on labour rights violation from the following sources
“U.S. State Department Annual Reports on Human Rights Practices; International
Labour Organization Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and
Recommendations, andCommittee on FreedomofAssociation reports; and the Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) Annual Survey of Violations
of Trade Union Rights (ICFTU reports, Weisband & Colvin, 2000)”. I have used this
index calling it labuno as an alternative measure of the condition of labour rights.
The labuno variable is available for the period from 1985 to 2002. Table 2 is the
summary statistic for the variables I have used in my empirical analysis.
4 Results
For the econometric analysis, I have done a cross-country regression with country-
fixed effects using a panel data set over the year 1980–2014, adjusted for cluster
robust standard errors. Since I have used different specifications, the number of
countries and the number of years were different in different equations based on data
availability. The maximum number of countries considered is 163. Another point to
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Table 2 Summary statistic
Variable N Mean P50 Sd Min Max
Lexm 4424 −1.387063 −0.9064129 1.473896 −15.95403 −0.0085644
Lpop 4270 3.650069 3.781378 1.522887 −0.1453724 9.656001
Lenroll 3289 4.035252 4.304307 0.713328 −0.9469046 5.079032
free_asso 4178 1.56989 2 0.72377 0 2
forced_lab 4178 1.707516 2 0.6084915 0 2
Disc 4178 1.637626 2 0.7042001 0 2
child_lab 4178 0.9497367 1 0.8857995 0 2
Fundamental 4178 5.864768 6 2.21561 0 8
Linj 533 −2.557212 −2.488915 1.291608 −9.21034 0.3074847
Lstrike 724 3.146752 2.995732 1.929084 0 7.578146
Lunion 590 3.409722 3.355152 0.8228831 0.2623642 5.630495
Lhou 441 3.731084 3.74242 0.138508 3.104587 4.05889
Labuno 1416 3.032452 3.157 0.4600937 −0.2876821 3.540959
Source Author
remember is that the panel is unbalanced. The time period under consideration also
varies under different specifications.
Our general specification is
Yit = f (Xit , Lit )
where Yit is manufactured exports (lexm) of country i at time t as a fraction of country
i’s merchandise exports at time t, Xit refers to a vector of control variables that proxy
for the natural determinants of comparative advantage and Lit refers to any of the
proxies for labour standards outlined in the previous section.
The functional form of the above specification is a log-linear form. In this form,
all variables are measured in natural logarithms:
ln Yit = β0 + β1 ln Xit + β2 ln Lit + μi + εi t
μi is the country-fixed effect and εi t is the normal disturbance term. I use the
fixed effect model because it takes into account time-invariant unobservable country
heterogeneity, which could be correlated with the dependent variable, lexm. Further-
more, fixed effect model is usually recommended when the number of groups
(countries) is less than the number of time periods (years).
Also, to capture if the effect of labour rights on export is different at different level
of economic growth, I divide the countries into four categories based on their human
development index (HDI) in the year 1990. Then, I look at the effect of labour rights
on export for each category of country and see if the effect is different at different





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The interaction term between fundamental and income is negative and significant.
This means that if a richer country ratifies more labour conventions, its effects on
exports will be less positive than what will occur if a comparatively poorer country
ratifies the conventions. This is different from our conventional wisdom. Next, I look
at the labour rights index by Uno. The coefficients are insignificant. Next, the four
equations run regression of different metrices of actual condition of labour rights
and their interaction with income. Out of all the metrices, only the interaction term
between lunion and income is significant. For all other metrices, the coefficients
are insignificant. In lunion, the interaction term is positive. This result says that as
for lower income countries, the negative effect of greater unionization on export is
greater than for richer countries. However, if we look at other metrices, we can find
no such relation being significant. Although no definite relation comes out between
labour rights and export, we can see that the result could depend on whether it is a
poor or rich country.
Next tables are regressions done by categorizing countries in three groups based
on their 1990 HDI index—high, medium and low. The last equation in each table
includes all countries together.
In Table 4, I use free_asso, disc, forced_lab and child_lab as control variables to
count how many of the eight core ILO conventions have been ratified by a country.





































































N 1230 919 701 3191
Note Some countries in our sample did not fit into the classification of high, medium and low HDI
countries. Therefore, their aggregate number (Column 1+ Column 2+ Column 3) do not equal all
countries (Column 4)
Source Author
p values in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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The only significant result that I find is formiddleHDI countries. It shows that ifmore
child labour conventions are ratified, there is a negative effect on exports. Another
interesting thing is that free_association has a positive coefficient with exports
(although not significant) across all categories of countries, while the rest of the vari-
ables capturing ILO core convention ratification like forced labour, discrimination
and child_lab has mostly negative coefficient (again not significant).
In Table 5, I use the Labour Rights Index by Uno and check its effect on exports
across different categories of countries; no significant effect in any category of
country could be found.
In Table 6, using number of fatal injuries per 100,000 employees as the control, I
find a significant and negative relation on exports in high HDI countries, i.e. in high









































N 121 413 334 1010
Source Author
p values in parentheses










































N 225 81 118 434
Source Author
p values in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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HDI countries, better labour conditions when measured in terms of actual injuries
have a significant positive effect on exports. There is no such significant relation
between linj and lexp for middle and low HDI countries.
Table 7 uses extent of strikes in a country as a control, and I could not find any
significant effect on exports in any category of countries.
Tables 8 and 9 use trade union density and average hours worked as controls but in
neither case could I find any significant effects on export in any category of countries.
From Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, one common thing that can be observed is that
given small sample size, we do not often get significant results but still it suggests











































N 303 144 121 586
Source Author
p values in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001









































N 328 101 52 481
Source Author
p values in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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N 221 84 54 364
Source Author
p values in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the effects of labour standards on export performance of
countries. I have tried to test the conventional wisdom and belief that low labour
standards give a country some advantages in the form of export competitiveness. I
also tested if the effect of labour rights on export is different at different levels of
economic growth. I found that although no definite relation emerges between labour
rights and export performance, the result could depend on whether it is a poor or
rich country. Specifically, if a richer country ratifies more labour conventions, its
effects on exports will be less positive than what will occur if a comparatively poorer
country ratifies the conventions.
But as mentioned at the end of the previous section, although insignificant, we
do see in some cases, some of the proxies of labour standards having a positive
impact on export performance. This signifies that countries do have an incentive to
strengthen their labour conditions to improve export performance, especially if it
is a poorer country. Therefore, we may say that the conventional belief that these
countries deliberately engage in a race to the bottom may not be true since that may
actually harm their interest.
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of Sustainability Standards in Indonesia:
Potentials and Pitfalls of Making Global
Value Chains More Sustainable
Clara Brandi
1 Introduction
Development pathways have to be altered to make them both more environmentally
sustainable and socially inclusive.1 To be environmentally sustainable, development
must be reconciled with planetary boundaries. To reduce poverty, development must
be inclusive, such that it benefits all members of society. These two approaches can
entail both synergies and conflicts. For instance, solar panels can give poor people
access to low-carbon energy. Meanwhile, ecologically sustainable energy or food
production may increase costs and consumer prices, or production of biofuels may
crowdout food production, thereby compromising food security. Synergies have been
investigated in focusing on concepts such as the “Green Economy” (UNEP, 2011),
“Green Growth” (OECD, 2011) and “Inclusive Green Growth” (World Bank, 2012).
UNEP’sGreenEconomy Initiative sets the stage for the transition to a green economy
that is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive. OECD’s Towards Green
Growth Initiative provides a framework for achieving economic growth and devel-
opment while preventing environmental degradation. World Bank’s Inclusive Green
Growth sets out a pathway to sustainable development. These concepts explicitly
focus on the positive and reinforcing interlinkages between environmental sustain-
ability and development. The related trade-offs, however, have not been in the lime-
light yet (Brandi, 2016). Against this background, this chapter assesses the poten-
tial trade-offs between socio-economic and green dimensions of development in the
1Substantial parts of this chapter have previously been published in Brandi (2016), “Sustain-
ability Standards and SustainableDevelopment: Synergies andTrade-offs of Transnational Business
Governance”, Sustainable Development, 25(1), 25–34.
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context of sustainability standards for palm oil and proposes practical ways to address
these trade-offs.
Palm oil gives rise to both substantial positive socio-economic as well as nega-
tive environmental and social impacts, generating important questions at the nexus
of environmental sustainability and socio-economic development issues (Brandi,
2015). On the one hand, the palm oil sector poses a lucrative source of income by
offering a high return on land and labour and can function as an important engine for
rural socio-economic development. At the same time, the palm oil sector has serious
negative impacts regarding environmental sustainability, including reduced biodi-
versity and massive greenhouse gas emissions when forest and peatland are replaced
(Danielsen et al., 2009; Sheil et al., 2009). Hosting tropical forests and peatlands that
count among the world’s largest, Indonesia serves as a good example to illustrate the
increasing relevance of sustainability standards in the sector.
Over the last years, rising sustainability concerns regarding palmoil have triggered
various standard-setting and certification initiatives. The most important initiative is
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a private-driven multi-stakeholder
standard and certification scheme that entails third-party verification that the product
under consideration is in compliance with the given principles and criteria of the
RSPO standard. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in regulatory
initiatives to develop private voluntary sustainability standards. The literature refers
to this boom as the rise of “civil regulation” (Vogel, 2008) or the “certification
revolution” (Conroy, 2007).
At the same time, lately, the landscape has started to change. For example, in
Indonesia, the government recently introduced the “Indonesian Sustainable Palm
Oil” (ISPO) initiative, a mandatory government-led certification scheme. The rise
of ISPO illustrates the recent trend in terms of public actors reclaiming certification
authority through state-led, mandatory schemes, undermining the private transna-
tional certification institutions in support of government-driven certification regimes
(Hospes, 2014; Giessen et al., 2016; Wijaya & Glasbergen, 2016). The interac-
tion between private and public authorities in the governance of environmental and
social challenges is still an understudied field of global governance. This paper
will shed light on it with a particular emphasis on the effects for smallholders and
potential trade-offs between socio-economic and green dimensions of sustainable
development.
It is essential to include smallholders into certification schemes—both from an
environmental sustainability and from a socio-economic development perspective.
Any sustainability standard is more effective from an economic, environmental and
social perspective if it includes this important group. At the same time, certification
of smallholders is challenging, as it demands a set of financial, managerial and agro-
nomic capacities that smallholders inmost cases lack.While smallholder certification
can be a promising instrument in order to contribute to inclusive green growth, there
are important potential trade-offs between environmental sustainability and inclu-
sive development: First, there is a worry that the diffusion of private standards that
aim at enhancing environmental sustainability may undermine the socio-economic
situation of smallholders—in so far as standards generate market exclusion. Second,
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while smallholder certification can generate socio-economic benefits for farmerswho
are a part of certification schemes, these benefits may have perverse implications for
environmental sustainability—in so far as they increase incentives to expand palm
oil plantations, including into forested areas. This chapter analyses these trade-offs
and discusses practical implications with a view to fostering the synergies between
economic and environmental sustainability in the context of sustainability standards
and smallholder certification. The chapter focuses on the private-driven RSPO but
also discusses the public-driven ISPO and examines what their interaction might
imply for the above-mentioned trade-offs.
The findings in this chapter are based on secondary sources as well as primary
data collected through a smallholder survey as well as interviews with various stake-
holders. To collect the data, field research was conducted within the context of
four RSPO smallholder certification projects in four different provinces in Sumatra,
comprising both independent and scheme smallholders. The survey was conducted
with 196 independent smallholders. In addition, 71 semi-structured interviews with
smallholders, heads of small smallholder groups, mill and plantation company staff,
and experts were conducted.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 underlines the
importance of smallholder certification and Sect. 3 outlines the benefits of RSPO
certification for smallholders and assesses trade-offs between socio-economic and
green dimensions of development in the context of private-driven sustainability stan-
dards for palm oil. Section 4 discusses the implications of the interaction between
private- and public-driven certification schemes for the trade-offs under considera-
tion. Section 5 offers concluding comments, focusing on how trade-offs in the context
of smallholder certification can be managed and what lessons may emerge for other
sectors as well as for other countries.
2 The Importance of Smallholder Certification
Rising concerns about the negative effects of palmoil production have led to the emer-
gence of sustainability standards and certification schemes. For palm oil, RSPO is
the most prominent private-driven standard-setting body so far (Brandi, 2016, p. 26).
RSPO, a multi-stakeholder voluntary initiative founded in 2004, brings together
major actors from the palm oil supply chain with NGOs in order to promote the
growth and use of sustainable palm oil through credible global standards. Through
multi-stakeholder consultations, the Roundtable has developed a set of principles and
criteria (P&C) for sustainable palm oil production and has been implementing inde-
pendent certification of growers according to these P&C since 2008. RSPO standards
cover a broad range of sustainability aspects with regard to the environmental and
social effects of palm oil production. The relevant certification criteria require the
following aspects: compliance with laws and regulations; transparency; economic
long-term planning; good agricultural practices; social responsibility for employees
and the rights of communities; environmental responsibility; and the protection of
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high conservation value areas (RSPO, 2007). For each of the criteria, indicators exist
that are verified on the ground by auditors during the certification process.
Including smallholders into certification schemes is essential—in the palm oil
sectors and beyond it (Brandi, 2016, p. 26). Overall, smallholders account for around
85% of the 525 million farmers worldwide (Nagayets, 2005, p. 2; FAO, 2012, p. 56).
These smallholders and their livelihoods are important both from a development as
well as from an environment perspective. They can be both a hurdle for the “main-
streaming” of certification (Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assess-
ment of Standards and Certification, 2012) or play the beneficial role of “managed
ecosystems” (Swinton, 2008). In Indonesia, more than one million smallholders are
an essential element of the palm oil sector. They account for 38% of cultivation
area and 35% of production output (Indonesian Palm Oil Commission, 2012) and
are of central relevance for processes of sector change. A social and sustainability-
oriented transformation of the palm oil sector can only be realized on the basis of
their cooperation and inclusion in sustainability standards and certification schemes.
Certification schemes have to include the important group of smallholders for
two main reasons: for environmental reasons and in order to help smallholders to
improve yields and quality of their production and to avoid potential exclusion from
standard-sensitive markets.2
Environmental Reasons for Smallholder Inclusion The large-scale environmental
impacts from oil palm cultivation stated above—greenhouse gas emissions through
land-use conversion, loss of biodiversity anddeforestation—occur through the expan-
sion of large plantations and through smallholder palm oil expansion and production
alike. Smallholder certification can be regarded as a potentially promising comple-
mentary instrument to the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations in
establishing more sustainable oil palm cultivation (Brandi, 2016, pp. 29–30).
Certification causes smallholders to improve their often poor agronomic prac-
tices, thereby reducing small-scale negative environmental impacts. Smallholders
often use poor agronomic practices when they lack the relevant knowledge relating
to integrated pest management, correct application of agrochemicals, soil manage-
ment via intercropping, modalities of land conversion (use of fire to clear forest)
and the illegality of hunting protected animal species, of which there have been
increasing reports over the past several years. Knowledge and capacity-building as
well as rising environmental awareness in the process of preparing for the certifica-
tion of sustainability standards can generate spill-over effects and help in other fields
of environmental action in rural regions. Smallholders using better agronomic prac-
tices offer the potential to realise yield increases on already existing cultivation areas.
In this way, overall palm oil production can potentially be increased in a sustainable
way without converting primary forests.
RSPO aims at reducing negative environmental impacts, including large-scale
concerns such as deforestation and associated negative effects on ecosystems. On the
ground, as the empirical findings of this study suggest, a private standard like RSPO
2The remainder of this section is based on Brandi (2016), pp. 29–31.
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struggles to effectively combat large-scale problems within the existing institutional
framework. At the same time, voluntary standards can contribute towards reducing
negative environmental impacts on a small scale. Potential small-scale environmental
benefits include reduced chemical usage via the application of an integrated pest
management system, soil quality improvements (e.g. higher soil fertility), erosion
control, improved waste management and buffer zones near rivers.
Economic Reasons for Smallholder Inclusion Smallholder certification can
generate a number of important economic benefits for smallholders, including
increases in yields and better quality of fruit and price premiums (Brandi, 2016,
p. 29). The improvement of capacities in the process of gaining certification leads
to spill-over effects on other activities. The training smallholders receive for better
agronomic management, and organisational and economic planning is expected to
strongly improve the efficiency of their agricultural and economic activities. More-
over, the potential premium for certified sustainable palm oil paid in international
markets or the direct sale of certificates like Green Palm can potentially generate
additional income for smallholders and contribute to improving their livelihoods.
The certification of smallholders thus offers economic development opportunities,
especially for rural regions. Smallholder development and its social multiplier effects
are the main drivers for rural development, thus making it essential that smallholders
realise the above-stated market access and benefit via certification. Additionally, the
certificationprocess can incorporate stronger supply chain cooperation, thus lowering
production costs, raising productivity to a better quality level and stabilizing supply
through risk diversification.
There are two types of smallholders in Indonesia. While scheme smallholders
are tied to a formal partnership, Nucleus Estate Smallholder (NES) scheme, with a
palm oil company and are receiving important technical assistance, knowledge and
inputs, independent smallholders, on the other hand, operate independently through
all phases of production. This chapter puts the spotlight on the latter since informa-
tion on the certification of independent smallholders is particularly scarce. There
have been few smallholder certifications so far, especially independent ones. In
2010, the first Indonesian scheme smallholders were certified under RSPO. In 2012,
the first independent smallholders were certified in Thailand. In Indonesia, the first
independent smallholders, a smallholder association in Riau, received certification
from the RSPO in 2013, constituting the second such certification of independent
smallholders in theworld. Subsequently, the association of independent smallholders
Tajung Sehati in Jambi was also certified under RSPO.
3 Economic and Environmental Sustainability: The Risk
of Trade-Offs
To what extent are there trade-offs between socio-economic and environmental
sustainability in the context of private-driven oil palm smallholder certification? This
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section begins by discussingwhether the socio-economic dimension of sustainability
is coming under pressure in the context of smallholder certification being used as a
tool to foster environmental sustainability before it turns to a discussion on whether
environmental sustainability is at risk in the context of supporting smallholders to
become certified and comply with sustainability standards in the palm oil sector.3
Smallholder Exclusion First, there is a worry that the diffusion of standards that
aim at enhancing environmental sustainability may undermine the socio-economic
situation of smallholders. Current certification schemes might exclude smallholders
because they are dominantly designed for large-scale agro-industry requiring costs
and capacities that are often out of reach for most smallholders. The concern is that
smallholders may be excluded from international markets that demand certified palm
oil.
There is no consensus in the literature regarding the question whether and under
which conditions standards cause market exclusion for smallholders. While some
studies disagree, the literature frequently suggests that, while their impact is context-
specific, private standards may indeed undermine smallholder market participation
and that the threat of exclusion in case of non-compliance with certification standards
can be significant for smallholders (e.g. Herzfeld et al., 2011; Elbehri et al., 2013;
Schuster & Maertens, 2013; Loconto & Dankers, 2014). The underlying fear is that
smallholders who are not certified cannot gain access to markets that require compli-
ance with sustainability standards and that non-certified smallholders are excluded
from these markets. Moreover, most authors argue that stringent standards imperil
smallholder participation in global value chains because sourcing from numerous
smallholders is more costly for companies, for example, due to higher transaction
costs for monitoring conformity and the need for more intensive farm extension
(Reardon et al., 1999; Swinnen, 2007). In other words, certification systems could
lead to the exclusion of smallholders from international trade. This is a substantive
fear among policy makers and development practitioners.
However, the research conducted on smallholder certification in Indonesia has
shown that independent smallholders have so far not been confronted with exclusion
frommarkets in general. Only very few independent smallholders mentioned explic-
itly that they saw a benefit in being able to contribute to satisfy international demand
for sustainable palm oil with their production. For instance, China and India, as well
as the domestic Indonesian market, are still largely sourcing non-certified palm oil.
Since the demand is strong enough to absorb non-certified palm oil, independent
smallholders are still able to sell their production output to non-certified mills. Thus,
as long as international demand for non-certified palm oil remains unchanged, or
rises, and markets requiring compliance with sustainability standards remain small,
non-certified smallholders are not confronted with complete market exclusion.
Perverse Incentives Second, while smallholder certification can generate socio-
economic benefits for farmers who are a part of certification schemes, above all by
3This section is based on Brandi (2016), pp. 30–31.
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increasing yields, socio-economic benefits of certification may have perverse impli-
cations for environmental sustainability. This in turn can lead to increased economic
attractiveness of oil palm cultivation and increased financial capacity of the small-
holder to buy land for expanding palm oil plantation areas. If expansion takes place
in forested areas, it constitutes a contradiction to a key aim of sustainability standards
for palm oil. The survey conducted with palm oil smallholders in Indonesia included
a question regarding the expansion of their palm oil plots into forested areas. Almost
40% of smallholders who answered the question stated that they would expand into
an area that is covered by forest.
Thus, RSPO certification might lead to a perverse incentive scheme concerning
expansion into forest areas. Nevertheless, the decision of the smallholder to expand
depends on a variety of factors, such as personal motivation, world market prices of
palm oil and other financial needs. Nevertheless, this problem of a possible perverse
incentive scheme for independent smallholders has to be taken into account in the
context of RSPO certification processes.
4 The Changing Standards Landscape and Its Implications
Recently, with the rise of public-driven standards and certification schemes, the
landscape of sustainability standards has begun to change. In 2010, ISPO was estab-
lished, a mandatory government-led certification scheme. The launch of ISPO is
largely driven by a struggle between the national level, especially the government
and domestic producer companies, and the international level, above all international
NGOs and their influence in the RSPO. For instance, the chair of the Indonesian Palm
Oil Committee (IPOC) explicitly characterized the challenge of sustainable palm oil
as an Indonesian problem that has to be solved at the national level rather than one
that concerns the international community. A second important driver for the launch
of ISPO was competition for market shares. For instance, the chair of IPOC made
it clear that the aim of ISPO is to enhance the competitiveness of Indonesian palm
oil in global markets (Suharto, 2010).
What does the interaction between the private-driven and the public-driven certi-
fication schemes imply for the trade-offs mentioned above? Overall, ISPO is (even)
less demanding than RSPO. First of all, ISPO imposes less stringent requirements
for many environmental issues. ISPO lacks 11% of the indicators found in the RSPO,
including an indicator on high conservation value (HCV) (Salim, 2014). Moreover,
in the context of ISPO, many key social issues are missing or vaguely worded (Paoli,
2013). For instance, ISPO does not contain the concept of “free, prior, informed
consent” (FPIC), wherein consent for plantation development or local community
land-use change is to be obtained in a “free, prior and informed” way from affected
individuals and communities.
What does the launch of ISPO imply for smallholders? On the one hand, the inter-
play of public and private standards can give rise to inefficiencies and put a burden
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on producers, especially small ones, if they have to become certified under different
standards. On the other hand, public-driven schemesmay take better account of small
producers or smallholders than private-driven ones in so far as states “claim back
their regulatory power, playing back their role in granting and enforcing citizens’
rights” (Bartley, 2014). While the potentially dysfunctional interaction of public
and private standards can burden producers, especially small ones, the case at hand
suggests that the public-driven scheme may actually take better account of small
producers or smallholders than private-driven ones. The high financial and admin-
istrative costs make certification almost impossible for small producers and small-
holders without additional support, potentially leading to their exclusion from the
international market. With state-driven schemes like ISPO, states seem to re-claim
their role in taking care of their citizens. Indeed, ISPOhas put a spotlight on certifying
smallholders, arguably a stronger one than the private-driven RSPO, despite efforts
to include smallholder interests in that context as well. It is sometimes even argued
that ISPO was introduced to eventually develop a standard that is better applicable
to smallholders. In 2015, the Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture and UNDP began
the process of pilot testing the guidelines for ISPO smallholder certification (UNDP,
2015), addressing the need to focus on smallholders (Salim, 2014). At the same
time, smallholders would still be likely to face severe challenges when adopting
ISPO (Jong, 2018). Moreover, since there is no comprehensive roadmap for inte-
grating smallholders, the implementation of ISPO in that context might end up being
ineffective (Yuliawati, 2016).
Overall, the above-mentioned trend towards more public-driven initiatives might
affect potential trade-offs between social and environmental dimensions of sustain-
ability. The case of palm oil suggests that while the public-driven scheme may
take better account of small producers or smallholders than the private-driven one,
ISPO is less demanding than RSPO in terms of a number of relevant environmental
challenges.
5 Conclusion
While sustainability standards and smallholder certification have the potential to
create substantial socio-economic benefits for smallholders, large-scale environ-
mental benefits focussing on deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions are found
to be difficult to achieve.4 Only small-scale environmental benefits such as reduced
usage of agrochemicals seem realistic. One major reason for limited effectiveness in
environmental terms is that sustainability standards like RSPO are not without loop-
holes and face implementation and control challenges. Overall, private sustainability
standards alone can hardly solve all relevant environmental problems of palm oil
production, for example, indirect land-use change. In order to be effective, standards
4See also Brandi (2016), pp. 31–32.
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need a favourable economic and institutional environment. The formulation of a stan-
dard’s P&C implies difficult trade-offs thus private sustainability standards cannot
provide all-encompassing solutions for all problems. As discussed above, sustain-
ability standards are meant to contribute to solving dilemmas such as that between
a lucrative sector of the economy producing income and jobs, on the one hand, and
its negative environmental impacts, on the other hand. Yet, the development and
implementation of such standards creates new dilemmas.
This chapter has shown that aiming for “sustainable development” or “inclusive
green growth” on the basis of smallholder certification is challenging and can entail
major trade-offs. First, there is a worry that the diffusion of standards that aim at
enhancing environmental sustainabilitymay undermine the socio-economic situation
of smallholders. Since smallholders can access certified markets only through group
certification, they need to organize cooperatives or other types of smallholder groups.
Even more importantly, smallholder certification usually requires external support
as it demands capacities that smallholders often lack. The concern is that, without
external support, smallholders may, in the future, be excluded from international
markets that demand certified palm oil.
Second, while smallholder certification can generate socio-economic benefits for
farmers who are a part of certification schemes, these benefits may have perverse
implications for environmental sustainability. Training associated with certification
can increase the smallholders’ productivity and thus their income from palm oil.
This in turn can lead to increased economic attractiveness of oil palm cultivation and
increased financial capacity of the smallholder to buy land for expanding palm oil
plantation areas. If expansion takes place in forested areas, it constitutes a contradic-
tion to a key aim of sustainability standards for palm oil. The current specification
of the RSPO P&C thus entails a potential contradiction between RSPO goals to
foster socio-economic and environmental sustainability at the same time. Produc-
tivity gains related to RSPO certification can potentially lead to increased expan-
sion into forest or protected areas. This perverse incentive scheme might contra-
dict the aim of RSPO to combat deforestation. In order to avoid such contradictory
outcomes, control and safeguard mechanisms should be implemented—especially
in smallholder certification projects.
More recently, the landscape of sustainability standards has begun to change.
In the light of the rise of private-driven certification initiatives, there is a need for
more research on the interaction between private- and public- driven certification
schemes and its implications for smallholders and for the trade-offs examined in
this chapter. In the shorter run, the introduction of state-driven schemes like the one
assessed in this chapter arguably creates more fragmentation by being added to the
existing ones—especially since they seem to be triggering the introduction of even
more national standards in other sectors and in other countries that are following the
example set by ISPO. For example, the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry created a
mandatory certification system for the forest sector (Giessen et al., 2016) and after the
establishment of ISPO, the Ministry of Agriculture initiated a similar approach for
the rubber sector asking a third party for the creation of a draft for a national rubber
certification scheme. Moreover, the launch of ISPO has triggered the introduction
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of additional, potentially competing and national standards for palm oil. In 2015,
the Government of Malaysia, ranked second in terms of volume after Indonesia,
introduced the MSPO standard, explicitly “following in the footsteps of Indonesia”
(Adnan, 2013). Moreover, Brazil has also introduced national schemes for palm oil
and soy (Hospes, 2014).
More research is also needed on how the shift towards national public-driven
certification schemes and their interaction with private-driven governance initiatives
affects the environmental, social and economic sustainability of the sectors under
consideration in the longer run. In the shorter run, the introduction of national public-
driven schemes, at least in the case at hand, seems to be beneficial for smallholders
but appears to lead to the introduction of a lower standard, especially from the point
of view of environmental sustainability.
How can the trade-offs between economic and environmental sustainability in the
context of smallholder certification bemanaged?One possible approach could be that
when joining a smallholder group, smallholders should sign a contract forbidding
the establishment of new plots in forested areas—be it nearby or in other provinces.
The breach of such a contract should attract the withdrawal of the certificate of the
whole group or exclude the particular member of the group in order to generate
social pressure. In addition, special training should be provided that focuses on the
benefits of environmentally sustainable production for the smallholders. Overall, the
environmental aims of smallholder certification should be given the same attention,
from the beginning, as the socio-economic aims. Possible contradictions between
these two sets of goals should be managed, or at least be made transparent—both in
the Indonesian palm oil sector but also in other sectors and in other countries as well.
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Chapter 9
The Programme for the Endorsement
of Forest Certification (PEFC) and Its
Contribution to Sustainable Forest
Management in Indonesia
Pratiwi Kartika, Hariyadi, and Cerdikwan
1 Introduction
Indonesia has an extensive tropical forest, which accounts for almost half of its land.
This signifies not only plentiful resources but also numerous problems such as forest
fires, deforestation and illegal logging. Although the government has put in place
several regulations to address them, these problems persist. Effort was also taken at
the international level, with the international community offering an internationally-
recognized, private certification to companies practicing sustainable forest manage-
ment (SFM). Since the effort is initiated by a private agent, this certification is
voluntary. The International Trade Centre (ITC, 2012) reports that there are 17
types of voluntary standards that have been implemented in many countries with
many types of products certified. In forest management, so far, there have been two
internationally-recognized voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) which can be
obtained by any forest concession holder in Indonesia—Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) and Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC).
VSS, or private voluntary standards (PVS), emerged at a time when inter-state
negotiations on collective action for social and environmental concerns had reached
a deadlock. Private actors, namely multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) came up with some agreement over good social
and environmental practices, known as sustainability standards (Djama, 2011). In
many cases, VSS are seen as a more effective way to enforce sustainable practices
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amongst the producers than government regulations (Hagen&Alvarez, 2011;Djama,
2011). Thus, VSS are deemed to weaken governments’ role. In terms of actual
practice, private and public standards are often seen as duplicating, but sometimes,
complementing each other (Hagen & Alvarez, 2011). Multiple standards may be
harmful for producers due to the larger compliance cost (Hagen & Alvarez, 2011;
Ruslandi, Klassen, Romero, & Putz, 2014).
This chapter investigates whether PEFC complements the mandatory standard as
well as the FSC, and whether it plays an important role for sustainability practices
in the Indonesian forest industry. We focus on PEFC since little attention has so far
been given to this standard. FSC, which was introduced in Indonesia in the 1990s,
has received much more attention (Ruslandi et al., 2014; Romero et al., 2015). This
chapter further aims to analyse whether PEFC is likely to be widely applied in
Indonesia and thus help address the forest management problems in the country.
This research is based on interviews conducted with a forestry research institution,
an Indonesian association of forest concession holders—Indonesian Forestry Certi-
fication Cooperation (IFCC) (through which PEFCwas introduced in Indonesia) and
a certification body. In addition, this research is based on an analysis of documents
of PEFC, FSC and of the public mandatory standard, Sustainable Forest Production
Management (PHPL).
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes forest management prob-
lems in Indonesia and a series of government regulations addressing these problems.
Section 3 reviews a number of standards existing in the country both in the past and in
the present, and discusseswhether the PEFCfills in forwhatwas lacking in the PHPL,
SVLK (Timber Legality Assurance System), and FSC. Section 4 explores several
features indicating PEFC’s acceptability in Indonesia and its role in contributing to
SFM in the country. Section 5 provides a conclusion on whether PEFC is likely to be
widely applied in Indonesia to help remedy the unsustainable practices in Indonesian
forestry.
2 Forest Management in Indonesia
Indonesia has an extraordinary biodiversity and huge size of tropical forest. In
accordance with Act No. 41/1999 on Forestry, forest area includes conservation
forest, protection forest and production forest. Referring to the Forestry Statistics of
Indonesia 2013, the total forest including inlandwater, and coastal andmarine ecosys-
tems accounted for 129.43millionhectares (MOEF, 2014)while later statistics (2017)
placed the figure at 125.92 million hectares (MOEF 2018). However, Indonesia has
been facing daunting challenges to protect and manage its forest resources due to its
high rates of deforestation, illegal logging, social frictions over forest rights between
the government and local communities, etc. The underlying sources of many, if not
most, of these challenges rest on the confusion and disagreement over who should
control or own Indonesia’s forests (Contreras & Fay, 2005). Research on land-use
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and remote sensing data reveals that significant forest areas are in fact community-
planted agro-forests, agricultural lands and grasslands. The government, however,
views them as natural forests or lands to be reforested for timber production, and this
often results in conflicts (Contreras & Fay, 2005). Other serious challenges include
forest fires and deforestation. The deforestation rate inside and outside forest areas in
Indonesia remains high; for the period of 2011–12, it reached a figure of 613,480 ha
per year (MOEF, 2014). Through tougher efforts, the government has succeeded in
reducing the deforestation rate to 480,010 ha per year for the period of 2016–2017
(MOEF 2018).
To respond to these challenges, the government has in fact launched several tough
policies and efforts. Reinforcing the existing legal framework, the government passed
the so-called lex specialisAct No. 18/2013 on theDeterring andCombating of Forest
Deteriorating Actions. Partly, these policies aim at reinforcing previous progressive
initiatives relating to the reduction of carbon emissions from the forest sector that
was launched in October 2009 wherein Indonesia committed to reducing national
emissions by 26%, or by as much as 41% against business-as-usual by 2020 with
international support (G-20Leaders Summit, September 2009).Apart fromdesigning
related policies to achieve this target, Indonesia embarked on two consecutive two-
year moratoriums on forests and peat lands concessions. In 2011, the government
issued a presidential decree on the national action plan to reduce GHG emissions.
With the new administration, throughmidterm national development planning 2015–
2019, the government embarked on a more ambitious policy route to upgrade SFM
and conservation measures (Appendix I, Presidential Decree No. 2/2015). For the
post 2020period, the government envisions a progression beyond its existing commit-
ment to emission reductions. Based on the country’s emissions level assessment,
the government has set an unconditional reduction target of 29% and a conditional
reduction target of up to 41% of the business-as-usual scenario by 2030 (UNFCCC,
2016).
Forest management and conservation measures and policies have evolved dynam-
ically over time and they have been determined by both societal values as well as
socio-economic and political conditions. Making them work effectively is a serious
challenge (Maryudi, 2015). In order to promote SFM in the light of the growing
scepticism about the effectiveness of governmental policies and initiatives, and the
perceived failure of a global intergovernmental mechanism to stop deforestation and
forest degradation, voluntary certification schemes were seen as a viable alternative
to sustain nationally existing mandatory policies and regulations (Maryudi, 2015;
Van Bueren, 2010).
3 Forest-Related Standards in Indonesia
Forest certification is not new to Indonesia. The country has engagedwith forest certi-
fication since 1990. Indonesia has its own national forest certification system, called
Indonesia Ecolabelling Institute (LEI—Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia), which was
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introduced in 1997. In 2000, this institute signed a Joint Certification Program (JCP)
with the FSC (Muhtaman & Prasetyo, 2006). FSC certification, as an international
certification system, has also been available in Indonesia for some years. In 2009,
the government started themandatory certificationprogrammes—PHPL(Sustainable
Production Forest Management) and SVLK (Timber Legality Assurance Scheme).
PHPL was endorsed through several government regulations, i.e. Govt. Reg.
No. 6/2007 junto No. 3/2008 on Forest Governance, the Establishment of Forest
Management Plans and Forest Utilization, and MOEF Reg. No. 38/Menhut-II/2009
junto Permenhut P.68/Menhut-II/2011, junto Permenhut P.45/Menhut-II/2012, junto
Permenhut P.42/Menhut-II/2013 on Standards and Guidelines for the Assessment of
the Sustainability Performance of Production Forest Management and for Timber
Legality Assurance for Concession Holders or People’s Forests (Nurtjahjawilasa,
Duryat, Yasman, Septiani, & Lasmini, 2013). This programme aims to enforce the
existing laws in order to ensure that forest management is subject to sustainability
principles. Since this programme is a mandatory government instrument, it does not
relate to the technical issue of trade of forest products and is not targeted at fulfilling
market demands. The programme sets five basic criteria relating to the following
aspects: (1) legality and security of forest resources; (2) product sustainability; (3)
conservation, ecology and environment; (4) economic benefits and (5) institutions
(Nurtjahjawilasa et al., 2013). To measure the degree to which PHPL is performed
by a forest management unit, there is measurement guidance and standardization.
This standardization and guidance are then used as instruments for the certification
process by an independent assessor.
SVLK is amandatory tracking system, effective since 2009, which was developed
by involving multistakeholders to ensure the legality of sources from which timber
is being traded in Indonesia. The system seeks to improve forest management and to
maintain the credibility and legality of Indonesian timber. It was eventually integrated
into the PHPL programme. Pursuant to the Ministry of Trade’s Regulation No. 64
in 2012, there are 40 timber-based products obliged to obtain the SVLK certificate.
The SVLK audit is performed by a certification body which has been certified by
the National Accreditation Committee (KAN) to be a Timber Legality Verification
Body (LV-LK) in line with MOEF’s Decree. This policy reflects the government’s
commitment to fight illegal logging and illegal timber trading and to fulfil inter-
national market demand for certified legal timber—in particular from the European
Union (EU), USA, Japan and Australia. This system can be seen as a “national incen-
tive” to respond to the increasing demand for timber legality certification schemes
from abroad, such as FSC and PEFC (Ministry of Environment and Forestry/MOEF,
2016). By the end of 2016, about 24 million hectares of forest and 2843 forest-based
industries were SVLK certified (The Jakarta Post, 2016).
Obtaining certification is not always easy, and there are several barriers that
prevent or discourage voluntary certification in particular. Bartley (2010) and
Ruslandi et al. (2014), in their study of FSC certification in Indonesia, point to a
lack of market incentive as one of the barriers. The EU, as the most green-conscious
market, is apparently not Indonesia’s largest export destination for timber and timber
products. Another barrier is the high cost of achieving the standards required by
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Table 1 Forest management components and their references to FSC and PEFC principles
Forest management components used in this study FSC principles PEFC principles
Compliance with laws and satisfaction of financial
obligations
1 1
Implementation of reduced-impact logging 5, 6, 7, 8 2, 3, 4, 6
Social impact assessment and community development
programs
3, 4 9, 10
Environmental management and monitoring plans 6, 8 2, 6, 3, 4
Biodiversity conservation 9 7
Worker rights, health and safety 4 11
Yield sustainability and silviculture 7, 8, 10 2, 3, 5, 8
Source Columns 1 and 2 from Ruslandi et al. (2014); Column 3 authors’ elaboration
FSC. To obtain the certificate, a concession has to pay audit fees, make infrastruc-
ture improvements and forgo the profits from unsustainable practices. From the five
concession areas that Ruslandi et al. (2014) focus on in their research, the conces-
sions needed time as long as from 3 to 10 years to get the FSC certificate. Another
international voluntary certificate introduced in Indonesia is PEFC. The Indonesia
Forest Certification Cooperation (IFCC), which introduced PEFC in Indonesia, was
established in 2011, and the standards of PEFC Indonesia were endorsed in 2014.
Comparison of PEFC, FSC and Government Regulations
To get an idea of whether PEFC, FSC and government regulations are substitutable
or complementary, the three standards are compared across seven forest management
components. Each component ismatched to its reference inPEFCandFSCprinciples,
respectively (Table 1).
Referring to the seven forest management components above, Table 2 compar-
atively displays governmental regulations, FSC and PEFC requirements. Features
of the requirements of the two voluntary certification schemes will be elaborated
subsequently.
With regard to compliance with regulations and satisfaction of financial obli-
gations, both PEFC and FSC strengthen government regulations. However, PEFC
explicitly mentions that concessions have to comply with the SVLK—the public
mandatory standard. This implies that in this regard, PEFC does not want to be
contradictory to government regulations. In addition, PEFC has some additional
requirements such as to identify an adequate infrastructure for delivery of goods and
protection of ecosystem, and to carry out R&D activities. However, in general, PEFC
has many similarities with FSC, e.g. concessions have to abide with national legisla-
tions, pay all of the financial obligations to the government, and state explicitly their
commitment to SFM.
As for the implementationof reduced-impact logging (RIL), thePEFC requirement
is similar to that of FSC as it includes criteria, e.g. on tree felling, bucking and log
yarding, as well as on soil and water protection functions. Since the implementation
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Table 2 Comparing governmental regulations and voluntary certification schemes’ requirements
Forest management
components
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the compensation fee
for the communities; deal
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methods to prioritise worker
safety, ensure efficiency,
and minimize logging waste
Efficient and low
environmental impact
skidding with planning and
operational controls down
to the individual tree level
Deactivation activities
(e.g.post-logging road and
skid trail closure) to reduce
soil erosion and restrict
illegal access
Construct and maintain
logging roads so as to
minimize soil erosion and
facilitate log transport
Monitor compliance with





requirements, RIL is a
must in PEFC, which
includes requirements on
tree felling, bucking and
log yarding as well as on
soil and water protection
functions
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results of these monitoring
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PEFC also requires an
R&D plan. However,
PEFC does not mention
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effectiveness;
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the labour law (Law
13/2003) and related
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Government regulations FSC requirements PEFC requirements
Yield sustainability and
silviculture




Intensive growth and yield
monitoring are required;




be reduced, and logging
cycles lengthened
PEFC requires merely




management plan has to
include silviculture
technique and that the
harvest rate must not
exceed the rate of
sustainable production
Source Columns 1, 2, and 3 from Ruslandi et al. (2014); Column 4 authors’ elaboration
level of government regulations on RIL is low (Ruslandi et al., 2014), PEFC and
FSC requirements on RIL strengthen government regulation.
Regarding their environmental management and monitoring plan, PEFC requires
concessions to provide documentation ofmeasures relating to land use, forest protec-
tion functions and forest fire prevention. It also requires an R&D plan. In this regard,
the PEFC requirement is in line with those of the government and FSC. However,
the FSC requirement is more detailed than that of PEFC. For instance, FSC lists
examples of particular activities that have to be mentioned in the evaluation report
if those activities are to be conducted by concessions in future. FSC also requires
concessions to include particular measures such as water flow management in their
plan.
Biodiversity conservation and protection: Compared to governmental regulations
and FSC, the PEFC scheme has set at least two important emphases: (1) the impor-
tance of not only maintaining the (key) protected flora and fauna, endemic, rare
and threatened/endangered species and their habitats in accordance with the national
regulations and international conventions but also repairing their habitat and features
of special biological interests and (2) the obligation to carry out the environmental
impact assessment (EIA) indicated in point (1) and to incorporate measures to
mitigate those impacts and disruptions.
In the framework of forestmanagement components, the PEFC requirements rein-
force the existing ones and provide more comprehensive parameters compared to
government regulations, i.e. the mandatory PHPL, and also compared to the existing
voluntary certification scheme, the FSC. For the government, this is quite impor-
tant because there are no explicit regulations that require biodiversity protection and
conservation at the concession unit level, nor in the framework of the national legis-
lation agenda to amend the specific law concerning biodiversity (Act No. 5/1990)
(Prolegnas, 2015; Ruslandi et al., 2014).
Social impacts and community development: Compared to the mandatory PHPL
and the FSC, the PEFC provides more detailed parameters on the fulfilment of certi-
fication requirements regarding the customary and legal rights of indigenous people.
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Several specific aspects of the PEFC scheme can be summarized as follows: (1)
the strengthening of the credibility of conflict resolution within the framework of
forest management, which is closely related to the customary and legal rights of the
indigenous people/community, through a participatory and equitable agreement and
institutionalizedmechanism; (2) the ambitious obligation to carry out a social impact
assessment of forest management activities regarding indigenous people and/or local
communities, prior to their implementation; and (3) the obligation for the holder of
the forest concession to identify the forest resources that have important value for
recreation purposes and to protect them from the negative impacts of recreation activ-
ities. This parameter is thus strengthening governmental regulations,whichwere seen
to have failed to enforce community development programmes as an obligation for
forest concession holders (Ruslandi et al., 2014).
Workers’ normative rights: Both the FSC and the PEFC set more or less compa-
rable requirements regarding the obligation of the forest concession holders to fulfil
all related normative rights of workers employed in these sectors in compliance
with national regulations and international conventions, both in their operations and
workplace infrastructure. However, compared to the FSC scheme, PEFC require-
ments seem to be slightly more imperative in this case in terms of the workers’ rights
to collective bargaining with their company. In this regard, the PEFC clearly both
complements and strengthens the governmental regulations.
Yield sustainability and silviculture: PEFC requirements are very general, only
requiring that silviculture techniques be included in the management plan, and that
the harvest rate of forest products not exceed the rate of sustainable production. FSC,
in turn, requires regular monitoring of harvest rates and logging cycles as well as
their revision if the rates are not appropriate.
In general, PEFC requirements in Indonesia are not as detailed as those of FSC. For
example, the FSC document exemplifies significant activities that have to be included
in the EIA that a company has to undertake. Meanwhile, PEFC details only the list
of prohibited ingredients for pesticides. Another notable difference is that PEFC
mentions several times that it requires concessions to be in compliance with national
legislation including SVLK. This means that PEFC does not want to be contradictory
to government regulations, and perhaps wants to gain the government’s endorsement.
This also indicates that PEFC does not substitute government regulations.
Having analysed theFSCandPEFCcolumns in the table above, it seems that PEFC
does not add important requirements for SFM. Both FSC and PEFC show many
similarities for each forest management component. Therefore, even though FSC
and PEFC may not complement each other, both of them complement government
regulations.
9 The Programme for the Endorsement of Forest … 155
4 Discussion
4.1 PEFC Acceptability
This section makes an attempt to predict whether PEFC will be widely acceptable
in the forest industry in Indonesia. The acceptability depends on PEFC’s current
status in the country, the nature of its criteria, its differences compared to the existing
scheme, i.e. FSC, and the socio-political conditions in the country.
To begin with, it is worth noting that both FSC and PEFC are similar certification
systems which focus on source-oriented standards in an effort to achieve SFM and
sustainably produced wood. They have the same primary goal, which is to maintain
and sustain the ecosystem integrity and its social functions (VanBueren, 2010) (Table
3). Their mission is, quite simply, sustainable tropical forest management. Therefore,
as forest policy analysts say, their proposed solution is developing a set of global
sustainable forestry principles and criteria, engaging national and sub-national multi-
stakeholder committees to develop regionally appropriate standards, inviting third
parties to audit forestry operations for compliance, and finally, certifying those who
pass the test (Cashore, Gale, Errol, & Newsom, 2006). However, they are in fact
competing agents, and even prominent competitors of one another (Bernstein &
Cashore, 2003; Cashore, Gale, Errol, & Newsom, 2006). The FSC, in its operations
worldwide, still has to find some accommodation with its competitors (Bernstein &
Cashore, 2003).
Normatively, the standards of the PEFC system are adaptable to the national char-
acteristics, involving multiple stakeholders for consensus-based certifications. This
system is also developed in a framework of cooperative action and without any nega-
tive campaign against any forest management unit. In this regard, the market sees
it as a system which is easily accessible. The government itself sees that both the
voluntary and mandatory certification systems have different histories, mechanisms
and goals, but these schemes continue to have similar frameworks for developing




FSC Maintain and sustain the
ecosystem integrity and its
social functions
PEFC international and national
systems endorsed by PEFC
ISO environment management
system
RIL standard, Tropical Forest
Foundation (USA)
Source Van Bueren (2010)
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Table 4 Comparing voluntary certification schemes and their operations
Dimension PEFC FSC
Year of launching 1999 1994
Year of introduction in
Indonesia
2014 2000
Area coverage worldwide 304 million hectares 199 million hectares
Area coverage in Indonesia 3.8 million hectares 3.1 million hectares
Number of certificates 60 39
Perception Forest production industry Environmental activists
Criteria Countries create their own
standards based on seven
meta-standards
Ten rigid principles and
criteria, to be applied
universally
Sources Buckingham and Jepson (2013); Authors’ respondent; FSC (2018); PEFC (2017); IFCC
(2018)
criteria and indicators aimed to infuse sustainability principles into forest produc-
tion and management. Thus, their development and implementation are likely to be
mutually reinforcing and synergetic (MOEF, s.a.).
As a market-driven certification scheme, the PEFC system has received relatively
positive responses from concession holders. Forest coverage by this certification
system has now grown to 304million hectares worldwide (PEFC, 2017).Meanwhile,
the FSC scheme, whichwas introducedmuch earlier in 1994, covers only 199million
hectares (FSC, 2018) (Table 4). This suggests that the certification system developed
by the PEFC may have wider market acceptability.
In Indonesia, the PEFC certification system was introduced by the Indonesian
Forestry Certification Cooperation (IFCC) as its National Governing Body at the end
of 2014. Although it is still new and in the development phase, the PEFC scheme has
had relatively high acceptability in Indonesia too.Within less than a year following its
introduction, for instance, more than 600,000 ha (PEFC, 2015) of the industrial forest
plantation (HTI—Hutan Tanaman Industri) were certified, a number that reached
3.7 million hectares in early 2018 (IFCC, 2018). At the same point in time, the
FSC scheme, which had been introduced in 2000 already, covered Indonesian forest
area of 3.1 million hectares (FSC, 2018) (Table 4). This assessment confirms earlier
studies suggesting that the attraction to FSC certification remains comparatively
weak in developing countries (Bernstein & Cashore, 2003; Cashore, Gale, Errol,
& Newsom, 2006). Current data shows that only 23% of FSC-certified forest area
is located in developing countries. Under the PEFC scheme, in fact, the share of
developing countries in global certified area is even less—at around 9%.Nonetheless,
the significance of these numbers should not be exaggerated. Principles introduced
within the FSC scheme are universally applied to all countries, while principles under
the PEFC scheme are prepared by the respective country and then agreed upon. In
this regard, both schemes are rolled out according to their respective characteristics.
The FSC scheme is perceived to be designed by environmentalists, whereas the
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PEFC is seen to be closer to the interests of forest production industries by analysts
such as Buckingham and Jepson (2013). We can easily understand why some studies
conclude that getting FSC certification will be time consuming and costly (Bartley
2010; Ruslandi et al., 2014). Requirements and standards imposed by the PEFC are
not as tight as those imposed by the FSC. For instance, FSC certification cannot
be granted to HTI which was converted from natural forest after November 1994,
whereas PEFC certification only \excludes plantation forest which was converted
from natural forest after 2010. It is, therefore, the big groups of forest concession
holders in Indonesia like the Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) and Asia Pacific Resources
International Limited (APRIL Group) that have obtained PEFC certification.
Since the PEFC scheme seems relatively acceptable to the market in terms of its
principles and standards, which are nationally adaptable and involve multiple stake-
holders, more HTI areas may become PEFC-certified in future. An Indonesian forest
business association, for instance, argued that the PEFC system, which is voluntary
and market-driven, can be an important instrument to realize SFM as the system is
also primarily targeted to achieve economic, social and ecological sustainability. The
importance of this ISO-based scheme can also be seen as having strategic value for
the market survival of forest concession holders. Indeed, rising concerns of forest
companies to join PEFC may hint to its positive economic impact. The voluntary
scheme can also strengthen the SFM processes which are normatively imposed by
the state institution in charge, namely theMOEF in the context of enforcing the regu-
lation, facilitation and oversight of forest companies’ compliance to SFM principles
(interview with a business association).
However, forest concession holders in Indonesia continue to face constraints in
getting voluntary forest certification—not only because of their different financial
capacities to bear the certification costs but also because of different preparation
levels (Brockhaus,Obidzinski,Dermawan,Laumonier,&Luttrell, 2012).Companies
who got certified have usually applied SFM practices right from the beginning so that
they do not have to bear huge certification costs (interviewwith a forestry researcher).
4.2 The PEFC Scheme’s Implications for SFM in Indonesia
As indicated above, PEFCmay strengthen the SFM policies that Indonesia has so far
undertaken for social and environmental protection including the reduction of carbon
emissions from the forest sector. Even though it is comparatively well-accepted by
the private sector, this does not mean that PEFC will automatically become the main
source of certification. As mentioned before, the government itself has developed
and imposed a mandatory certification scheme, PHPL, for forest concession holders.
This programme was actually an improved version of a set of voluntary government
programmes commissioned by LEI. It resulted from the concerns of environmental
activists as well as USA and European tropical timber consumers demanding a certi-
fication programme (as a market instrument) for forest products to reduce the pace
of tropical forest degradation in the world (MOEF, 2015). However, the programme
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does not address the technical problem of trade of forest timber and is not targeted
to fulfil market demands in the same way as the voluntary certification programmes.
In addition, the Indonesian forest business association has planned to develop a
so-called SelfDeclare certification programme. This programme is mandatory for
all association members with the purpose of measuring their actual performance in
achieving sustainable production forestmanagement. It aims to promote itsmembers’
readiness to fulfil the governmental mandatory certification programme and the
voluntary market-driven programmes. Since the certification programme is mainly
about facilitation, the criteria and indicators used as a basis for evaluation focus on
input and processes rather than on output.
Despite the existence of other initiatives, there are prospects for continued and
growing acceptance of the PEFC certification scheme in Indonesia. Since the PHPL
programme does not necessarily suit market demands, the PEFC scheme, based
on nationally adapted principles and standards, may become a viable voluntary
alternative.
Indeed, PHPL faces a number of constraints relating to implementing agencies’
capacities and poor performance of forestry governance and certain law enforcement
activities. The introduction of the FSC and PEFC certification programmes was in
part driven by a lack of “market trust”. This lack of trust, which had also resulted
in the imposition of a due diligence policy for Indonesian forest products earlier
on, relates to high corruption levels in Indonesia as well as poor forest manage-
ment indices (interview with a certification body), amongst other issues. PHPL’s
performance also depends on the degree to which government-to-government (G-
to-G) SFM cooperation mechanisms between Indonesia and the countries of timber
product consumers are strengthened. If this is not the case, the credibility of the
PHPL scheme as an instrument to achieve SFM may suffer. There is also a growing
concern amongst producers that consumers from other major markets outside the
USA and Europe are likely to demand tighter certification of forest products as well.
In this regard, forest producers have begun to realize that a market-driven voluntary
certification scheme such as PEFC is a choice they have to make (interview with a
business association).
Overall, the future application and success of the PEFC scheme in Indonesia
will be dependent on two significant aspects. First, a high level of support from
the main stakeholders, namely civil society, industry and, most importantly, the
government, will be required. As in the regional context, voluntary certification
programmes in Indonesia have in fact not been getting full support from these main
stakeholders. Data shows that the Indonesian government was not supportive enough
of some voluntary forest certification schemes, in this case the FSC, while volun-
tary standards developed by LEI were seen as an important way to preserve national
autonomy and sovereignty as well as compatibility with domestic circumstances. In
the context of Indonesian industry, the development of LEI standards was at least
in part supported by the industry associations. With regard to civil society support,
the Rainforest Alliance has played an active role, with its SmartWood programme
certifying the first-ever developing country forest operation, Perum Perhutani, in
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Indonesia in 1990. But, there are also NGOs that have not been supportive of volun-
tary certification. The World Rainforest Movement, allied with local forestry NGOs
such as the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI—Wahana Lingkungan
Hidup Indonesia), for instance, called for amoratorium on FSC and LEI certification.
This socio-economic and political constellation underlines a viable argument that
the Asia-Pacific region basically lacks the general structural conditions for effective
forest certification (Cashore, Gale, Errol, & Newsom, 2006).
Second, the legitimacy of PEFC will flow from both domestic and global actors.
The importance of the legitimacy issue here can be seen in the context of PEFC’s
status as a non-state (governance) scheme, which means that it lacks the traditional
enforcement capacities associated with the sovereign state in the realm of global
governance (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995; Bernstein & Cashore, 2003). Even though
voluntary forest certification plays an important role in the absence of binding inter-
national law on tropical forest use, its global legitimacy is still contested and this has
local repercussions. In terms of domestic legitimacy, stakeholders’ hesitant accep-
tance of FSC is an experience that PEFC should keep in mind. The degree to which
the scheme becomes an effective anchor for national SFM in Indonesia and also for
the governance of global emissions from the forestry sector remains to be seen.
5 Conclusion
This study investigatedwhetherPEFCas a relatively new forest certification system in
Indonesia substitutes or complements the existing forest certification systems, which
mainly are FSC and government regulations. In addition, this study also aimed to
predict whether concession holders are likely to be further attracted to obtain PEFC
certification. In other words, the study sought to understand the role PEFC is likely
to play for the purpose of SFM in Indonesia.
This study found that PEFC seems to substitute FSC as both schemes are very
similar but FSC requirements are more detailed and stricter than PEFC’s and thus
attract fewer concession holders. Both PEFC and FSC complement government regu-
lations as both voluntary schemes require higher standards than the government regu-
lations. This indicates that voluntary forest certification schemes can play a role to
fill the global forest governance gap in the absence of a binding hard law.
However, to measure PEFC acceptability in Indonesia, two aspects still play an
importance role—the degree to which domestic stakeholder support is given, and
PEFC’s global legitimacy as a non-state scheme. Some of the domestic stakeholders
including the government and parts of civil society do not show sufficient support.
Thus, its potential contribution to national SFM in Indonesia and, eventually, to the
governance of global emissions from the forestry sector remains to be seen.
Future research could delve into the technical requirements of each certification
scheme and its applicability in the Indonesian forestry sector. Analysing perceptions
of a broad range of stakeholders regarding each scheme is also important in order to
determine best practices for forest management.
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Chapter 10
Global and National Food Safety
and Quality Standards: Implications
and Impacts for Farmers in Thailand
and India
Sarah Holzapfel and Aimée Hampel-Milagrosa
1 Introduction
In the last three decades, a transformation of the agricultural sector in the developing
countries has taken place. The relative importance of staple crops and traditional
export commodities (coffee, cacao, tea, sugar, spices and nuts) in agricultural trade
and production has declined, and a shift towards high-value products can be observed
(Humphrey & Memedovic, 2006; Reardon & Timmer, 2007; World Bank, 2008).
In the developing countries, rapid economic growth, urbanization and globalization
have induced changes in consumer diets away from staple foods towards an increased
consumption of high-value products (Gulati, Minot & Bora, 2007; Pingali, 2007;
World Bank, 2008). As a result, the domestic market for high-value products is one
of the fastest growing agriculturalmarkets inmany developing economies, expanding
by 6–7% a year (World Bank, 2008). At the same time, the demand for speciality
products and for a year-round supply of highly perishable fruits and vegetables has
increased in industrialized countries, creating new exporting opportunities for many
developing economies (World Bank, 2008).
However, in recent years, meeting the market requirements in high-value supply
chains has become more challenging (Gulati et al., 2007). In particular, high-value
export and domestic supply chains in developing countries are increasingly governed
by a plethora of public and private food safety and quality standards (Balsevich
et al., 2003; Henson & Reardon, 2005). Developed countries’ public standards have
long been criticized for acting as non-tariff barriers to trade for exports from devel-
oping countries (Henson & Caswell, 1999; Henson & Loader, 2001; Otsuki, Wilson
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& Sewadeh, 2001). Private standards, introduced and required by supermarkets,
however, often exceed the requirements of public standards and, although volun-
tary, become mandatory to access high-value markets worldwide (Berdegué, Balse-
vich, Flores & Reardon, 2005; Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Elizabeth & Reardon,
2000; Jaffee et al., 2005). The pre-farmgate standard GlobalGAP1 is the most widely
known private standard for good agricultural practices (GAPs). It was developed by
a group of European retailers in 1997 with the aim of harmonizing retailers’ existing
standards and evolved to be a requirement of major retailers worldwide. The main
focus of the standard is on food safety, but it also covers aspects of environmental
protection, workers’ health, safety and welfare, and traceability (GLOBAL GAP,
2012).
There is widespread concern among development practitioners and academics
that small-scale farmers will lose access to high-value markets because of their
inability to meet stringent private standards, such as GlobalGAP (Graffham, Cooper,
Wainwright & MacGregor, 2007; Humphrey & Memedovic, 2006; Jaffee, Henson
& Rios, 2011). First, adopting private standards usually entails high compliance
and certification costs that disadvantage smallholders. Second, small-scale farmers
often lack the technical ability to adapt their farming practices to the requirements of
standards (Jaffee et al., 2011; Narrod et al., 2009). Yet, others argue that the challenge
can also be turned into an opportunity. Standards are said to encourage new forms
of cooperation between producers and agribusinesses, to lead to the upgrading of
supply chains and to facilitate access to new remunerative markets (Jaffee, 2003).
Moreover, standards are also said to lead to better employment opportunities for rural
households, to contribute to better working conditions on farms and to higher welfare
for farm workers (Colen, Maertens & Swinnen, 2012; Ehlert, Mithöfer & Waibel,
2014). Seen from this viewpoint, the adoption of standards can lead to higher and
more stable incomes and thereby to a reduction of poverty and vulnerability among
rural households.
Public and private actors in the developing countries, often supported by devel-
opment cooperation actors, have reacted to the increased demand for standards in
several ways. Public actors have developed national or regional public standards that
improve food safety and quality and are more inclusive than international private
standards. Private actors, often in cooperation with the public sector, have devel-
oped their own national GAP standards that are benchmarked with the international
standard GlobalGAP (e.g. ThaiGAP, ChinaGAP, KenyaGAP), but are more adapted
to national conditions. More recently, supermarkets in developing countries have
started to introduce private GAP standards to substitute for inadequate or missing
public standards, to differentiate from produce sold by traditional retailers and to
coordinate supply chains (Reardon, Henson & Gulati, 2010).
1The standard is based on third-party certification, and farmers are audited by certification bodies
accredited by Foodplus GmbH, the GLOBALGAP secretariat. GLOBALGAP is jointly governed
by retailers and producers. In 2012, 49 retailers and food services were members of GLOBALGAP
and 197 producers and suppliers. Of the latter, 32 came from developing countries (GLOBALGAP,
2012).
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Given the potential opportunities and challenges of food safety and quality stan-
dards, the aim of this chapter is to contribute to the understanding of how public
and private actors in developing countries react to global and national standards
and to analyse the implications of diverse standards on smallholders in the fruit and
vegetable (F&V) value chain. To do this, we have carried out an extensive litera-
ture review. In addition, we have conducted semi-structured interviews with farmers,
farmer organizations, extensionworkers, exporters and retailers in theThai and Indian
fruit and vegetable sector, as well as with government officials, researchers and food
safety experts.
The proliferation of standards is at different stages in different developing coun-
tries. We analyse the evolution and proliferation of standards for the cases of Thai-
land and India. The two countries differ in several regards: the overall importance
of private, international standards, the level of supermarket penetration and the
level of engagement of the public and private sectors in standard development and
dissemination.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we describe how Thailand and India
address food safety and quality and how they have reacted to international standards,
such as GlobalGAP, by introducing their own local public and private standards.
We also discuss the importance of retailers in introducing standards in developing
countries’ domestic supply chains. Next, we review the literature on the impacts of
standards on actors in the Thai and Indian F&V value chain and compare findings
among the two country cases. Last, we identify lessons learned from the comparison
and provide policy recommendations.
2 Public and Private Food Safety and Quality Standards
in Thailand and India
In this section, we look closer into how production and exports have evolved in
both countries over the last decade, and into the diversity of food safety and quality
standards. This focus is important. While Thailand and India are renowned as strong
producers of agricultural commodities in Asia and worldwide, both countries are
still plagued with severe food safety and quality problems. Issues of food safety
and quality remain a real threat, particularly for exporters who try to respond to
heightened global demand while simultaneously adapting to strict global quality
standards. With the objective of easing the adaptation process, local governments
have assisted producer–exporters by creating domestic standards. However, as the
following discussion will show, this has not always been a success.
We begin by describing how production and export of fruits and vegetables have
developed in both countries and explain how food safety and quality issues affect
exports. We then go on to discuss the evolution of two broad categories of GAP
standards that differ in terms of their levels of difficulty and coverage. These are:
166 S. Holzapfel and A. Hampel-Milagrosa
Table 1 Types and examples of GAP standards in developing countries
Level 1: Private GAP standards for the high-value export market
• Collective: GlobalGAP
• Chain-specific: Tesco Nature’s Choice, Carrefour Quality Line
• National standards developed to achieve GlobalGAP benchmarking status (recognized as
GlobalGAP equivalent): ThaiGAP, IndiaGAP and IndGAP
Level 2: Local GAP standards for the high-value domestic market and the export supply chain
• Standards owned by public actors (Q-GAP, revised IndiaGAP)
• Standards owned by private actors (ThaiGAP Level 2, basic IndGAP)
Source Hampel-Milagrosa and Holzapfel (2016)
Level 1 GAP standards for the high-value export market and Level 2 local GAP
standards for the high-value domestic market and export supply chain (Table 1).
Level 1 GAP standards are private, third-party standards applied by lead firms in
the food chain tomeet consumers’ concerns over food safety, to differentiate products
based on quality attributes, to mitigate commercial risks and to ensure compliance
with public regulations. Although voluntary, they are becoming increasingly manda-
tory to supply high-valuemarkets worldwide. Themost well-known Level 1 standard
is the GlobalGAP standard, but there are also several chain-specific GAP standards
with similar requirements (e.g. TescoNature’s Choice).Moreover, both Thailand and
India have developed national Level 1 standards (ThaiGAP and IndGAP) with the
aim of being recognized as GlobalGAP equivalents. These are more adapted to local
circumstances than the GlobalGAP standards, and therefore expected to be easier
and less costly to comply with.
Level 2 standards are basic voluntary GAP standards that are introduced either by
governments or by private actors or by both collectively as a public–private partner-
ship. They are easier to comply with for smallholders than international standards
(Level 1) and aim to fulfil two objectives: to ensure food safety in the domestic
market and to gradually upgrade food safety systems to facilitate exports and to
allow adoption of Level 1 standards (Amekawa, 2013; eFresh Portal, 2016; Korpra-
ditskul, Suwannamook, Adulyarattanapan & Damsiri, 2010). Basic GAP standards
under Level 2 are diverse: some are not as stringent, whereas others are more chal-
lenging to comply with. In our case studies, both the public and private sectors in
Thailand and India have introduced their own local Level 2 GAP standards for the
high-value domestic markets and the export supply chain, resulting in two coexisting
standards and confusion among producers and exporters.
2.1 Production, Exports and Food Safety
Thailand and India are among the largest producers and exporters of horticultural
products in theworld and among the developing countriesmost affected by increasing
standards (Jaffee et al., 2005; Jairath & Purohit, 2013; Manarungsan et al., 2005). In
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2014, India was the second largest producer of fruits (excluding melons) as well as of
vegetables (including melons) (FAO, 2010). Thailand was the 14th largest producer
of fruits (excluding melons) and the 41st largest producer of vegetables (including
melons) (FAO, 2010). Despite high production volumes, Indian fruit and vegetable
exports are relatively low. India is the 13th biggest exporter of vegetables (HS 07) and
the 21st biggest exporter of fruits (HS 08) (ITC, 2017). One reason for low exports
is that production is mainly targeted for domestic consumption. Another reason
is producers’ failure to adhere to international food safety and quality standards.
Thailand, being the 11th biggest exporter of vegetables (HS 07) and the 20th biggest
exporter of fruits (HS 08) (ITC, 2017), performs comparably better.
Both Thailand and India suffer from food safety issues which have negatively
impacted exports to high-value markets, such as the European Union (EU). Unsafe
farming practices are prevalent, resulting in high risks for the consumer and nega-
tive health impacts for farmers. Microbial contamination of fruits and vegetables is
a problem as a result of poor hygiene practices, the use of untreated manure and
polluted irrigation water (Shepard, 2006; UNIDO, NORAD & IDS, 2015). Further-
more, pesticide overuse is common, especially among small-scale farmers, for whom
pesticides provide an effective way to manage risks and are frequently applied as a
preventivemeasure.Often, farmers followamonthly orweekly spraying calendar and
apply doses that are higher than what is recommended on the label (Plianbangchang,
Jetiyanon &Wittaya-Areekul, 2009; Shepard, 2006). This practice is encouraged by
the fact that the physical appearance is the major factor for the determination of the
market price in traditional supply chains (Shepard, 2006). For the case of Thailand,
a recent study by Wanwimolruk, Phopin, Boonpangrak and Prachayasittikul (2016)
showed that EU maximum residue limits (MRLs) were exceeded in 35–71% of the
cases, depending on the type of vegetable and the marketing outlet (local market or
supermarket).
Thailand’s fruit and vegetable exports to the EU fell steadily from 37,414 tons in
2007 to 23,187 tons in 2014 (ITC, 2017) (Table 2),2 which can partly be attributed
to difficulties in meeting the increasingly strict standards in the EU. Within the
group of middle-income countries, Thailand has the highest unit and percent rejec-
tion rates for exports of agrifood products into the EU and Japan (UNIDO et al.,
2015). Thai imports account for 21% of all EU rejections due to pesticide residues
(2002–2010), 21% of Japanese rejections due to bacterial contamination (2006–
2010) and 22%ofAustralian rejections on the basis of non-compliance with hygienic
conditions/controls (UNIDO et al., 2015).
Similarly, India has also experienced high rejection rates for most of the agricul-
tural commodities it exports. Based on aggregated 2002–2010 data from UNIDO
et al. (2015), India ranked fourth among countries with the largest number of agri-
food rejections from the EU, with a total of 1145 rejections or equivalent to 127 EU
rejections per year. Indian fruits and vegetables rank second to Mexico in terms of
2HS 0714 (manioc, arrowroot salem, etc.) is excluded from the analysis because almost the entire
production of cassava in Thailand is processed into dry chips and pellets and then exported as animal
feed (Ratanawaraha, Senanarong & Suriyapan, 2001).
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Table 2 Production and export of fruits and vegetables in Thailand and India
Year Thailand









2007 2,74,7023 239,281 23,591 12,622,969 752,995 13,823
2008 2,759,375 250,795 22,437 10,993,626 765,847 12,282
2009 3,430,686 251,327 19,036 10,798,782 1,036,019 13,505
2010 3,623,646 220,733 16,333 10,436,562 913,390 11,800
2011 3,833,422 260,643 15,252 10,942,378 1,222,597 11,517
2012 3,817,113 238,359 13,001 11,081,410 1,428,942 15,056
2013 3,903,385 208,473 11,509 10,693,755 1,431,090 10,686
2014 4,112,977 201,548 12,593 11,341,667 1,457,446 10,594
Year India









2007 88,532,008 1,524,120 106,756 63,888,880 634,147 119,005
2008 92,214,635 2,262,600 102,825 69,797,425 827,372 153,539
2009 91,441,005 2,483,145 91,034 70,242,281 813,685 130,506
2010 100,652,944 1,716,045 72,823 76,411,205 386,012 121,800
2011 107,050,691 2,177,850 152,743 75,241,396 791,170 114,827
2012 114,332,800 2,347,190 108,255 76,877,434 837,762 121,132
2013 120,992,200 2,621,246 120,320 84,004,249 940,576 182,329
2014 126,578,659 2,533,913 132,597 89,920,608 805,033 144,994
aVegetables Primary (FAOSTAT)
bHS 07 edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers, excluding HS 0714 roots and tubers (ICT)
cFruit including melons (FAOSTAT)
dHS08 edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or melons (ICT)
bHS 07 edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers
Sources FAO (2017), ITC (2017)
largest rejection rates for the US market, with a total of 8770 rejections or equivalent
to 974 rejections per year (ibid). India joins Turkey, China and Vietnam in having
the highest rate of rejections per US$1 million of imports. UNIDO et al. (2015),
and Roy and Thorat (2008) report that the most common grounds for rejection of
Indian exports to EU are mycotoxins, food/feed additives and bacterial contamina-
tion. For produce directed to the American market, the most common reasons for
rejection are wrong or inappropriate labelling, unhygienic conditions and bacterial
contamination. Such high rates of rejection point to inadequate compliance, or lack
thereof, to international standards (ibid). Indian fruit and vegetable exports to the
EU, in contrast to Thailand, did not experience a decrease over the period from 2007
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to 2014 but increased by 23%. However, the increase in exports is much lower than
the increase in exports to world and production increases. Production increased by
42% and exports to the world by 55% over the same period (ITC, 2017).
2.2 Level 1 Standards: Private GAP Standards
for the High-Value Export Market
There is considerable evidence that adopting Level 1 private food safety and quality
standards such as GlobalGAP is especially challenging for small-scale farmers
(Ashraf, Giné & Karlan, 2009; Graffham et al., 2007; Roy & Thorat, 2008). Compli-
ance with standards entails high upfront investments in farm facilities and equip-
ment, which smallholders are often not able to incur, especially if they lack access
to credit (Jaffee et al., 2005). In addition, the costs of compliance with standards are,
to a large extent, fixed costs, which disadvantage small-scale producers (Chemnitz,
2007; Jaffee et al., 2005). Besides, the technical and information requirements of
standards are high. Farmers have to adopt more sophisticated farming practices, and
they require producers to be informed about changing requirements of standards.
However, acquiring information is also subject to economies of scale (Narrod et al.,
2009; Roy & Thorat, 2008). Poor education levels and a lack of access to extension
services and training programmes further hinder the implementation of food safety
and quality standards by small-scale farmers (Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin &
Dohrn, 2009).
In the light of the above-mentioned challenges, several donors, governments and
NGOs in Thailand and India—as in other developing and emerging countries—
have initiated development programmes to facilitate the adoption of private stan-
dards by small-scale farmers (McCullough, Pingali & Stamoulis, 2008). Most initia-
tives focused on the GlobalGAP standard, which became increasingly mandatory to
supply the European market in the mid-2000s and therewith threatened to exclude
small-scale farmers from high-value markets (Humphrey, 2008; Will, 2010). These
programmes supported the creation of farmer groups and offered financial assis-
tance, training and information to the groups to achieve certification (Humphrey,
2008; Kersting&Wollni, 2012; Roy&Thorat, 2008).Moreover, public–private part-
nerships were formed between donors and exporters to enable small-scale farmers
to adopt the standard as part of exporter–outgrower schemes (Holzapfel & Wollni,
2014a; Humphrey, 2008; Narrod et al., 2009; Roy & Thorat, 2008).
Notwithstanding these developments, the number of GlobalGAP-certified
producers remains low. In 2016, 188 F&V producers in Thailand and 8006 F&V
producers in India were GlobalGAP-certified according to the GlobalGAP database.
These are low numbers given that there are almost six million farms in Thailand and
more than 263 million farms in India. In Thailand, the number of certified producers
has evendeclined.While in 2009, 809producers inThailandwere certifiedwithGlob-
alGAP, this number declined continuously until 2015 where only 55 producers were
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certified (Table 3). In 2016, the number of certified producers again slightly increased
to 164 producers (GlobalGAP, 2016). According to Thai experts, the decline in the
number of GlobalGAP-certified producers can be explained by a high number of
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) notifications. To avoid a ban by
the EU on Thai exports of F&V, the Thai government started in September 2010
to inspect 50% of produce intended for the European market. Earlier, only 10% of
produce was randomly sampled. In addition, the government introduced an estab-
lishment list for exporters to the EU to increase the level of control. These measures
have led to Thai F&V exporters supplying the EU market to limit their production
and activities.
A shift from group certification towards individual certification can be observed
in the case of Thailand. Compared to individual certification, group certification can
make compliance with GlobalGAP feasible for small-scale farmers by reducing the
costs of compliance for the individual producers and by making it easier for external
service providers to provide farmers with advice and training (Will, 2010). Two
main group types exist under GlobalGAP option 2. The first is farmers’ association
or cooperativewhere the group ismanaged by farmers, and the second is an outgrower
scheme of a company, where the company organizes smallholders and manages the
group (GTZ, 2010). In Thailand, in 2009, only 29 producers were certified under
option 1 while 780 farmers were certified in eleven farmer groups. In 2015, only two
small producer groups with a total of 12 farmers were certified while the number of
producers certified under option 1 increased to 43. This indicates that GlobalGAP
adoption by smallholders is extremely challenging and often not sustainable as has
also been shown byHolzapfel andWollni (2014b). The case of India, however, shows
that group certification canwork. The number of farmers and groups certified in India
has steadily increased from 2125 farmers (42 groups) in 2008 to 8006 farmers (87
groups) in 2016.
In addition to programmes supporting smallholders in adopting the GlobalGAP
standard, both Thailand and India started developing their own national private stan-
dards, ThaiGAP, IndGAP and IndiaGAP, with the aim of achieving GlobalGAP
benchmarking status, i.e. recognition as GlobalGAP equivalent. The standards are
adapted to local circumstances and are thus expected to be easier and less costly to
comply with than the GlobalGAP standard (Indian Agricultural and Processed Food
Products Development Authority, 2011; Keeratipipatpong, 2010).
The ThaiGAP standard is a product of cooperation between the Thai Chamber of
Commerce,Kasetsart University, theNational Food Institute, theNationalMetrology
Institute of Germany and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (Keeratipipat-
pong, 2010). The standard achieved benchmarking status in 2010, but benchmarking
was not renewed for GlobalGAP version 5 due to a low demand for the standard,
which is reflected in the decreasing number of GlobalGAP-certified producers. It is
not clear to what extent the ThaiGAP standard was successful in lowering costs of
compliance and in making compliance less challenging.
The Indian case is rather complicated as there are two national standards with
two different owners, namely: IndiaGAP owned by the Bureau of Indian Standards
(BIS) and IndGAP owned by Quality Council of India (QCI). Both IndiaGAP and
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IndGAP still seek benchmarking against GlobalGAP (Punjabi & Mukherjee, 2015;
see www.qcin.org). The IndiaGAP, owned by BIS, was drafted by the Agriculture
and Processed Food Export Development Authority (APEDA) in 2007 but was first
officially released in 2010. Though a public standard, APEDA designed the Indi-
aGAP closely around the GlobalGAP but fitted to Indian conditions. IndiaGAP aims
to help in the adoption of good agricultural practices all over the country and is
oriented for Indian producers (both big and small farmers) that are in the high-value
export market for agricultural products. Similar to the GlobalGAP, under the Indi-
aGAP certification scheme, farmers have two options for certification: individual and
group certifications. It is expected that if IndiaGAP is properly implemented through
certification of model farms, exports will increase by 25–30% (Food Industry India,
2007; see also www.bis.org.in).
The IndGAP was drafted and released by QCI in 2014. According to a 2016
interview with a QCI representative, APEDA, after creating the draft IndiaGAP,
turned over the draft documents toQCI to use as the basis for developing IndGAP. So,
while APEDAwas occupied promoting IndiaGAP, QCI developed IndGAP (national
standard for high-value exports) and basic IndGAP (local standard for domestic
market). Meanwhile, IndGAP originates from an institution created through private–
public partnership (PPP), with up to 50% funding from the government and the rest
coming from industry bodies. QCI was set up as an accreditation body in India,
and although its chairman is appointed by the Prime Minister, operationally, QCI is
liberated from government control. QCI has a third-party verification system for the
IndGAP in place.
IndiaGAP from APEDA and BIS is government-owned and government-led.
Since its inception in 1980, BIS has been mandated by Parliament to prepare various
Indian national standards and therefore had the legal authority to own and publish
IndiaGAP. However, its implementation posed some problems. The structure of
Indian government ministries is such that the Ministry of Agriculture is respon-
sible for anything related to domestic agriculture whereas theMinistry of Commerce
has the mandate for activities related to exports. Thus, since the original IndiaGAP
refers to agricultural products that are destined to go outside of India, APEDA and
BIS had to deal with two different Indianministries whose jurisdictions overlap in the
implementation of this certification scheme. A second issue is that unlike IndGAP,
IndiaGAP does not allow for third-party verification. There is no third-party certifica-
tion system that was built around IndiaGAP when the standard was drafted, creating
problems of legitimacy and robustness of the standard. Thus, although efforts to have
IndiaGAP benchmarked against GlobalGAP have been made, its lack of third-party
verification needs to be resolved.
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2.3 Level 2 Standards: Local GAP Standards for Broad-Scale
Adoption
Both the public and private sectors in Thailand and India have introduced local GAP
standards for the high-value domestic markets and the export supply chain, resulting
in two coexisting standards and confusion among producers and exporters.
2.3.1 Thailand
In Thailand, the government passed the ‘Road Map of Food Safety’ and introduced
the Q-GAP standard, a national voluntary standard for good agricultural practices,
in 2004. The aim was to implement effective food safety controls at all levels of
the value chain (Ministry of Public Health, 2004; Sardsud, 2007a). The road map
defines three goals: to maintain exports of agricultural commodities and food at the
current level, to reduce quarantine problems and to reduce the number of illnesses
from contaminated food in Thailand (FAO & WHO, 2004).
Q-GAP initially consisted of 31 crop-specific protocols and was later extended
to cover 169 commodities (Pongvinyoo, 2015; Sardsud, 2007a, p. 59). The Q-GAP
scheme is implemented by the government at all stages. The government sets the
standards, the National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standards
(ACFS) under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) serves as the
accreditation body, and the Department of Agriculture (DOA) acts as a certification
body. Since 2010, the certification and advisory function are partly outsourced to
the private sector and to farmer organizations (Pongvinyoo, 2015). The Q-GAP is
a requirement of several domestic retailers, and a requirement to export (Sardsud,
2007a; Wannamolee, 2008). In 2013, the Q-GAP standard was newly issued as Thai
Agricultural Standard (TAS) of food crops and was harmonized with ASEAN GAP
(Korpraditskul & Ratanakreetakul, 2015), a standard developed by members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to facilitate harmonization of
GAP programmes among ASEAN member countries (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).
The private sector, however, assesses the Q-GAP standard as insufficient.3 To export
to high-value markets, in particular Europe, the GlobalGAP standard is needed,
which is challenging to adopt and entails high compliance costs for producers and
exporters. Supermarkets operating in Thailand also assess the Q-GAP standard as
insufficient.
Recognizing this, the Thai Chamber of Commerce, owner of the ThaiGAP stan-
dard, kicked off the development of ThaiGAP Level 2 for the domestic market.
The ThaiGAP standard for the domestic market ensures a higher level of food
safety than the Q-GAP standard, but is less challenging to comply with than the
GlobalGAP/ThaiGAP standard (Wattanavaekin, 2010). It is seen as a tool for local
3The standard is criticized for lacking credibility because both certification and accreditation are
in the hands of the government and the agencies responsible for certifying farmers lack adequate
financing (Sardsud, 2007).
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producers to gain and maintain access to retailers and supermarkets in Thailand
(Korpraditskul & Ratanakreetakul, 2015). It is also used to promote the fruit and
vegetable sector after the export crisis. The development of the ThaiGAP standard
for the domestic market was supported by the Thai Retailers Association and several
Thai supermarkets, among them Siam Makro, Tops Supermarket, Tesco Lotus and
CP All Plc. Participating retailers aim to use ThaiGAP to ensure consumer safety
and to differentiate their products. Thai consumers have been found to be sensitive
to food safety and to shift from wet markets to supermarkets because they expect a
higher level of food safety (Reardon et al., 2010; Reardon, Timmer &Minten, 2012).
The first producers became certified against the ThaiGAP standard for the domestic
market in 2015.
2.3.2 India
Similarly, in India there are two parallel standards: the government-owned Indi-
aGAP—initiated by the BIS in cooperation with APEDA in 2010—and the IndGAP
standard, introduced in 2014 by a (semi-)private actor, QCI. Like ThaiGAP, both
IndiaGAP and IndGAP have two levels: Level 1 for the high-value export market
and Level 2 for the domestic market and to allow gradual upgrading to international
standards. At Level 2, the revised IndiaGAP that was introduced in 2013 originated
from BIS/APEDA while the basic IndGAP that was introduced in 2014 was devel-
oped by QCI (Punjabi & Mukherjee, 2015; Jairath & Purohit, 2013). The revised
IndiaGAP was a simpler and less stringent certification scheme that would allow
farmers to get used to domestic standards so that transition of crop production prac-
tices towards IndiaGAP and GlobalGAP accreditation would be easier. Both Level
2 local GAP standards were set up to address the fact that the GlobalGAP and Indi-
aGAP/IndGAP schemes that are currently in operation in India aremeant only for the
exportmarket and are being operated by large farmers and farmer groups, overlooking
the domestic market. Moreover, both schemes recognize the difficulties smallholders
face in getting their produce accredited in order to enter high-value domesticmarkets.
A Level 2 national accreditation is a small step that might eventually make Level 1
accreditation much easier for smaller farmers.
There has already been a certified model farm for IndGAP according to QCI. As
of now, both the revised IndiaGAP and basic IndGAP are rather new and therefore
no empirical evidence on their impact is available. However, our earlier research in
India has shown that the majority of retailers, including international retailers, do
not apply food safety and quality standards in India although they might apply them
elsewhere (interviewwith IFPRI, 2014;Hampel-Milagrosa et al., 2017). Primary data
from producers and retailers that were interviewed in the state of Andhra Pradesh
show that modern retailers tend to implement basic product standards for fruits and
vegetables but do not apply farm-level GAP standards. Supermarkets, for their fruits
and vegetables portfolio, do not abide by public and private food safety standards
(Cohen, 2013). Thus, modern Indian retailers’ main criteria for selection of produce
10 Global and National Food Safety and Quality Standards … 175
tend to neglect critical issues of food safety, including pre- and post-harvest practices,
and workers’ health and safety.
In addition, traditional markets still encompass a majority of the market share
for fruits and vegetables in India, a contributing reason why standards are difficult
to implement in the country (Babu, 2012; Gulati, 2007). Foreign direct investment
(FDI) in retail is currently the key that allows modern retail chains to operate in
the country, but actual investment is still very low (Baskaran, 2012). Many experts
believe that once retail FDI enters on a bigger scale, stricter standards that conform
to international criteria may be implemented and lead to improvements in the whole
sector (interviewwith Global Agrisystems, 2014; Chari &Madhav Raghavan, 2012).
3 Implications and Impacts of Standards on Farmers
This section summarizes the existing literature on the implications and impacts of
standards on smallholders inThailand and India. The analysis is carried out separately
for Level 1 and Level 2 standards. In addition, we distinguish between Level 2
standards promoted by public actors and those demanded by domestic retailers since
these were found to differ in their level of difficulty.
3.1 Level 1 GAP Standards for High-Value Export Market
Research on Level 1 standards focuses on the GlobalGAP standard. Findings from
both countries on the factors influencing adoption, the impacts of adoption and the
sustainability of certification show a similar pattern. Studies from India (Roy &
Thorat, 2008) and Thailand (Kersting & Wollni, 2012) on the factors influencing
GlobalGAP adoption find that if farmers are supported by external actors in the
adoption process, such as a donor, an exporter or a marketing partner to a producer
cooperative, it is not land size, but farmers’ human and organizational capacities that
are the main determinants of adoption. Small-scale farmers are unlikely to adopt the
standard without support and need external assistance at all stages of the adoption
process: to obtain the relevant information, to decide on whether or not to adopt the
standard and to implement the requirements at farm level (Roy & Thorat, 2008).
Studies show that once farmers have adopted the GlobalGAP standard, on
an average, they gain from certification (Bourquin & Thiagarajan, n.d.; Holzapfel
& Wollni, 2014a, 2014b; Punjabi & Mukherjee, 2015; Roy & Thorat, 2008). Using
panel data of 218 farm households in Thailand, Holzapfel andWollni (2014a, 2014b)
find that GlobalGAP adoption, on an average, has a significant positive impact on
F&V prices as well as on farmers’ household incomes. The impact on prices and
household incomes depends highly on the type of institutional arrangement small-
holders are certified in. Farmers certified in producer-managed groups had very high
benefits and on average received 62% higher prices and 14,678 USD higher net
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household incomes. In contrast, farmers certified in exporter-managed groups did
not benefit from higher prices or incomes. Exporters covered expenses for certifi-
cation and provided trainings, but farmers were not paid higher prices. Holzapfel
and Wollni (2014b) also find that larger farmers in producer-managed certification
groups realize high net income gains while smaller farmers only benefit as long as
they do not have to incur the costs of compliance, i.e. as long as certification costs
and costs for technical assistance, equipment and laboratory analyses are paid for by
a donor.
For the case of India, Bourquin and Thiagarajan (n.d.) analysed the impact
of a USAID-funded project supporting mango producers in India and found that
GlobalGAP-certified farmers selling to the domestic high-value market receive 20–
30% more and farmers selling to the export market 50% higher returns than farmers
selling through traditional channels. However, they also found that the additional
revenue is not sufficient to pay for the costs of certification during the first year.
Similarly, Punjabi and Mukherjee (2015) found that grape growers contracted by
an exporter and producing under GlobalGAP have a 60% higher gross margin than
farmers supplying to the traditional market. In addition, contracted farmers benefit
from a lower price risk because of a minimum guaranteed price and from lower
production risks. The export company’s extension agents regularly inform farmers
on weather and infestation risks and provide advice on the issues.
Small-scale farmers, however, need continuous support to make GlobalGAP
certification sustainable. Holzapfel and Wollni (2014b), for the case of Thai F&V
producers, find that certification in donor-supported producer-managed groups is
not sustainable. There are two main reasons for this. First, when donor support ends,
small-scale farmers are often not able to cover the recurrent costs of compliance.
Second, donor support focused on initial adoption and one-time certification and
not on improving the long-term capacities of farmers and farmer groups to manage
certification on their own. The results also showed that farmers certified in exporter-
managed groups had a 85% higher probability of becoming re-certified (Holzapfel
& Wollni, 2014b). Exporters continued to support their contract farmers after donor
support ended through extension services, input provision and management of the
quality management system and by covering the certification costs.
A lack of sustainability of donor-supported GlobalGAP certification was also
found in a USAID project supporting GlobalGAP certification of mango farmers in
India. Only 26 out of 62 farmers who became certified in 2006 and 2007 sought
recertification in 2008 (Bourquin & Thiagarajan, n.d.). One of the lessons learned
from the projects is that farmer groups that were not artificially formed for Glob-
alGAP certification but that had existed before (self-help groups, cooperatives, clus-
ters) are more successful (Bourquin & Thiagarajan, n.d.). Punjabi and Mukherjee
(2015) also stress the importance of longer-term support to GlobalGAP-certified
small-scale farmers. Record keeping about farm practices (e.g. pesticide and fertil-
izer use, and hygiene) is a particular problem for small-scale farmers. Extension
agents of the contracting exporting company help farmers to maintain records for
the first 2–3 years of certification until farmers acquire the capacity to fulfil the task
themselves.
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The case of Mahagrapes (Roy & Thorat, 2008), a marketing partner to producer
cooperatives in India, shows a very successful example of collective action and
farmer-led GlobalGAP certification. Mahagrapes provides a range of services to its
member cooperatives and to farmers, such as procurement of information on stan-
dards and export markets, negotiation of contracts, provision of inputs, and training
about grape growing and handling methods. It succeeded in providing GlobalGAP
certification to all its member cooperatives. Member farmers only have to pay $28
annually for certification due to economies of scale, which is much lower than has
been found in other studies. The grape sector in India is a success story, and 6409
of the 8107 farmers in India currently certified against GlobalGAP are certified for
grapes.
3.2 Level 2 GAP Standards
As shown above, Level 2 GAP standards for fresh fruits and vegetables exist in
bothThailand (Q-GAP/TAS/ThaiGAP) and India (basic IndGAP/revised IndiaGAP).
However, since basic IndGAP and the revised IndiaGAP have recently been intro-
duced in India and only one farmer had been certified till 2015, the impacts on farmers
are yet to be assessed. For this reason, this section focuses on the GAP standards
in Thailand. The case of Thailand provides important lessons learned for India and
other countries that have initiated basic voluntary GAP standards.
3.2.1 Level 2 GAP Standards Promoted by Public Actors
The TAS (previously Q-GAP) is widely known in Thailand. In 2016, 112 thousand
farms in Thailand were certified against the standard (Department of Agriculture,
2016). This is almost as many producers as are certified with GlobalGAP worldwide
(GLobalGAP, 2014),4 but a huge decline from more than 220,000 producers that
were Q-GAP-certified in 2012 (Amekawa et al., 2017). The decline started with the
introduction of the TAS in 2013 (TAS 9001-2013), which replaced Q-GAP andmade
it more challenging for Thai farmers to obtain a certificate.5,6 The revision of the
Q-GAP standard is an attempt of the Thai government to improve the effectiveness of
the standard and to increase its acceptance in international markets. Several studies
4According to GlobalGAP (2014), more than 139,000 certified producers in over 110 countries
were certified in 2014.
5The TAS standard has 116 control pointsand farmers have to comply with 100% of 23 control
points and with 60% of 41 control points. A total of 54 control points are recommendations
(Amekawa et al., 2017). In comparison, the Q-GAP standard has only 84 control points and farmers
were required to comply with only 51% of the control points (Amekawa, 2013).
6TheGlobalGAP Integrated FarmAssurance standardVersion 5 includes 218 control points, thereof
87 major must (100% compliance), 113 minor must (95% compliance) and 18 recommendations
(GlobalGAP, 2015).
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have dealt with the impacts of the Q-GAP standard on food safety and farm practices
and have analysed the benefits and problems associated with the standard.
Amekawa (2013), basedon64 structured interviewswithQ-GAP-certifiedpomelo
producers inNorthernThailand, analysed farmers’ understanding of theQ-GAP stan-
dard and the effect of Q-GAP on farming practices and pesticide use. They find that
only half the producers surveyedwere able to relate theQ-GAP standard to the official
food safety goal, the proper use and control of agrochemicals and other production
practices. They also find that the level of implementation of Q-GAP requirements
is low (especially record keeping) and that changes in pesticide management under-
taken by farmers were unrelated to Q-GAP. Similarly, Schreinemachers et al. (2012),
who compared pesticide use and handling practices amongQ-GAP adopters and non-
adopters, showed that a Q-GAP certificate does not have a significant effect on the
amount of pesticides used nor on pesticide handling practices. It did, however, have a
small impact on the use of hazardous and banned pesticide and has increased farmers’
awareness of the dangers of hazardous substances.
The impact of Q-GAP on prices and income has been analysed by Krause, Lippe
and Grote (2014) for cut orchids and by Pongvinyoo, Yamao and Hosono (2014)
for coffee. Both find that Q-GAP does not influence prices and that certified and
non-certified producers sell to the same buyers and markets. The lack of economic
incentive for farmers to comply with Q-GAP requirements can be named as one of
the reasons for farmers’ non-compliance with Q-GAP requirements (Krause et al.,
2014). More importantly, however, there are several problems associated with the
design and implementation of the Q-GAP standard which lead to a low level of
adoption of the standard requirements and ultimately to a lack of credibility.
First, accreditation and certification are both in the hands of the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Cooperatives, which creates doubts about the credibility of the certi-
fication system (Sardsud, 2007a). Second, overambitious targets to certify at least
145,000 farmers from 2004 to 2008 have put too much pressure on the responsible
government agencies who lack capacities to carry out appropriate training, or inspec-
tion and certification services (Sardsud, 2007a). This has resulted in farmers applying
for Q-GAP receiving insufficient training and in lax audit and control. For example,
Schreinemachers et al. (2012) state that according to the DOA there are only 120
DOA auditors in Northern Thailand but more than 140,000 registered farms. The
government has decided to outsource auditing to private contractors, but these are
often only insufficiently trained. Third, auditing has focused mostly on final stages
of production (pesticide residue testing and record keeping of pesticide applications)
although the Q-GAP standard covers a much broader range of issues. Moreover,
farmers are not sufficiently provided with alternatives to the use of synthetic pesti-
cides, such as integrated pest management (IPM) methods (Schreinemachers et al.,
2012).
Experiences from Thailand with the implementation of the Q-GAP standard
provide important lessons for India. It is important that the APEDA and the QCI,
which have launched IndiaGAP and IndGAP, ensure that farmers have access to
sufficient information and training, that the quality of infrastructure is upgraded and
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that certification bodies have adequate capacities to carry out inspections. The devel-
opment of a joint standard shared between APEDA and QCI is an option that we
recommend. Not only will this joint standard unify the two seemingly competing
public (IndiaGAP) and semi-private (IndGAP) standards but also reduce confusion
among producers and among international buyers with regard to which standard
has authority. Joining forces to create a joint standard will also increase capacities in
terms of certification. There is always a trade-off between certifying as many farmers
as possible and investing in training and auditing to ensure that farmers know and
apply GAP principles and that certified farmers comply with the requirements of the
standard.
3.2.2 Private Level 2 GAP Standards Imposed by Domestic Retailers
The impact of private standards applied by retailers in the domesticmarket is still very
low in India but much stronger in Thailand where supermarkets have a much higher
market share. With increasing market share of supermarkets and rising consumer
concerns for food safety and quality, the impacts of standards are expected to increase
significantly over the next decade.
As described in Sect. 2.3, supermarkets in India do not yet apply GAP standards.
The situation in Thailand is different. Thai supermarkets use labels for fruits and
vegetables, such as the Q-mark, pesticide-free or organic. In addition, supermarkets
have introduced supply chainmanagement programmes to ensure a basic level of food
safety, developed their own food safety standards (e.g.Makro) or require certification
with Q-GAP (e.g. Tops). This has certain implications for producers. For example,
a case study of Tops carried out in 2006 showed that Tops, following a supply chain
restructuring programme, significantly reduced its involvement with smallholders.
Following a screening, Tops only chose those farmers as suppliers who already
applied ‘intelligent pesticidemanagement’ and started to requireQ-GAPcertification
from suppliers (Buurma & Saranak, 2006).
Fruits and vegetables are 2–6 times more expensive in supermarkets compared to
local open-air markets (Wanwimolruk et al., 2016). Thai consumers are prepared to
pay the price also because they expect produce to be safe. Wanwimolruk et al. (2016)
in a recent study, however, found that fruits and vegetables from supermarkets exceed
MRLs at a rate of 35% for Chinese kale (local markets 48%), at a rate of 55% for
pak choi (local markets 71%) and at a rate of 49% for morning glory (local market
42%). A similar study by the Thai Pesticide Alert Network (Thai-PAN) showed
that produce labelled as Q-GAP-certified exceeded MRLs in 57% of the cases and
produce labelled as organic in 25%of the cases (Thailand PAN, 2016). These findings
put high pressure on supermarkets as well as on ACFS which is responsible for the
Q-GAP standard. Under these circumstances, the ThaiGAP standard for the domestic
market, which is now piloted, may receive a boost.
There are not yet many experiences with the ThaiGAP standard for the domestic
market, because the standard has only recently been introduced and uptil 2015, only
18 producers had received a certificate. Like GlobalGAP, the ThaiGAP (domestic
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Table 4 Comparison of the ThaiGAP standard for the domestic market with GlobalGAP
ThaiGAP domestic ThaiGAP/GlobalGAP
General regulation ruled by Thai chamber
of commerce
General regulation ruled by food plus
All farm base 27 51
Crop base 83 113
Fruit and vegetable 57 70
Traceability (QR code) Traceability (QR code)
Certification body of ISO 17065 Certification of ISO 17065 GLOBALGAP
Source Korpraditskul and Ratanakreetakul (2015)
market) standard is a private, voluntary standard, but is adapted to the local circum-
stances and has a significantly lower number of control points (Table 4). The standard
owner, the Thai Chamber of Commerce, has decided to offer only one certification
option, individual certification for ThaiGAP (domestic market). The main reason
provided by Thai Chamber of Commerce is that the experience of the GlobalGAP
option 2 project has shown that the group certification process, especially the quality
management system, is too complex.
It is yet to be seen whether ThaiGAP (domestic market) will also be an option
for small-scale farmers. The 16 farmers that have already obtained a certificate have
been proposed by the supermarkets involved in the ThaiGAP project. All of them are
large-scale farmers that own between 8 and 32 hectares, which ismuch larger than the
Thai average of 3.6 hectares (Pongsrihadulchai, 2009). However, some smallholders
have been included in the certificates via contract farming arrangements.
Potentially, the ThaiGAP standard can play a big role in future in Thailand.Almost
all major supermarkets in Thailand have supported the development of the standard
which shows their high demand for safe fruits and vegetables. If applied at a broader
scale and eventually made a requirement of Thai supermarkets, the standard is likely
to improve the level of food safety for the domestic consumer and to decrease adverse
environmental and health effects of pesticides. At the same time, there is the risk that
small-scale farmers who are not able to comply will lose access to the lucrative
supermarket channel. It is therefore important to identify ways to also enable small-
scale farmers to adopt the standard.
4 Conclusion and Recommendations
Donor programmes on food safety and quality over the past decade have mainly
focused on the GlobalGAP standard (Level 1 standard). The results of studies in
Thailand and India show that even if access to donor support is available, it is the
wealthier and more educated small-scale farmers who adopt and benefit from the
GlobalGAP standard, indicating that the poorest segment of smallholders has not
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benefited from donor interventions. In addition, the vast majority of smallholders
serve domestic markets or lower value export markets, where GlobalGAP is not a
requirement.
Local Level 2 GAP standards applied in developing countries’ domestic supply
chains can potentially reach a much larger number of producers and as a result
may have a much higher impact. On the one hand, if imposed by supermarkets,
local standards may lead to changes in the supply chain. Although the standards
applied to the domestic market are usually less stringent than GlobalGAP, they pose
a similar threat and may lead to the loss of market access for resource-poor small-
scale producerswith limited human and social capital. On the other hand, they play an
important role in introducingmore sustainable agricultural practices and in improving
the level of food safety for domestic consumers.
We found coexisting and overlapping local GAP standards (Level 2) initiated by
public and private actors in both Thailand and India. In Thailand, the public sector has
introduced the Q-GAP (now TAS) in 2004. The standard is a requirement for export,
and theQ-GAP label is used by domestic supermarket chains.However, studies found
that the level of implementation of standard requirements among certified farmers is
low. The government lacks the resources and capacity to monitor compliance, and
credibility is low because both certification and accreditation are in the hands of
the government. As a result, the standard is assessed as insufficient by the private
sector. Recognizing this, the private sector decided to develop its own local GAP
standard, the ThaiGAP standard. ThaiGAP is a third-party standard based on Glob-
alGAP standard, but more adapted to local circumstances and with lower number of
requirements. The four largest major supermarket chains in Thailand participated in
the development of ThaiGAP, and if made a requirement, ThaiGAP may have major
impact on the F&V value chain.
In India, we found IndiaGAP (introduced by APEDA—a public institution) and
IndGAP (introduced by QCI—a public/private institution) as two competing GAP
standards geared for the same producers that are in the same high-value export
market. Similar to Thailand, levels of implementation of standard requirements
among farmers are low for both standards. However, whereas IndiaGAP was intro-
duced much earlier with dismal certification rates among farmers, the IndGAP was
only recently introduced and uptake could still increase. Also, similar to the case of
Thailand, lack of resources hounds both institutions and the capacity to monitor
compliance among farmers is low. The decision to introduce revised IndiaGAP
(APEDA) and basic IndGAP (QCI) came in order to allow farmers to gradually
ease into GlobalGAP standards. This was equally an opportunity to certify smaller
farmers in India and provide assurance of food safety and quality to local consumers.
Owing to the large numbers of smallholders in India, proper and widespread imple-
mentation of revised IndiaGAP and basic IndGAP is expected to have a profound
impact on domestic markets.
Parallel standards—as found in both Thailand and India—lead to high transac-
tion costs and uncertainty among producers, exporters and consumers. We therefore
encourage public and private actors to harmonize existing GAP standards. Instead of
aiming to certify as many smallholders as possible, governments are recommended
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to invest in upgrading the quality of the infrastructure needed for standard adoption
(in particular, metrology and accreditation) and in extension programmes and media
campaigns that disseminate GAP on a larger scale. The widespread awareness and
application of GAP principles are particularly important to improve the level of food
safety for domestic consumers.
Moreover, institutional arrangements that allow large numbers of small-scale
farmers to adopt local GAP standards should be supported. Here, lessons can be
learnt from the example of GlobalGAP, in which large-scale producers and enter-
prises support small-scale farmers in adopting standards. In addition, the support of
service providers and producer cooperatives that offer access to financing and training
to enable standard adoption by small-scale farmers is crucial. The grape sector in
India is a particularly successful case, showing how large numbers of smallholders
can be sustainably integrated intoGlobalGAPgroup certification schemes and benefit
from certification.
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Chapter 11
Making the Local Work for the Global
Best: A Comparative Study of Vehicle
Efficiency Standards Implementation
in China and Mexico
Juan Carlos Mendoza and CAO Jiahan
1 Introduction
The invention and dissemination of road vehicles globally constituted a major tech-
nological shift in the transportation, economic productivity and competitiveness
paradigms. While the social and economic benefits flowing from this innovation are
overwhelming, the use of fuels to get this technology “on the move” has had a deep
ecological impact, resulting in adverse local as well as climate change effects. The
transport sector is a key contributor to worldwide greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs)
and other volatile compounds, and over 63.7% of the world’s total oil consumption
is related to fuel usage (IEA, 2014, p. 33), making the transport sector respon-
sible for approximately 23% of the total energy-related CO2 emissions (6.7 GtCO2
in 2010) (Sims et al., 2014, p. 602). Road transportation represents 73% of such
contributions, making it one of the top priority areas for formulating and achieving
mitigation efforts globally. Due to accelerated urbanization processes, economic and
population growth, transport demand per capita is expected to grow at a faster rate
in the developing and emerging countries in the coming decades (Sims et al., 2014,
p. 603).
In order to address the ever-increasing concerns about climate risks, fuel efficiency
norms and standards have been key policy tools to lead the transformation towards
achieving a drastic reduction in the use of fuel and/or the total amount of aggregated
emissions derived from light and heavy-duty vehicles. Through technological and
market adjustments and institutional arrangements, it is estimated that potential GHG
emissions reduction coming from the adoption of vehicle efficiency standards could
go up from 1.6 to 3.5 GtCO2 by 2030 (Stec & Baraj, 2009, p. 304)—a figure higher
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than the total amount of GtCO2 emissions in Latin America and Africa together
in 2012 (EIA, 2015). The adoption of such standards becomes more relevant in
emerging economies where along with population dynamics and economic growth,
fuel use, vehicle fleets and automotive industries show major growth trends.
Fuel efficiency norms and standards are not only relevant in terms of climate
changemitigation1 but also because of the co-benefits they provide locally.According
to the Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI, 2010), the implementation of such
standards could lead to cleaner and healthier cities, foster green mobility, ensure
sustainable energy use and improve economic opportunities (GFEI, 2015). Accord-
ingly, the multi-dimensional effects of fuel efficiency relate to the global develop-
ment agenda framed by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG),2 and for specific
sectoral supporting agendas such as the Global Energy Efficiency Accelerators Plat-
form promoted by the UN’s Sustainable Energy for All Initiative (SE4All), aiming
to double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency in six key sectors
(including transport)3 by 2030.
While the global benefits of fuel efficiency standards are well accepted, their
implementation at the national level varies from country to country. Although there
is no “one-size-fits-all” global standard on fuel efficiency, there are two general refer-
ence standards: those used in the European Union4 and those used in the USA.5 Both
regulations cover elements and parameters regarding the automotive sector produc-
tion processes such as technologies to improve litre per kilometre efficiency, CO2
grams per kilometre measurement, time frames, testing methods, fleet requirements,
etc. The selection of those parameters is based on the industry and market produc-
tion necessities and consumption patterns, satisfying and prioritizing the criteria to
be covered on a dominant technological basis.
1The IPCC AR5 recognized in 2014–2015 that one of the key developments in the transport sector
in terms of GHG emissions reduction potential has been the fuel economy standards and GHG
vehicle performance standards implemented for light and heavy-duty vehicles (Sims et al., 2014,
p.605).
2The goals that have a direct link to the fuel efficiency standards in the final adopted document
at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 are: Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives
and promote well-being for all at all ages; Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable
and modern energy for all; Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable
industrialization and foster innovation; Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe,
resilient and sustainable; Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns and;
Goal 13: Take urgent actions to combat climate change and its impacts.
3According to the SE4All Agenda, these sectors are: lighting, electrical appliances, building,
industry, district heating/cooling and fuel efficiency.
4Road transport contributes about one-fifth of the EU’s total emissions of CO2. While these emis-
sions fell by 3.3% in 2012, they are still 20.5% higher than in 1990. Transport is the only major
sector in the EU where greenhouse gas emissions are still rising.
5Japan’s experience in fuel efficiency standards shouldn’t be, however, diminished. Japanhas histori-
cally had the lightest,most fuel-efficient vehicle fleet in theworld.Historically, Japan’s fuel economy
standards have been rigorous in comparison to other countries, but in the current conditions it has
set lower targets for the coming years. For the purpose of this research project, we aim to focus on
the EU and US regulations.
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This chapter analyses the implementation of fuel efficiency standards in two devel-
oping economies: China and Mexico. The second section introduces the method-
ology used for the comparative analysis. The third section analyzes the use of
fuel efficiency standards in emerging economies, underlining the idea that the local
economic, political and institutional context must act as the determinant in imple-
menting external standards in national contexts. In two subsections, both national
cases are discussed while a third subsection comparatively analyses determinants
and barriers in both cases regarding the fuel efficiency implementation process.
Challenges and lessons learned are presented in the final section as conclusions.
2 Methodology
The methodology applied in this study is a comparative analysis based on the
typology6 proposed by the International Council of Clean Transportation (ICCT)
on fuel and vehicle groups (Kodjak, 2015). Countries that have implemented policy
actions towards fuel efficiency are divided into threemain groups based on the imple-
mentation stage/policy action status. Under this typology, Mexico and China share
certain attributes; both employ processes involving clean, low-sulphur, available or
planned standards, but both also partially adopt external (de facto “global”) standards
(Euro or US EPA). Derived from this categorization of countries, it is possible to
draw a two-country case-oriented comparison based on interpretation of literature
and review of policies rather than bearing a set of variables. The study is focused
on making an appropriate comparison in respect of fuel efficiency implementation
processes in emerging economies.
Due to the governance and economic asymmetries between these two countries,
the strategy adopted was based on a “Most Different Systems Design” method.
According to Lor (2012), this method implies a selection of different countries that
share a phenomenon which constitutes a societal challenge based on attributes rather
thanmerely variables. The strategy aims to define a boundary of comparability useful
for limiting the scope of the comparison. Nevertheless, the typology is used for
reference purposes only because several countries even within the proposed groups
may differ in their implementation stages of fuel efficiency standards. The criteria
offered by this strategy are logical and consistent for the purposes of the research
objectives.
6Mouton and Marais (1990, p. 137) define a typology as a conceptual framework in which
phenomena are classified in termsof characteristics that theyhave in commonwith other phenomena.
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3 Fuel Efficiency Standards in Emerging Economies
Fuel efficiency standards are understood as having a strong regulatory component;
the adoption and scope of implementation of such standards depend on the stage of
the value chainwhere they are intended to be applied. Fuel efficiency standards estab-
lish emission limits in the automotive industry; the indirect effect on the private or
productive sector entails the adoption or development of new and clean technologies
in order to make cars produce fewer emissions by making fuel usage more efficient.
The adoption of this technology is voluntary; each company decides where and in
which fleet investments would be feasible in order to comply with the standard.
Several co-effects result from the adoption of such standards: improved air quality
and public health caused by lessening particulate matter, nitrogen oxides and ozone
molecule concentrations in the atmosphere, mobility and renewed automotive fleet
in urban and peri-urban areas, among others (GFEI, 2010). The interplay between
voluntary and/or mandatory standards on fuel efficiency remains in many emerging
economies dependent on its implementation stage. For instance, USA and Mexico
have both fuel economy andGHGstandards, andmanufacturersmust satisfy both. By
contrast, South Korea’s light-duty vehicle manufacturers have the option to choose
which standard to meet—fuel economy or GHG standard (IEA, 2015a).
In most scenarios, emerging economies usually adopt and implement fuel
economy/efficiency standards based on a reference to the EU/US regulations that
are modified according to its own national conditions and economic structures. This
entails a complex process of norm diffusion from the global to the local level.
Such adoption is in some cases mixed—this means incorporating elements from
both (and other) regulations into a unique standard; in other cases, it is part of a
homologation process on a regional basis. China and Mexico are clear examples
of the above. As Mikler (2008, p. 1) suggests, fuel economy/efficiency implies that
“sharing sovereignty in the process of making and implementing national regulations
produces opportunities for global regulation”; fuel economy/efficiency standards
require complex public–private governancewhere incentives, regulation and commu-
nication are vital. Therefore, fuel economy/efficiency standards are key components
of a regulation process that could be analysed from the multi-level governance
approach (Payne & Phillips, 2015; Evans, 2012), with the benefit of allowing the
national implementation to be examined under the light of its own specific condi-
tions without disregarding the global processes. The local–global inter-linkages that
a regulation such as the fuel economy/efficiency one creates could be enablers/drivers
for societal change (Hughes, 2010), not only in terms of environmental benefits, but
under a wider sustainability scope.
The analysis of the China and Mexico cases aims to provide an overview of the
implementation process of fuel efficiency standards in particular economies, in order
to find their comparability elements. The idea of a differentiated local political and
economic arrangement connecting with the global efforts to impulse fuel efficiency
underlies this study.
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3.1 The Case of China
The Chinese vehicle fuel economy standard is a weight class based, per vehicle and
corporate average standard that is mandatory for every domestically made vehicle
and is more stringent than its European counterpart (EIA, 2015). Light-duty vehicle
manufacturers in China must meet a fuel-consumption standard at each weight class
level andmust meet an overall corporate average fuel-consumption standard. Vehicle
fuel economy standards in China are based on 16 weight classes, ranging from
vehicles weighing less than 750 kg (approximately 1500 lb) to vehicles weighing
more than 2500 kg, or approximately 5500 lb. Based on the New European Driving
Circle (NEDC) testing standard system, China has set a new fuel economy target for
2020, which would require the fleet average fuel economy to reach 5l/100 km. This
target could translate into about 53 mpg US equivalent, or about 116 CO2g/km EU
equivalent (Arena & Mezzana, 2014).
China initially based its vehicle emission standard on that of Europe. In 2000, the
Chinese government issued the first national emission standard for both heavy and
light-duty vehicles that was equivalent to Euro I, followed by several more stringent
standards in later years. The China National V emission standard was implemented
nationwide by harmonizing the Euro V emission standard. Meanwhile, the China
National VI emission standard was announced by the government at the end of 2016
to be implemented nationwide from 2019. Since the EU upgrades emission standards
every 4–5 years or so, China sets new targets every 4.5 years on average in order to
catch up with EU standards as early as possible, as the implementation of China’s
national emission standards usually lags behind Europe by 5–9 years (Table 1). With
the acceleration of urbanization as well as localization of the auto industry, China
has begun to design its own emission standards system. When setting the National
VI emission standard for light-duty vehicles, the Chinese government introduced the
US (California) standard, but at the same time it also developed a new National VI
emission standard for heavy-duty vehicles, with no reference to the EU or the US
model.
Table 1 Year of implementation of vehicle emission standards in China and EU
Vehicle emission standards Year of implementation (all
sales and registrations)
Time lag: China versus EU
China EU
China National I (Euro I) 2000 1992 8
China National II (Euro II) 2004 1996 8
China National III (Euro III) 2007 2000 7
China National IV (Euro IV) 2010 2005 5
China National V (Euro V) 2018 2009 9
Source Authors
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There were basically two factors that drove China to adopt the EU’s emissions
standards in the beginning. The first was its social circumstances; China’s vast rural
areas and population imply widespread need for the use of diesel trucks, rural and
non-road vehicles, just as diesel vehicles are prevalent in the European market. The
other was the late development of the auto industry, which meant that most of the
domestically made vehicles depended on technologies from Europe.
Nowadays, China’s urban population has exceeded its rural population and gaso-
line vehicles, especially passenger cars, have gained a dominating proportion in
the cities and even in some rural areas. Meanwhile, although European car compa-
nies still retain a certain market share in China, American and Japanese automakers
have been enlarging their business, which has diversified China’s autoindustry. The
changing landscape of China’s urbanization and auto industry has led the Chinese
government to create its own standards by taking the US (California) standards as
reference. China’s geographic area covers similar latitudes as those of the USA.
What is more, diesel vehicles that enjoy less stringent regulations (when compared
to gasoline vehicles) still dominate the European market, while 99% of China’s vehi-
cles today are gasoline vehicles, falling into a situation similar to the USA. Adopting
fair regulations on gasoline and diesel vehicles, the US standards are a better fit for
China’s current situation.
In China, it is notable that all the vehicle efficiency standards are set by the
central government,with severalMinistries and state-ownedoil companies involved.7
These governmental institutions or enterprises with vested interests sometimes have
conflicting views with regard to how to formulate vehicle efficiency standards. One
typical example is that the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), which
used to lack the authority to set standards, as the lead agency for developing and
enforcing vehicle emission standards, can now exert a strong influence on specifying
fuel quality parameters. In contrast, the auto industry seems to have a relatively weak
voice in the process, while the participation of NGOs is negligible.
Since retail prices of gasoline and diesel have always been set by the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on behalf of the central govern-
ment in China, it is difficult for the oil industry to recoup capital investments on
refinery upgrades without a market pricing mechanism. In addition, small refineries
with outdated technologies are not cost effective to upgrade. Concerns about unem-
ployment and other economic impacts from facility closures in some regions where
these small refineries are located could causemore delay in tightening fuel standards.
This is why China’s fuel efficiency standards have consistently lagged behind the
fuel requirements corresponding to the emission standards.8 Since the best vehicle
7Some of these institutions are the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Science and Technology
(MST), Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), State Administration for Market Regulation
(SAMR), China National PetroleumCorporation (CNPC) as well as China Petroleum and Chemical
Corporation (SINOPEC).
8China’s State Council issued the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan in September
2013, vowing to greatly improve air quality by 2017 in most Chinese cities, especially the
metropolises. To implement this plan, the central government urged state-owned oil giants to quicken
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emission performance can only be achieved if fuel and emission standards are imple-
mented in parallel and a compliance program is established to enforce both fuel and
vehicle standards, the staggered implementation of fuel standards has become amajor
roadblock in bringing down vehicle emissions.
Beijing, being the capital city, was one of the few exceptional places in China that
could employ the highest fuel and emission standards simultaneously. For the sake of
improving air quality, Beijing has pioneered the setting and implementation of these
national standards. Most of the standards, from National I to V, were first piloted in
Beijing and then fully applied across the nation after a gap of two or three years. For
instance, in 2013, Beijing put the National V emission standard into practice, five
years ahead of its proposed implementation nationwide.
3.2 The Case of Mexico
Mexico’s fuel economy standard was first set in 2013, after several rounds of negotia-
tions. NOM-163-SEMARNAT-ENER-SCFI-2013 (NOM 163) regulates year-model
automobiles starting from 2012 productions. The norm that is referred to is the US
Code of Federal Regulations vol. 40 parts 85, 86 and 600 and the Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Stan-
dards Final Rule (EPA, 2010). NOM 163 complements the existing regulations on
fuel limits and average methods,9 which, nevertheless, had never included compo-
nents such as emission goals (g-CO2/km) and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards. When published, this standard became a model in the region, being the
first Latin American standard of its type (with other countries such as Peru, Chile
and Argentina developing similar schemes), reflecting a complex relation within the
North American region.10
Themajor drivers for the implementationof such a standard are linked to air quality
(health effects) and climate change. Since the mid-1980s, air pollution became a
major problem in urban areas in Mexico, mainly in the Metropolitan area of Mexico
City. According to Molina (2005), some policies were implemented aiming to estab-
lish major pollutants’ permissible limits, gaining some results for certain pollutants
their pace on fuel quality upgrading, in order to keep up with the more stringent vehicle emission
standards.ChinesePremierLiKeqianghas reiterated the significanceof domestic gasoline anddiesel
standards improvement in coping with environmental pollution. He encouraged further investment
and technological innovation by major oil companies, which could lead to an early accomplishment
of the set goals.
9Mexico uses the US-combined test cycle officially, although several companies—mainly the
European ones—may incorporate the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) into their plants’
processes.
10In fact, the Mexican standard on fuel efficiency was created with an effort to look for a homolo-
gation with the USA standard proposed by then President Barack Obama in 2009, followed by
Canada in 2010. The Mexican norm tries to homologate the 2016 USA goals of 35.5 miles per US
Gallon (mpg). However, depending on the priorities of the newly elected Mexican Government, the
Mexican standard’s revision could point to another direction.
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(mainly lead, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide), but retaining high levels of partic-
ulate material (PM10 and PM2.5), carbon monoxide and ozone. In 2003, norms on
vehicles were first issued, trying to reduce smog and limit pollutant emissions,
followed by health-related standards on limits to all pollutants. Also, implemen-
tation of specific public policies for reducing emissions coming frommobile sources
(such as Vehicle Verification Programs or the circulation restriction program (Hoy
no circula) fostered an awareness of the high impact of transport on air quality.
Mexico has used theUSEPAreference and testmethod as a “global best” reference
for its own national standard setting. The Mexican fuel efficiency norm is aligned in
design and depth with the US and Canadian standards (ICCT, 2012), trying to equal
efficiency levels by 2016. In 2012, then US President Barack Obama announced a
new 54.5 mpg (20.9 K/l) goal for USA fuel efficiency by 2025 (The White House,
2012)—considerably higher than the Mexican 2016 goal (whose revision process
started in 2018). However, in 2018, the Trump administration announced a new
policy shift, abandoning the standards and freezing them to the 2020 values, arguing
they were too high and expensive (Walsh, 2018). US EPA announced a new rule
named “Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient” (SAFE) for the years 2021–2025, which
was criticized by a group of scientists (Bento, et al., 2018). In order to match this
goal, the subsequent Mexican regulation has to be more solid and set higher thresh-
olds. This, however, could be contested by the private sector—as was the case in
2012. This is notwithstanding the recent environmental concerns regarding urban air
pollution, alteration and corruption in the vehicle verification testing methods and
technologies used by international automotive companies, which undermined fuel
efficiency governance, and the regulatory challenges in getting the standard updated
on the basis of robust modelling instruments.
The transport sector is therefore a complex issue in terms of standards-related
processes in the country, either for climate change reduction schemes or fuel effi-
ciency. During the standards negotiation process, some of the concerns of the auto-
motive sector were the cost effectiveness and terms of its mandate. Mostly dependent
on foreign technology, imports would modify the commercial chain of technology
associated with autoparts and engines in terms of compliance, posing serious chal-
lenges to the industry actors. Another barrier to the implementation of the standard
was the absence of an overall standards policy that provides direction to all the
standards related to a certain area. Although there is, for instance, a clear relation
between the fuel economy standards and both health and climate change policies,
the standard was negotiated separately with the automotive industry with a focus on
industry implications rather than on health impacts. In-depth analysis is also likely to
show that there are significant gaps in the standard setting process (standard cycle),
which does not link development planning and normative analysis in a clear fashion.
The Mexican experience shows that a wide vision of integral and multi-dimensional
policies is needed in order to create a clearly-articulated policy that has governance
mandates for all sectors involved.11
11The necessity of updating the NOM 163 inMexico has been supported, however, by parallel envi-
ronmental policies. In preparing a new national communication for the United Nations Framework
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3.3 China and Mexico: A Comparative Analysis
Both country cases demonstrate that there are several attributes and features related
to their fuel efficiency standards implementation processes that are similar. First,
the transportation sector in both countries is currently regarded as one of the main
contributors to overall GHG emissions, mainly because commercial vehicles have
become one of the most important sources of air pollution. In Beijing, Shanghai
and other Chinese metropolitan areas, passenger vehicles are major contributors to
the overall GHG emissions due to traffic congestion. Similarly, in Mexico the trans-
port sector contributed in 2015 with 25.1% of total GHG emissions in the country,
mainly dominated by freight and passenger vehicles (23.4% of total GHG emis-
sions) (INECC, 2018). According to Mexico’s Climate Change Special Program,
94% of the current transport GHG-related emissions come from road transportation.
Besides, Mexico is the second largest market for new vehicles in Latin America, with
a medium annual growth rate of 7.09% from 2013 to 2017 (1.3 million units per year
projected average) (PROMEXICO, 2014, p. 16). A future increase in automobile
consumption in both countries could exacerbate the global warming effect.12
Second, China and Mexico rank among the 15 largest automobile producers (first
and thirteenth place respectively in 2018) and are leading automobile exporters
in the world (JATO, 2019). According to the International Organization of Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), Chinese and Mexican car industries represented
30.7% of the global total of cars and commercial vehicle production in 2017 (OICA,
2018). At the same time, light-duty vehicles sales and exports in both countries have
been increasing significantly (PROMEXICO, 2014).13 Through exports, China and
Mexico could bring about some indirect impacts for importing countries in terms of
their national GHG emissions.
Third, both China and Mexico have to fulfil their individual commitments on
combating climate change as a part of the global efforts and seek alignment in
climate actions based on their own national interests. By the end of June 2015, both
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),Mexico is preparing technological routes in which fuel
efficiency standards for light vehicles will play a very relevant mitigation role. Discussions on a
new standard for heavy duty-vehicles, and discussions on the energy transition requirements seem
to pose new challenges for future debates.
12MexicoCity entered into an environmental air quality crisis in early 2016because theMetropolitan
Index of Air Quality (IMECA) was surpassed for more than 150 points after 14 years of stability.
Allegedly, one of the main causes of this was a court decision in June 2015 that allowed particular
vehicle owners to get a protection against the assignation requirements for the vehicle verifica-
tion programme based on year-model rather than emissions, which changed the criteria allowing
for circulating cars. This, along with altered verification schemes, increased the number of cars
circulating in the city to more than one million per day.
13The new international context for the car industry has affected the traditional car manufacturing
geography. While the US, Canada, Japan and France have showed a decline in their production
rates, emerging producers such as China, India, Brazil and Korea have showed considerable growth.
Although in the last year (April 2018–2019) Mexico showed an important decrease on its car sales
(−10.4%), it has shown growth and stability in the period 2012–2016. Investment announcements
and growing road infrastructure are complementary elements for these dynamics.
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China and Mexico had presented their new climate mitigation and adaptation targets
after 2020, under their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)14 to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where the transport
sector is a key player.
The standard setting and implementation processes in both China and Mexico
have been quite different. Norm diffusion rests on a diversity of factors within each
country: socio-economic structure, regulatory framework, private sector engage-
ment, industry and investments and even sub-regional standards application. The key
dissimilarity is the adoption of different reference standards: while China has been
working under the EU’s regulatory framework,Mexico has set a partial homologation
with the US EPA regulation. Consequently, the adoption of different targets, indica-
tors, testing methods, fleet targets, penalties, incentives, etc., opens the possibility of
analysing how the implementation process of fuel efficiency/economy standards in
both economies has aligned with global commitment while at the same time being
aligned with their own national development conditions.
4 Conclusion
Fuel efficiency is at the core of a local–global solution for GHG emissions reduc-
tion by addressing the negative impacts of vehicle fuel-consumption patterns, and
generating significant local impacts that could be translated into global benefits. It is
notable that a series of efficiency programs such as Europe’s Euro VI and US’s EPA
2010 have been undertaken on a global scale, thus becoming the de facto “global”
standards, but it is relevant to analyse how this standardization process has been
translated and adapted in emerging economies where fuel use, GHG emissions and
economic growth will tend to increase.
When applying the European or American models to some emerging economies
like China and Mexico, we found a difference in situations. Although EU/US stan-
dards are relevant for ensuring comprehensive frameworks for action, standards do
not always consider national contexts of the emerging countries, neglecting their
specific economic and sectoral conditions. At the same time, although standards
are a recognized policy tool and a cost-effective strategy for private investment in
many emerging economies (both at the national and local levels), there is a lack of
proper standard setting or application processes related to the respective economic
and political structure. The result is a domestically challenging multi-stakeholder
process that leads to ineffective operations and local–global dialogue, resulting in
insufficient mitigation mechanisms that could harm both economic development and
environmental balance in emerging markets.
Fuel efficiency standards could be considered as both performance and sustain-
ability standards, for they aim at reducing environmentally and socially harmful
14Mexico has started the national revision of its NDC mitigation and adaptation goals, under the
mandate of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, for its completion in 2020.
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impacts of vehicles. Almost all of these standards are set up by national govern-
ment agencies to provide legally binding requirements for general market access,
thus becoming public mandatory sustainability standards. In terms of the geographic
and systemic reach as well as ambition, vehicle fuel efficiency and GHG emissions
standards adopted by a single country could also generate sustainability benefits
transnationally. Such standards are focused on both product performance and the
production process, and will in most cases apply strict criteria for the sake of climate
and environment in both the national and international contexts.At the domestic level,
frequent interactions between public and private sectors finally shape these standards
that become legally mandated. Meanwhile, dialogues between national and interna-
tional standards or regulations are conducted from time to time. As the International
Energy Agency (IEA) suggests (2011, 2015b), fuel efficiency standards are at the
core of sound transport and mobility policies that care for environmental and social
effects, and promote a technology transition from fossil fuels to clean technolo-
gies. Measures such as labelling, eco-driving policies, electric mobility, transport
batteries and efficiency together could play a transformational role in re-shaping
energy systems nationally and globally.
The application of efficiency standards in emerging economies should guide
public policies, investments and other partnerships in a holistic and in-context
manner, responding to sustainable development, green economy, climate change
and industrial sector priorities. Fuel efficiency standards represent an illustrative
example of how this could be translated into practice, with governance playing a key
role. “Global” (EU/US) standards should not be considered as a “one-size-fits-all”
solution, but rather as a sustainable guideline to reduce emissions worldwide.
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Chapter 12
Standard-Setting in Water Use
and Sustainable Development:
A Comparative Critical Analysis of Grey
Water Recycling in the Tourism Sector
André Coelho, Alexandre Domingues, Maria Cândida A. de M. Mousinho,
and Cassia Saretta
1 Introduction
Tourism is a key sector for studies related to sustainability and the use of natural
resources towards truly inclusive development. The sector is responsible for nearly
10% of the world’s GDP and for the generation of 280 million jobs. In 2015, approx-
imately 1 billion tourists performed domestic or international trips, circulating tril-
lions of dollars in the world economy (World Travel & Tourism Council, 2016).
The number of international tourist arrivals worldwide is expected to increase by an
average of 3.3% a year over the period 2010 to 2030 (UNWTO, 2016). Cited by the
United Nations (UN) as the strongest sector for job creation (United Nations General
Asembly, 2014), it is, however, also responsible for an aggressive use of resources
such as water, food, wood and fossil fuels. Despite the fact that it is an industry
related to leisure and cultural awareness, the sector has a deep impact on the use of
natural resources and natural services.
In contemporary society, water is, in its most simple form of understanding,
synonymous with life. It is no wonder that the astronomical sciences search for
this natural resource in other spheres of the universe as evidence of the possibility of
life. More concretely, the fact is that human beings have always needed this natural
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resource as a source of livelihood and it is an unassailable reality that they will
continue to do so. The scientific and technological advances in the areas of food,
health, transport, for example, would not have been possible without the systematic
use of water, which shows that this source is not only a fundamental need for human
existence, but crucial for the realization of all other needs.
The implementation of up-to-date sustainability standards or practices aligned
with a multi-stakeholder regulatory framework for water use may complement the
international collaboration on new solutions at local, national and regional levels. In
order to establish a pilot study, this chapter aims to understand to what extent stan-
dards and regulations apply to the sustainable use of water in the hotel industry. The
study highlights the multi-stakeholder nature of sustainability standards, using the
tourism sector in an exploratory and comparative analysis of the tourist areas of two
major cities. Rio de Janeiro, in Brazil, was used as an example of an internationally
appealing Latin American city without any formal standards for water use. Berlin,
in Germany, was used as a seemingly contrasting example for the implementation of
sustainability standards.
2 Tourism and Sustainable Development
Several authors have studied the tourism industry from the perspective of sustain-
ability, focusing on aspects relating to its carbon footprint (Sun, 2014), energy,
culture, water and environmental impacts as a whole (Aall, 2011; Collins, Jones, &
Munday, 2009; Law & Cheung, 2007; Li, Wichmann, & Otterpohl, 2009; Radwan,
Jones, & Minoli, 2012). They have all gained prominent attention in recent years as
the notion of the environmental externality of tourism growth has found focus.
The conceptual framework of sustainability seems to be in accordance with the
growth of the leisure industry, as the main tourism products (segments) in the world
are directly linked to natural resources (Beach & Sun, Ecotourism and Cultural
Tourism). Sustainability is a concept that focuses on the fate of the next generations;
it is based on the challenge of maintaining the lifestyle of the present in the future
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). The effects of the increase of tourists circulating in the
world are thus not to be measured in terms of their current status but are to be viewed
in the context of their long-lasting impact.
The activities of tourists at destinations are additional to those of local residents
and regular transit visitors, and their presence adds to the overall environmental
impact at the location. Several studies prove that the use of natural resources by
someone who is not a local resident is at least two times higher than the optimal use
by a local user (Aall, 2011; Gössling et al., 2012; International Network on Regional
Economics, Mobility and Tourism & World Tourism Organization, 2012; Law &
Cheung, 2007;Martinez-Alier, 2015). According to Li, Yang, Liu, and Zheng (2014),
tourist flow has a seasonal diversity, with strong effects in the peak season (usually
the summer half of the year in most destinations) and weak effects in the off-season
(usually thewinter half of the year inmost destinations) (Gatt&Schranz, 2015).Local
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destinations with high tourist flow are certain to experience environmental effects,
comparable to cities. Similar to urban island effects in cities, tourist destinations
are expected to have destination island effects, in which one or more environmental
indexes are significantly higher than those of the surrounding non-tourism areas.
The hospitality business—especially hotels—has been studied as a driver of
sustainability standards in tourism as the main employer (workforce) in the sector
and as one of the biggest sectors in terms of financial movements for investments
(Gatt & Schranz, 2015; Li, Yang, Liu, & Zheng, 2014; Rahman, Dayang-Affizzah,
& Edman, 2012). Hotels are involved in several aspects of sustainability, from white
papers and corporate commitments to cleaner operation that is recognized by the
client, who, sometimes, endorses that by expressing loyalty to the brand. From the
used towels that should be hung and reused to solar panels that capture energy to
warm up pools and spa areas; fromwater reuse procedures to roof panels that capture
rainwater for gardening use, big chains and small hospitality businesses have been
studied in several contexts, but the literature does not show a major concern for
expanding the sustainbility impacts of local tourism as a worldwide concern.
Focusing on tourism accommodation as the locus of tourism, water consumption
and conventional water indicators are reviewed and discussed, and knowledge gaps
identified. From the tourism sector to regular home use, industrial consumption or
agricultural irrigation, the use of water is key to pursuing a quality of life. Its use has
proved contentious both in economic terms and in socio-cultural and environmental
terms. The relationship between humankind and nature sometimes lacks comple-
mentarity—as when usage that is necessary for self-sufficiency turns into usage in a
hegemonic, exploitative mode.
3 The Use of Water and Sustainability
Not only is water the most important natural resource in all economic cycles, it
is central to the very survival of human beings on the planet. How to properly
use this source is a crucial challenge in contemporary society—especially consid-
ering a scenario in which the demand for water is expected to increase by 55%
by 2050. In addition to this, we must consider the lack of accessibility to this
source—approximately 800 million people do not have access to quality drinking
water in theworld. Environmental issues are significant aswell—projections indicate
change in temporal and spatial distribution of water resources, potentially leading to
hydrological disasters (WWAP, 2015).
Water management standards may become the norm in the future (Styles, Schoen-
berger, & Galvez-Martos, 2015). A general review of the use of water is an urgent
issue when it comes to human needs and consumption. Even considering that most
of the water available in the world is used in agricultural and industrial operations,
regular personal use also needs to be addressed (Charara, Cashman, Bonnell, &
Gehr, 2011; Gössling, 2015; Li, Wichmann, & Otterpohl, 2009; Millimet & Roy,
2015; Styles et al., 2015).
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Several normative standards apply to a variety ofwatermanagement and recycling
techniques. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has more than
200 norms on water recycling systems, from portability criteria to equipment instal-
lation processes. Most countries also have local norms that apply and that follow the
same path. Table 1 shows examples of ISO standards regarding water reuse.
Thus, the management of water resources does not depend exclusively on public
entities, but also on a range of private actors (Jiménez-Cisneros, 2014). The entry
of the business sector, taking advantage of an emerging green market (Montibeller-
Filho, 2004), was characteristic of environmentalism in the 1990s and a positive
factor for sustainable development. It should be noted that, already in the mid-1990s,
the concept of sustainable development had been translated into a model to guide
business practice that would be economically viable and at the same time socially
and environmentally sustainable (Vizeu, Meneghetti, & Seifert, 2012). Similarly, the
ever-growing number of voluntary sustainability standards (VSS)—many of them
Table 1 Examples of ISO standards regarding water reuse
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Standardisation of a framework
for the definition and
measurement of service
activities relating to drinking
water supply systems and
wastewater systems
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Table 1 (continued)
Source (Techn. Committee) Normative standard examples Further details





wastewater use for irrigation
projects
Scope: Standardisation of water
reuse of any kind and for any
purpose. It covers centralized
and decentralised or onsite water
reuses, direct and indirect ones
as well as intentional and
unintentional ones. It includes
technical, economic,
environmental and societal
aspects of water reuse. Water
reuse comprises a sequence of
the stages and operations
involved in uptake, conveyance,
processing, storage, distribution,
consumption, drainage and other
handling of wastewater,
including the water reuse in
repeated, cascaded and recycled
ways. The scope of ISO/TC 253
(treated wastewater reuse for
irrigation) is merged into the
proposed new committee.
Source Authors: compiled from https://www.iso .org
developed by coalitions of non-state actors—have provided market-based mecha-
nisms for sustainability in production and consumption, e.g. for sustainable resource
use.
Among the several procedures andpractices for the sustainable use ofwater (which
may or may not be required by a specific sustainability standard), the use of grey
water is a reference to saving fresh, clean or treated water from regular human use. In
the context of this chapter, we will focus on water use by tourists and corresponding
opportunities for grey water recycling.
Grey Water as a Driver for the Safer Use of Natural Resources
Grey water is a type of wastewater generated in hotels, households or office buildings
from sinks, showers, baths, washing machines or dishwashers. It is considered as
containing fewer pathogens than domesticwastewater and is generally safer to handle
and easier to treat and reuse onsite for toilet flushing, landscape or crop irrigation and
other non-potable uses. The application of greywater reuse inmajor buildings such as
hotels provides substantial benefits for both the water supply subsystem by reducing
the demand for fresh clean water as well as the wastewater subsystems by reducing
the amount of wastewater required to be conveyed and treated. It is economically
viable in most aspects for major operations and simple to implement (Al-Jayyousi,
2003;Gatt&Schranz, 2015; Styles et al., 2015). Greywater, by definition, is different
from discharge of toilets and contaminated wastewater, which is designated as black
206 A. Coelho et al.
water to indicate that it contains human waste. The implementation of the system
is technically feasible; it is basically a matter of civil engineering arrangements to
reallocate pipes that will be connected to an alternative discharge system.
4 Methodology
This chapter evaluates two hotel samples in two major tourist cities in the world and
checks the use of grey water recycling systems. This is not a statistical study, but an
exploratory analysis with both primary and secondary data. Therefore, the process of
separation of the sample follows two basic criteria: (1) geographical criteria, which
means that the hotel should be in a predominantly tourist area; (2) a qualification
criterion, which means that within the selected areas, only the best-evaluated hotels1
(three to five stars) were selected to respond. After the methodological criteria appli-
cation, not more than thirty hotels were selected in each city and contacted over
telephone in the second half of 2015 to respond to three questions: (1) existence of
grey water system; (2) total number of rooms; and (3) number of rooms connected
to the system.
The chosen cities were Rio de Janeiro in Brazil and Berlin in Germany. For the
Brazilian sample, 27 hotels responded to the research, all located in the Copacabana
tourist region. In the German sample, 18 hotels responded to the research, mostly
located in Berlin Mitte. All hotels contacted were members of major alliances or had
a capacity for meeting international sustainability standards.
The data references were based on the literature for grey water use, which esti-
mates that freshwater consumption for high-end hotels with more than 100 rooms
is, for example, 126 litres per day (l/day), considering exclusive individual use
(shower/bath/sink) plus the use of 12 l/day for cleaning (Styles et al., 2015). This
adds up to 138 l/day, without the consideration of toilet use (aim of this article).
Other studies based on Nolde (2000) complement the findings of Gössling (2015)
and suggest 95 and 81 l/day as references for individual use (shower/bath/sink).
Experiments conducted in a summer hotel on the Spanish island of Mallorca suggest
110 l/day (March, Gual, & Orozco, 2004), a number that was considered for our
calculations of annual water use in hotels of the Copacabana region (Sample 1). For
hotels in Berlin (Sample 2), a different value (81 l/day) was used to reflect different
toilet water discharge equipment, cultural factors and weather conditions influencing
water use.
The parameters for toilet discharge of water (not suited for recycling) were also
derived fromMarch et al. (2004) for Sample 1 (Copacabana) and amounted to 36 l/day
for individual use; Styles et al. (2015) (38 l/day),Nolde (2000) (57 l/day) andGössling
(2015) (21 l/day) do not differ much from this number. For the above-mentioned
1Evaluations based on Trip Advisor’s standards. The hotels were investigated in specific tourist
areas.
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reasons (technical, cultural andweather-related factors), the lowest number (21 l/day)
from this row was again used to calculate annual values for Sample 2 (Berlin).
Given their exploratory and approximate character, the quantitative results in
Table 3 (Sect. 5) are not meant to statistically evaluate and rank the two tourist
regions under review, but rather to present a broad spectrum of different water use
patterns and saving potentials based on two simplified examples.
In addition, eight hotel maintenance managers were willing to complement our
quantitative estimates with more detailed interviews. They were interviewed in order
to check for two conditions: (1)whether the implementationwas driven by an external
requirement or by a strategic decision of the hotel managers and (2) whether there
were sustainability standards or procedures on grey water to be followed.
5 Results and Analysis
In the hotel business, several procedures are currently applied to mitigate the envi-
ronmental impacts of major hospitality operations in tourist destinations, but, in
most cases, they are driven by internal regulations, market strategies or certifica-
tion. According to the literature referenced in this chapter, the reuse of grey water is
currently one of the easiest procedures used by hotels to reduce the use of freshwater,
but its use is restricted to some hotels only and the reasons for this limited application
are still not clear.
For the qualitative questions, seven out of eight managers interviewed highlighted
that there was no specific sustainability standard mandating them to use grey water
systems. In fact, each company implemented the equipment based on its own evalua-
tion. One manager mentioned public incentives for hotels following specific sustain-
able criteria related to electric energy and water use. Table 2 shows the requirements
and standards implemented by hotels.
The qualitative results indicate that hotels using recycling systems were driven
by interests related to their own evaluations and expectations—from economic
Table 2 Qualitative interviews with hotel maintenance managers
Sample Motivation for the implementation of
grey water system
Sustainability standards in place
Copacabana group All managers said that it was an
internal strategic decision without any
external direction
No sustainability standards, but
technical standards for water
potability and system installation
Berlin Mitte group Three managers mentioned that it was
an internal decision and one
mentioned a possible public fund for
sustainability practices, including
other activities related to energy
No sustainability standards, but
technical standards for water
potability and system installation
Source Authors
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savings to recognition through clients and contributions to international brands’white
papers. This suggests that standards towards sustainable tourism and the common
good, unlike standards for technical operations, are not yet common, at least in the
sample sector and regions, even though such initiatives in principle exist (e.g. Rain-
forest Alliance Verification Standard for Tourism Services, Travelife Award, Global
Sustainable TourismCriteria/GSTC and a range of regional/national schemes). Addi-
tionally, the companies did not follow any regulatory procedure that could work as
an incentive to the implementation of a recycling water system.
The quantitative results are displayed in Table 3. Out of 27 hotels analyzed in
Rio de Janeiro, only four had a grey water management system in operation, while
out of 18 hotels consulted in Berlin, seven of them had one. Since water use and
saving rate per unit were assumed to be higher for the Brazilian sample than for the
German one, the total amount of savings was also higher (Table 3) although less
hotels had a recycling system in place. In turn, as the proportion of hotels using a
recycling system was much lower in the overall Brazilian sample compared to the
German one, the amount saved in Rio de Janeiro was proportionally lower than in
Berlin. However, even considering that the results for Berlin were better than for the
Table 3 Major quantitative results for water savings
Total use/savings
of the sample (l)
Total use/savings of
the samples (M3)
Olympic poolsg % of total use
Total use
(Copacabana)a
413,043,968.88 413,043.97 165.2 –
Total use
(Berlin)b
248,847,710.02 248,847.71 99.5 –
Total savings
(Copacabana)c
28,249,239.24 28,249.24 11.3 6.84
Total savings
(Berlin)d








57,426,394.62 57,426.39 23.0 23.08
Source Authors
aEstimated total (fresh) water use per year of the Brazilian sample (27 hotels, all rooms)
bEstimated total (fresh) water use per year of the German sample (18 hotels, all rooms)
cEstimated water savings in one year of operation of grey water recycling for the Brazilian sample
(4 hotels out of 27, only those rooms connected to the system were considered)
dEstimated water savings in one year of operation of grey water recycling for the German sample
(7 hotels out of 18, only those rooms connected to the system were considered)
e, fTotal possible savings if 100% of the sample had the system
gAverage Olympic pool with 2.5 million litres
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Brazilian sample, the majority of hotels consulted did not have the system in either
country.
Among our findings, there is a clear conclusion that the use of recycling systems
for water is relevant in terms of the volume saved in the tourism industry. Just
considering water savings in the studied sample, the results show that 6.86% and
8.07%, respectively, of the total water used in one year across the two samples were
saved. Translating these results into commonly understood terms, in the Brazilian
sample there was a total saving equivalent to 11 Olympic water pools in one year of
operation among the rooms with the system installed. In Germany, 8 Olympic water
pools could be saved within the sample analyzed. A greater result could be expected
if the whole industry in one city would be using this recycling system.
Exploring our data and case studies from literature, on average, hotels using
recycling systems may save between 20 and 25% of all the water used in their rooms.
Since neither standards nor regulations play a major role across these samples as a
driver for sustainability yet, they needed to be rebalanced, especially towards more
regulatory procedures. At present, hotels are simply taking their own initiatives.
Towards a Regulatory Framework
The primary research has highlighted a trend. Across the globe, there are signifi-
cant differences in water consumption with respect to resource endowment, pollu-
tion, technical composition, natural cycle, recycling, etc. In addition to estimating
and comparing the use of freshwater for human consumption and commercial use
we came across a simple conclusion: there is a need to eliminate endogeneity and
transform the process of saving this natural resource into a regulatory framework,
where private and public sectors could benefit from reduced consumption and from
recycling.
The process of “greening” the tourism industry is not an easy task. However, for
the cases studied, environmental regulation can exert a significant effect on commer-
cial productivity. It is a matter of implementing voluntary standards and mandatory
regulations before relevant economic variables reach the critical point affected by
the scarcity of water. Here, we have made an empirical estimation of the threshold
characteristics of environmental regulation for tourism, and simple suggestions can
already be put in place.
In the voluntary field, the adoption of sustainable practices is already happening
in the hotel industry, but, as we could map, even for high-end brands the adoption
of technical procedures to save water is not related to political encouragement or
pressure but to an economic motivation. This is not a bad thing, but it could be much
better executed if there would be an official yet voluntary framework to guide market
actions. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) could be a relevant starting
point to link voluntary practices of the tourism industry, such as grey water recycling,
to broader questions of sustainability and the management of natural resources in the
global arena. Voluntary standards for sustainable tourism, as mentioned in Sect. 5,
can constitute an important instrument to substantiate and implement the SDGs in
this sector.
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Within the SDGs framework, there are several topics that relate to the discussion
raised in this chapter and the proper adoption of these concepts could lead to better-
organized activities for saving freshwater. Table 4 highlights the potential of selected
SDGs to guide transformation in three categories related to this chapter: sustainability
cooperation, water use and tourism.
In addition to voluntary standards adoption based on SDGs, mandatory regulation
may be required. Considering that regulatory actions for protecting the environment
vary significantly from industry to industry (including tourism),while different indus-
tries may respond differently to the same regulation, it is important to introduce more
effective regulatory incentives towards the sustainable use of water. Indeed, environ-
mental regulation has a significant positive correlation with increased environmental
productivity
Table 4 Themes of this chapter as reflected in selected SDGs





to developing countries, to
improve domestic capacity for
tax and other revenue
collection
17.14





and civil society partnerships,




By 2030, substantially increase
water use efficiency across all
sectors and ensure sustainable
withdrawals and supply of
freshwater to address water
scarcity and substantially
reduce the number of people
suffering from water scarcity
6.5
By 2030, implement integrated
water resources management




By 2030, expand international
cooperation and
capacity-building support to





treatment, recycling and reuse
technologies
6.b






By 2030, devise and
implement policies to promote
sustainable tourism that
creates jobs and promotes










By 2030, ensure that people
everywhere have the relevant
information and awareness for
sustainable development and
lifestyles in harmony with
nature
12.b




creates jobs and promotes
local culture and products
Source Authors’ compilation based on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
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A regulatory framework towards the better use of water in tourism and other
commercial activities could be the result of an evolution. Continuous changes must
be achieved because as the recycling water concept matures, policymakers have
to face new challenges. The introduction of mandatory regulation for water use in
tourism should be based on at least three considerations:
1. Technological and cost evolution: rigid and at the same timeflexible schemesmay
be required ranging from tax benefits to special financing lines for infrastructure;
2. Socio-economic justice: as water is a natural resource that belongs to everyone,
even considering that tourists pay their share for its use, it is still a use that causes
social, economic and environmental impacts and this must be registered;
3. New concepts for renewable water sharing: as shares of renewable water use
increase, policymakers, managers and the public in general need to address new
challenges and priorities, such as sharing the recycled water in neighbourhoods
for multipurpose use.
Policymakers play a key role in shaping policy regulatory actions and public support
schemes such as financing lines. According toGonzález and Lacal-Arántegui (2016),
the proper design of a scheme and of the administrative procedures for accessing it
is essential in order to reduce uncertainty. This would not only avoid discouraging
investors, but also reduce the overall cost of the support scheme. Higher risk needs to
be compensated with higher remuneration levels in order to keep the support scheme
attractive for investors. The best sustainability practice is one with clear economic
and social benefits and substantial environmental protection, and this seems to be
the case for grey water recycling.
6 Policy Recommendations
Regarding the use of water by tourists, it is clear that tourists use more water than
regular citizens in similar activities. Recycling systems are the future of water use in
major hotels, but the existence of standards does not have any strong relationship to
present activities towards sustainability in this matter. In this context, reflection on
the sustainable use of water becomes essential. The choice is not between socio-
economic development and the environment, but between development models,
sensitive or not to the environment. Sustainable development should be underpinned
by the ethical idea of avoiding harm to what is necessary to preserve, regardless of
the existence of formal restrictions. In the end, it is the behaviour of any social actor
that defines outcomes (Sachs, 2015).
To a relevant extent, sustainable development requires good governance: public
and corporate. As such, combining public and private initiatives regarding stan-
dards and regulations might be a way of moving forward more effectively, given the
issue’s global scale and the need for transparency as well as participation. Sustain-
able behaviour begins with voluntary actions as an ethical idea although it is likely
that positive and negative incentives are needed.
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Free market believers would argue that, in the absence of rules clearly declaring
that certain behaviour is not allowed, corporate enterprises would not have a moral
obligation to their shareholders to pursue any objective other thanmaximizing profits,
even given that somemeasures are possible only due to circumstantial legal loopholes
(Sachs, 2015). In this light, it is relevant to create social understanding on how
society could together reshape thinking that might help tackle ongoing problems
and, consequently, develop a more successful path towards sustainability.
Significantly, regulation is a concept that must be addressed in addition to the
relevant (voluntary) standardization of sustainable action. The idea that regulation
should go hand in hand with standards is much more promising than merely negative
incentives, i.e. much more can be done than just restricting behaviour and preventing
undesirable activities. It is feasible to develop policies that would enable, or at least
facilitate, the flourishing of values through a positive approach. In sum, not only
is it important to develop measures to restrict unsustainable behaviour—penalties,
sanctions etc.—but it is also necessary to create opportunities for the development
of public goods such as funds, technical assistance and capacity building (Baldwing,
Cave, & Lodge, 2012). By taking full advantage of positive and negative regulatory
approaches, it is possible to handle policy issues with a variety of tools and standards,
and consequently achieve better outcomes.
As a contribution to future debates, it is important to highlight some key aspects.
First, this chapter aimed to make a pilot study of a sensitive issue that has a massive
impact on people’s lives: water use. It would be relevant if further research could
explore this idea and evaluate what is happening in the other strategic tourist cities of
the world. Those studies would allow the creation of more objective evidence-based
policies. Moreover, it is clear that the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)
should improve its framework in relation to water use standards. The lack of trans-
parency and guidance, on the one hand, makes it difficult for the industry to develop
proper voluntary sustainability investment decisions, and, on the other hand, for the
consumers to choose wisely between different products. Both sides are acting in
the absence of proper information and are not necessarily making the best possible
choices. Last and more importantly, it is relevant to take advantage of the SDGs to
develop a smart international policy framework on the issue. Taking the SDGs as a
reference point seems to be the most effective way of designing balanced (voluntary
and mandatory; positive and negative; local and international) governance models
to enable not only improvements in touristic practices all over the world but also to
tackle instances of improper green washing behaviour.
Finally, as an incentive for further research on the topic, three policy recommen-
dations may be collected from our exploratory research:
1. To expand the case studies on water use, either technical, behavioural, economic
or political, in order to achieve substantial knowledge that could underpin
evidence-based regulatory policies.
2. To advocate leadership of the UNWTO and other UN agencies in providing guid-
ance towards use of standards and regulations on water use.
12 Standard-Setting in Water Use and Sustainable Development … 213
3. To use the SDGs framework as a reference for the development of specific volun-
tary standards andmandatory regulations that could guide stakeholders to achieve
the best levels of sustainability, meaning, not only protecting natural resources,
but also achieving economic and social development.
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Jorge Antonio Pérez-Pineda, Johannes Blankenbach, and Archna Negi
The complexity of current global challenges necessitates innovative and strategic
solutions and, in particular, better models of governance. The twenty-first century
began with the launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), followed by
the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. This new set of
goals has evolved from a governmental approach to a multi-stakeholder approach,
introducing a comprehensive management framework for sustainable development
worldwide that goes much beyond the aid-centred focus of the past.
International institutions such as theUnitedNations (UN) and theOrganisation for
EconomicCo-operation andDevelopment (OECD) have extended support to govern-
ments and other actors in achieving development and sustainability goals through
various mechanisms and strategies. World summits such as Rio + 20 in 2012, the
First High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation in 2014 and the Third International Conference on Financing for Develop-
ment in 20151 made it clear that any effort towards economic growth and combating
poverty must be achieved with a commitment to environmental sustainability, human
rights, inclusion, transparency, accountability and coherence.
Inclusive economic growth, poverty reduction and sustainable development are
still considered to depend on “trade as an engine for development” (UNGA, 2015,
p. 37) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), despite the failure of the Doha
1The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) was agreed upon at this conference.
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Round and its other troubles, continues to be central to the trade agenda. In addi-
tion, we witness increasingly frequent interventions of the private sector in the global
development agenda (Severino & Ray, 2010, pp. 8–10). Despite the projected impor-
tance of trade for development, when companies from emerging economies and
developing countries enter the international markets, their products often face non-
tariff barriers (NTBs), which could include a range of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures (SPMs) as well as technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Mandatory sustain-
ability regulations as well as voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) may amount
to such barriers under certain circumstances. Trade statistics of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 17) reveal that TBTs
impact almost 70% ofworld trade, whereas SPMs impact around 10%ofworld trade.
VSS, unless referenced in mandatory regulation, are not formally categorised
as NTBs and therefore not covered by official trade rules. A market survey of the
International Trade Centre (ITC) for 14 leading VSS found that “all standards in the
report continue to show growth of total certified area, albeit not at the same pace
as in the past” (Lernoud et al., 2017, p. ii). In the light of such trends, while there
needs to be a better understanding of whether and how VSS could be used as a tool
to achieve the SDGs, the extent to which they constitue barriers to market entry
for emerging economies and developing countries and serve corporate opportunism,
also needs to be examined. Within these countries, marginalised regions and small-
scale producers seem to be at greatest risk of exclusion (UNFSS, 2016, p. 4). In
either case, there exists a clear need to comprehensively review current normative
and policy frameworks at the global level relating to sustainability standards and
regulations.
The first section of this volume—“Global Governance Frameworks for Sustain-
ability Standards”—introduced the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development as a
governance framework, against which to measure the performance of sustainability
standards. The 2030 Agenda, by guiding the design of sustainability regulations,
standards and corresponding impact assessments, can strengthen the link between
sustainable development and the use of sustainability standards and regulations. The
mutually reinforcing relationship between the SDGs and human rights is emphasised
in this context, as is the importance of implementing the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in order to operationalize corporate respect
for human rights across global operations and value chains: “[T]he implementation
of the UNGPs can be the single most important contribution by business to the reali-
sation of the SDGs” (Morris et al., 2019, p. 9). Even though theUNGPs recommend a
“smart mix” of voluntary and mandatory measures (OHCHR, 2011, p. 5), it remains
to be seen whether VSS can play a role in supporting human rights (and environ-
mental) due diligence—the key operational principle put forward by the UNGPs. A
matter of concern is that the kind of audits used for certification and verification of
VSS have not always proven reliable for detecting human rights and environmental
abuses. Also, due diligence is about companies internalising processes for human
rights and environmental risk assessment, mitigation action and monitoring across
their value chains, as well as corresponding reporting and remediation, rather than
outsourcing these steps. External VSS initiatives can at best support, but not replace,
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companies’ own due diligence policies and practices—and potentially legal obliga-
tion—to respect human rights and the environment across their global operations
and value chains.
Regarding other institutionalised frameworks, the WTO is of key importance
even though it does not cover private VSS (Henson, 2008, p. 76). It has gathered
vast experience in governing the use of SPS as well as technical regulations and
standards from public and international sources. Annex 4 of the Second Triennial
Review of the WTO’s TBT Agreement establishes criteria for international stan-
dards: “transparency”, “openness”, “impartiality and consensus”, “effectiveness and
relevance”, “coherence” and “development dimension” (WTO, 2000, p. 24). These
have also been taken up and extended by the International Social and Environmental
Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL), an umbrella organisation for private
standards schemes, notably in its “Credibility Principles” (ISEAL, 2013). Also, in
the context of trade, it appears that stagnation at the WTO has led to an increase in
bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which may constitute
a new framework of global governance and, as they become “greener”, provide a
conducive environment for sustainability standards and regulations.
Sustainability reporting, which is discussed as an instrument for sustainability
governance in this volume, has also found mention in several other publications that
have looked at global reporting as a “multi-stakeholder governance arrangement”
(Flohr, Rieth, Schwindenhammer, & Wolf, 2010, p. 219). Legitimacy seems to be
the key question here; in their analysis of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),
Flohr et al. (2010, p. 221) emphasise “the high legitimacy potential of a highly insti-
tutionalised and consensus based transnational multi-stakeholder initiative in which
corporations act as norm-entrepreneurs”. Haufler, as early on as 2001, argued that “all
sides view industry self-regulation as a potential new source of global governance”,
while highlighting that there is disagreement on “whether this is a legitimate and
effective means to achieve public policy goals” (Haufler, 2001, p. 1). Several factors
that hamper the legitimacy and effectiveness of industry-driven multi-stakeholder
initiatives are addressed in this volume, ranging from the lack of means of imple-
mentation to the formal or de facto exclusion of crucial local actors and rights-holders
from governance arrangements. When it comes to reporting in particular, it should
be noted that even where sustainability and/or human rights reporting is required
by mandatory national or regional regulation, governments are now being pushed to
move towards legally mandating certain types of company action rather than mere
reporting, as the latter has failed to drive real improvements in responsible business
conduct across industries. A briefing put forward by the Corporate Responsibility
(CORE) Coalition—and endorsed by many others—on the subject of the Modern
Slavery Act in the United Kingdom (UK) reads: “[T]he UK Government must now
look beyond reporting and introduce an additional legal requirement for companies
to carry out human rights due diligence (HRDD) in their global operations, activities,
products, services, investments and supply chains.” (CORE, 2019, p. 3).
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions are referred to as
concrete requirements in many sustainability standards and regulations, which
again underlines their close global governance link. The statistical finding in this
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volume that strengthening labour standards may in fact improve poorer countries’
export performance is an important argument in favour of both public and private
initiatives to effectively enforce and respect workers’ rights.
While the second part of this volume—titled “Sustainability Standards in Sectoral
and Country Contexts”—has a more local focus, implicit global governance link-
ages remain. The different challenges that are identified in this second part of the
volume regarding the national/local implementation of globally operating VSS and
their interplay with (local) mandatory regulations underline the need for further
research and clarity on the global governance aspects of sustainability standards in the
future. Challenges pertaining to sustainability standards take many different forms.
In some contexts, there seems to be a contradiction between socioeconomic bene-
fits for smallholders and large-scale environmental benefits such as reduced/halted
deforestation. Those farmers that can afford certification may even cause more envi-
ronmental damage by enlarging their cultivated area, which stands in contradiction
to the general purpose of VSS (and at the same time proves that VSS cannot prevent
over-production/consumption). The case of PEFC and FSC certification in Indonesia
shows that, at a formal level, private standards can complement local regulation well
if they comprise more detailed and far-reaching criteria than public stipulations. It
seems likely, however, that out of the twoVSS under review,more concession holders
may opt for PEFC as it is less stringent than FSC.
Comparing various types of global and national food safety and quality standards
for farmers, there is a challenge for emerging countries to comply with global stan-
dards, particularly in high-value supply chains both for foreign and local markets.
Due to the market power of large retailers and supermarket chains, they may, in a
purely commercial sense, become de facto mandatory and act as barriers to market
entry. There is also a critique that global VSS such as GlobalGAP seem to benefit
wealthier and more educated small-scale farmers, whereas local interpretations of
the same standardmay have broader coverage. However, local interpretations of VSS
may also lead to parallel standards (e.g. there are both public and private local GAP
versions in Thailand and India) resulting in high transaction costs without neces-
sarily leading to better sustainability outcomes. There is thus a case for standards
harmonisation among private and public actors at national levels. Public mandatory
sustainability standards (i.e. sustainability regulations) from individual or groups of
industrialised countries may have global implications, as the special case of vehicle
efficiency standards implementation in China and Mexico shows. However, aligning
emerging economies’ fuel efficiency norms with EURO VI (European Union) and
EPA 2010 (USA) does not always lead to the best results as there may be a mismatch
with the specific economic and sectoral conditions on the ground.
The two parts of this volume have sought to shed light on global governance and
sustainability standards from within and beyond the analytical mainstream. Not all
institutions and processes have got the attention they deserve in this context, such as
the UNTreaty process. Negotiations to develop a treaty on business and human rights
started in 2015 with the first meeting of the UNHuman Rights Council’s open-ended
intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business
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enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIWG).2 It has a mandate to elaborate an
international legally binding instrument, requiring companies to respect human rights
in their operations including value chains. While negotiations have been difficult so
far, this treaty has the potential to become an important global governance framework
for responsible business conduct in line with human rights and the SDGs.
Apart from the UNGPs, which have been mentioned above, the ILO Tripartite
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy
(ILO, 2017a) as well as the OECDGuidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD,
2011) also deserve attention. These sets of principles, guidelines and recommen-
dations all strive to promote responsible and sustainable business conduct and must
thus even be characterised as global public meta-standards, bridging the gap between
public and private actors in global governance. For instance, the ILOTripartiteDecla-
ration is “the only global instrument in this area that was elaborated and adopted by
governments, employers and workers from around the world” (ILO, 2017b). The
OECD Guidelines, first adopted in 1976, were updated in 2011 to incorporate the
UNGPs’ notion of human rights due diligence. A more recent OECD document, the
Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Business Conduct (OECD, 2018), spells
out the possible steps and design of human rights due diligence in greater detail. It
is likely to be “the most authoritative international elaboration of due diligence that
is likely to be available for many years” according to civil society network OECD
Watch (OECD Watch, 2018, p. 1).
Three of the above-mentioned guidelines are also highlighted in the Group of 20
(G20) Leaders’ Declaration adopted at the 2017 Hamburg Summit:
In order to achieve sustainable and inclusive supply chains, we commit to fostering the
implementation of labour, social and environmental standards and human rights in line with
internationally recognised frameworks, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy. Those countries that adhere to the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (OECDMNEGuidelines) commit to fostering them and welcome
others to follow. (G20, 2017, p. 4)
The Think 20 (T20), one of the G20’s outreach groups meant to provide policy
advice, suggests a “Global Pact for SustainableTrade” in its policy brief on “Fostering
the Sustainability of Global Value Chains (GVCs)”:
Our proposal is to bring this process of governmental regulations strategies to govern respon-
sibility in complex GVCs in different countries to the global stage, possibly with the partici-
pation of the major international institutions, government, business, especially SMEs [small
and medium-sized enterprises], and other non-state actors. This would take the form of a
Global Pact for Sustainable Trade, which would set minimum standards for environmental
protection as well as for labor conditions and human rights protection. (Blumenschein et al.,
2017, p. 7)
VSS are covered in the policy brief in the context of both opportunities and
challenges. For instance, the authors find that issues of “cost/benefit sharing yet have
2See the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s web portal and blog series on a “Binding
treaty” at https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty.
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to be overcomewithin and across voluntary standards systems” (Blumenschein et al.,
2017, p. 7).
Governments who, for often legitimate reasons, were sceptical of importing coun-
tries’ sustainability standards and regulations, dismissing them as (Western) protec-
tionism in disguise, seem to have becomemore open towards them, including private
VSS, which bear distinct risks, as some of the chapters discussed. The co-creation of
semi-governmental VSS platforms in India (March 2016), Brazil (May/June 2017),
China (June 2017) and Mexico (April 2018) for coordination, knowledge-sharing
and stakeholder support has been a strong signal that emerging economies, through
their national standards bodies, are ready to critically and constructively address
the issue of VSS. They are generally moving from being standards-takers to being
standards-makers. These platforms as well as other institutions looking into the issue
should now ensure proper worker and rights-holder engagement, and also explore
legislative options.
The new national VSS platforms were founded jointly with the UNFSS, an initia-
tive of five UN agencies born of the WTO’s initial inaction on private standards
(UNFSS, 2017; see also Sect. 2). Under UNFSS auspices andwith additional support
from the Managing Global Governance (MGG) programme of the German Devel-
opment Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), a global commu-
nity of experts and stakeholders has started to form, connecting national VSS plat-
forms and actors. Momentum for similar semi-governmental platforms—to address
potentials and pitfalls—is also building in South Africa and Indonesia.
There is an indication that sustainability standards, including VSS, are increas-
ingly engaging the attention of policy makers, companies and certification agen-
cies, while awareness of their limitations is also rising. Sustainability standards
generally, complemented bymulti-stakeholder structures for their national and global
governance, can potentially evolve into tools for the realisation of the 2030 Agenda,
but reinforced co-operation and, in part, legislation is required on issues of financing,
technical co-operation, impact evaluation, multi-stakeholder dialogue, worker voice,
as well as accountability and liability. The escalating proliferation of sustainability
standards and regulations has the potential to translate into asymmetric compliance
burdens for the developing and emerging economies, if simply passed down supply
chains, and an effective rationalisation is clearly the need of the hour, along with
an assessment of what really works best for workers, communities and the environ-
ment. Further, one of the main constraints for smallholders and SMEs in emerging
markets, independent of the sector, is the lack of financing for standards imple-
mentation, considering that cost-sharing arrangements are still very nascent. Several
options may be explored to bridge this gap, such as combining public and private
standards to reduce transaction costs or launching funding lines with multilateral
development banks and local financial institutions. For instance, “[e]mbedding stan-
dards compliance into the terms and conditions of lending contracts would facilitate
access to finance on the part of sustainability-oriented SMEs” (Sommer, 2017, p. 61).
It will need to be ensured, however, that this does not translate into excessive tech-
nical burdens for these SMEs in developing countries and emerging markets but
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truly supports them in addressing their human rights and environmental risks, while
maximizing positive impacts.
The implementation, especially of environmental standards, almost always
requires technical skills, appropriate equipment, knowledge of supply chain charac-
teristics and market data, etc. Again, development agencies, local governments and
international institutions such as ITC, UNFSS or UNCTAD could provide assistance,
complemented by South–South and triangular co-operation. In addition, private
enterprises and large-scale producers should offer support to small farmers, through
fair purchasing practices and proper supplier engagement, and possibly supported
by fundamentally reformed VSS schemes or national multi-stakeholder VSS plat-
forms. While this book has taken shape over the past years, mandatory human rights
due diligence and environmental legislation in line with the UNGPs has become a
tangible opportunity in European countries, at EU-level and other countries of the
world. The objective is to make sure companies’ respect for human rights and the
environment, including in their global value chains, is no longer an externalized and
voluntary option, but an internalized and legal requirement.
There is still a lack of evidence-based assessment of the real impacts of VSS
across different sectors and countries. At first sight, it seems obvious that the adop-
tion of standards can potentially have positive impacts on the environment, on society
and on the economy. However, as some of the chapters in this volume show, there
may be trade-offs and contradictions. It is therefore necessary to collect, compare
and analyse more data on the benefits and pitfalls of VSS, shedding light on crit-
ical issues such as possible market exclusions at the microlevel and macrolevel, as
well as (social) audit failure and lack of accountability. In terms of processes and
resources, sustainability standards impact assessment seek synergies with national
SDG monitoring and evaluation, for instance, by using joint indicators and data.
There aremany concerns at all levels regarding the legitimacy, fairness, quality and
effectiveness of multi-stakeholder dialogues, e.g. for the setting or implementation
of standards. Power asymmetries are often visible, and some brands and companies
may use these initiatives to ‘free-ride’ on leading practice by others while actu-
ally not changing much in the way they do business. Local chambers of commerce,
national standards bodies and international organisations should seek to establish
mechanisms for better assurance and against unnecessary proliferation, duplication
or overlap of standards as thismay imply an extra burden ofwork and extra costs espe-
cially for small-scale producers,without necessarily improvingdevelopmental, social
and environmental outcomes. Coordination tasks may also be undertaken by public–
private VSS platforms in more countries under the auspices of the UNFSS. Some
of the necessary resources could be channelled through South–South co-operation.
UNFSS-facilitated exchange across existing and future platforms may improve the
interplay of globally operating private VSS with public VSS and mandatory public
regulations in different countries, maximising their contribution to SDG implemen-
tation. A network of sustainability standards platforms could also promote public
support mechanisms at the national, regional and global scale for smaller producers
seeking to implement sustainability standards and practices. And last but not the
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least, such a network may evolve into a “Southern” building block for global multi-
stakeholder governanceof sustainability standards, includingVSS, basedon common
guidelines, rules and “standards for standards”.
In the end, it must be remembered that the issue of standards and regulations is
not simply a technical issue that can be planned and operationalised in an objective,
scientific and neutral way to bring out the optimal results as planned. Standards, in
their entire lifecycle—from the moment of conception till the time of operationali-
sation—are defined by the political and economic environment in which they exist.
There are power asymmetries—between the rich and the poor countries, between
the large and the small firms, between the large-scale farmers or foresters and the
smallholders, between employers and formal or informal workers, and between the
cause of growth and that of social and environmental protections—that define the
terms of the debate around standards. There are dynamic interfaces—between the
public and the private, between states and intergovernmental organisations, between
the government and the non-governmental sector and among the host of standard-
isation agencies—that keep this issue area in a continuous state of flux. Addition-
ally, definitional ambiguity, normative uncertainty and ideational divergences further
complicate an already complex canvas. The use of standards as a tool and driver of
global governance for sustainable development is commended as well as contested.
There is much scope for further research in this issue area and this book, it is hoped,
represents an early milestone in a long exploratory journey ahead.
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